In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

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S E C R E T PARIS Ø1426

E.O. 12Ø65: GDS 1/I5/85 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-P
TAGS: PFOR, US, UR, IR, FR
SUBJECT: SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATION

REF: STATE 1Ø289

(S - ENTIRE TEXT) MFA DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST/ NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS LECOMPT ONFIRMEDOTO US JANUARY 15 THAT A SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL OF COUNSELOR RANK HAD REFERRED TO THE 1981 USSR-IRAN TREATY IN A CONVERSATION WITH A MFA OFFICIAL ABOUT 3 WEEKS AGO. LECOMPT SAID THE REFERENCE MADE IN THE COURSE OF A CONVERSATION AND WAS NOT TAKEN BY THE MFA AS A DE-MARCHE. THE SOVIET COUNSELIR REFERRED TO THE TREATY, SAID IT WAS STILL OPERATIVE, AND ADDED THAT IT PERMITTED THE USSR TO INTERVENE IN IRAN IN THE EVENT OF INTERVENTION BY AN OUTSIDE FORCE. TO LECOMPT'S KNOWLEDGE, THE SOVIETS HAVE MENTIONED THE TREATY TO THE FRENCH JUST THIS ONCE. LECOMPT DID NOT TAKE THE REFERENCE AS A THREAT, SINCE HE SAW NO REASON WHY THE SOVIETS WOULD THREATEN THE FRENCH ON THIS SUBJECT.
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NNNNVV ESA926BRA388 **ACTION**

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E.O. 12065: GDS 2/1/89 (CLEMENT, CARL)

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH SOVIETS ON IRAN

1. SOVIET EMBASSY THIRD SECRETARY, MAGOMED OSMANOV, AT HIS REQUEST AGAIN CALLED ON NEA/IRN OFFICER FEBRUARY 1 TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON SITUATION IN IRAN. DEPOFF DECLINED OSMANOV'S REQUEST TO SPECULATE ON POSSIBLE HYPOTHETICAL OUTCOMES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IN IRAN. HE EXPLAINED TO OSMANOV THAT THE U.S., WITHOUT INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN, HAD TRIED TO ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES INVOLVED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF IRAN THROUGH DELIBERATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN IN THE STREETS. DEPOFF ADDED THAT U.S. HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO IMPRESS UPON ALL PARTIES THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT AND AVOIDANCE OF PROVOCATIONS SO THAT SOLUTIONS COULD BE SOUGHT THROUGH A LEGAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE.

2. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION CONCERNING APPARENT SOVIET MEDIA TILT IN FAVOR OF KHOMEINI, OSMANOV MAINTAINED THAT SOVIET MEDIA WAS NOW BEING MORE "OBJECTIVE" IN ITS TREATMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN. HE SAID THAT SOVIETS HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT KHOMEINI REPRESENTS "PROGRESSIVE" TENDENCIES, ON THE BASIS OF HIS OVERWHELMING

SUPPORT AMONG THE PEOPLE OF IRAN. OSMANOV ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE USSR WAS ATTEMPTING TO STEER A "NEUTRAL" COURSE VIS-A-VIS KHOMEINI, ABOUT WHOM THE SOVIETS STILL HAD MANY DOUBTS AND RESERVATIONS. THE SOVIETS WERE HOPEFUL THAT ONCE KHOMEINI WAS EXPOSED TO THE THINKING OF HIS TOP FOLLOWERS AND RELATIVES IN IRAN, HE WOULD MODERATE SOME OF HIS VIEWS AND POSITIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN AND ARE FEARFUL THAT THE SITUATION COULD TURN INTO ARMED STRUGGLE OR CIVIL WAR. DESPITE THEIR CONCERN, WHICH OSMANOV LABELED AS "LEGITIMATE," GIVEN THE FACT THAT IRAN BORDERS ON THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOVIETS DO NOT FEEL THAT THEY HAVE ANY OTHER CHOICE BUT TO WAIT AND OBSERVE DEVELOPMENTS. OSMANOV VOLUNTEERED THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO CONSIDER THAT THE U.S. HAS IMPORTANT LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN IRAN.

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3. OSMANOV RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT PRESENT SITUATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE LISTENING DEVICES IN IRAN AND NEXT POSSIBLE LOCATION FOR THEM. DEPOFF PROFESSED IGNORANCE CONCERNING BOTH SUBJECTS. OSMANOV THEN SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THESE FACILITIES SHOULD BE MOVED TO THE SOVIET UNION. WHEN DEPOFF TOLD HIM THAT WHILE HE WAS NO EXPERT ON SUCH MATTERS, SUGGESTION MIGHT WELL HAVE SOME MERIT, OSMANOV QUICKLY SAID THAT HE HAD ONLY BEEN JOKING.

4. DEPOFF TOLD OSMANOV THAT WHILE USG CONCERN OVER SOVIET MEDIA ATTACKS AGAINST US ROLE IN IRAN HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF SOVIETS AT HIGH LEVELS, HE ALSO WANTED TO UNDERSCORE POSSIBLY DANGEROUS NEGATIVE EFFECT ON SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN IRAN OF SUCH ATTACKS. OSMANOV CLAIMED TO APPRECIATE OUR CONCERN IN THIS REGARD AND PROMISED TO CONVEY SAME TO HIS SUPERIORS. HE SAID THAT ALL SOVIET DEPENDENTS HAD BEEN EVACUATED, MOST SOVIET ADVISORS OF VARIOUS KINDS HAD LEFT IRAN, AND THE SOVIET OFFICIAL FAMILY IN IRAN HAD BEEN REDUCED.

5. DEPOFF REITERATED TO OSMANOV THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING THE POLICIES AND ACTIONS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. CONTINUING CONTACT AND AIRING OF POSSIBLE CONCERNS WAS THEREFORE IN INTEREST OF BOTH. OSMANOV AGREED AND ASKED THAT CONTACT BE MAINTAINED. VANCE
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CONFIDENTIAL

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POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
NONE
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 (20 YEARS) (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, IR, UR
SUBJ: THREATENING LETTER OF PROBABLE SOVIET INSTIGATION

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON APRIL 8 POL COUNSELOR RECEIVED LETTER CONTAINING NEATLY PRINTED WARNING ABOUT CHINESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP AND "SEVERE PUNISHMENTS" TO BE METED OUT EVEN-HANDEDLY TO "AMERICAN AGGRESSORS" AND "CHINESE AGGRESSORS." THE LETTER HAD A BLACK BORDER AROUND IT CARRYING SOME THREE DOZEN WORLD CAPITALS, IN EUROPE, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA, AND WAS HEADED BY THE PURPORTED NAME OF THE THREATENING ORGANIZATION: THE "SECRET TRANS-WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR PUNISHMENT." THE LETTER CAME ADDRESSED TO POL COUNSELOR BY NAME (NOT POSITION) FROM VIENNA. IT WAS MAILED THERE MARCH 6 AND RECEIVED BY POST OFFICE HERE APRIL 6.

3. SINCE CHINESE RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. IS OF NOT THE SLIGHTEST INTEREST TO ANY IRANIAN TERRORIST GROUPS, THE LETTER CAN ONLY BE OF SOVIET INSPIRATION. IT HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS FOR MORE SPECIFIC INVESTIGATION. THE FACT THAT IT WAS ADDRESSED BY NAME TO POL COUNSELOR HERE, AMONG OTHERS, RAISES MORE GENERAL QUESTION AS TO WHETHER LOCAL SOVIET EMB IN TEHRAN HAS NOT BEEN ORCHESTRATING, OR CONTRIBUTING TO, SELECTIVE ANTI-AMERICAN INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN OVER SOME TIME--TO GO WITH ITS ATTEMPTED INTIMIDATION OF OTHERS, REPORTED SEPARATELY. NAAS##

BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT Rreleasable TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

(U) EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS: TRENDS, PRESSURES, PROSPECTS

Summary

(U) Moscow's movement toward substantial compliance with the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act raises the question of the effect that repeal of the amendment would have on Soviet emigration policy. For the past seven months, Soviet authorities have maintained Jewish emigration at the rate of about 4,000 per month, giving a projected total for 1979 of about 48,000. This compares with about 17,000 for 1977, 30,000 for 1978, and 34,000 for 1973, the top emigration year thus far.

(C) The outlook appears good for emigration to continue at a relatively high level through 1980. Repeal of the amendment would not be likely to have an adverse effect during this period.

(U) This judgment is based on the following considerations:

The initial Soviet decision to permit Jewish emigration was triggered by internal pressures. In the mid-1960's, Soviet Jews experienced a strong revival of their sense of identity; the movement for the right to emigrate rapidly gained momentum.

Foreign policy considerations also became an important factor, however, when the US treated emigration as a condition in negotiating "detente" issues. In manipulating emigration rates--first raising them in an attempt to prevent passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and then slashing them in retaliation for the amendment's passage--Soviet leaders discovered that the emigration issue affected the entire relationship with the

US and could not be keyed solely to the amendment. After the cut in emigration in 1974-75, foreign policy considerations as well as domestic pressures forced Moscow to start bringing emigration rates back up again.

Soviet authorities, in considering their emigration policy, balance the advantages and the costs of allowing emigration to go up:

--The number of Soviet Jews applying to emigrate increased sharply in late 1978 and shows no sign of falling off.

--Keeping emigration steady--even at current increased rates--would create a large backlog of applicants. Such individuals become alienated from the system and cause other Jews to become disaffected.

Yet, allowing emigration to keep pace with applications would also create difficult problems:

--The party and government bureaucracy continues to resist emigration as an embarrassing reflection on the Soviet system.

--The loss of a skilled group from the labor force comes at a time of acuté and growing manpower shortages in the European areas of the USSR.

--Increased Jewish emigration could trigger greater demands from other ethnic and religious groups for the right to emigrate.

--Although most Soviet Jews still prefer to remain in the USSR as Soviet citizens, rising emigration could generate heavy pressure ultimately for a more substantial Jewish exodus.

In their handling of anti-Semitism, Soviet authorities are self-defeating. They use it to express hostility toward emigrating Jews, yet they know that it only increases emigration pressures.

Thus, Soviet leaders have cogent reasons for exercising caution in managing their emigration policy. The present emigration rate appears to reflect their determination of the level that balances external and internal considerations.

(C) An increasingly prominent role in the debate on Soviet emigration policy and the effect of the Jackson-Vanik amendment has been assumed by prominent members of the Soviet refusenik community (i.e., Soviet Jews who have been refused permission to emigrate). They regard the amendment as the most effective single measure responsible for forcing the USSR to increase emigration rates, and they strenuously oppose its repeal. Yet, as emigration has gone up and become a touchstone of the US-Soviet relationship, their arguments have lost validity. Soviet authorities would hardly respond to the amendment's repeal by cutting emigration--an action Moscow probably regards as likely to provoke American retaliation.

* * * * * * *

(U) The rate of Jewish emigration from the USSR rose sharply from 17,000 in 1977 to about 30,000 in 1978. By projecting the monthly rates of late 1978 and early 1979, 1979 promises to be the biggest emigration year yet, possibly reaching 50,000. By comparison, some 34,800 Jews left the USSR in 1973, the highest annual number thus far.

(C) The outlook seems good for emigration to continue at relatively high rates through 1980. The pressures on Soviet authorities to maintain emigration at a substantial level appear to be compelling in the context of both domestic and foreign policy considerations, although some fluctuation is likely.

Why Emigration? Causes and Correlations

(U) The initial Soviet decision to permit Jewish emigration resulted from domestic pressures. In the 1960's, Soviet Jews--perhaps the most assimilated of all Soviet minorities--experienced a revival of their sense of Jewish identity as a result of several factors: the magnetic pull of Israel; the liberalization of the post-Stalin period; and the continuing evidence of anti-Semitism in Soviet policies and popular attitudes. In the late sixties, Soviet authorities began to give way to the growing efforts of Soviet Jews to secure the right to emigrate.

(U) Foreign policy considerations quickly assumed an important role when, in the early 1970's, Moscow began its pursuit of detente and discovered that US public opinion--especially as reflected by the Congress--regarded emigration as a condition in negotiating detente issues. By contrast, Soviet authorities showed little concern over Arab objections to the flow of Soviet Jews to Israel.

(C) From their experience with the Jackson-Vanik amendment, Soviet leaders learned that disregard of the emigration-detente linkage could jeopardize important Soviet interests and adversely affect the bilateral relationship. Moreover, the manipulation of emigration rates, first as an inducement and then as retaliation, demonstrated the inability of Moscow to sustain its position and the ineffectiveness of using emigration as a weapon in the context of a single bilateral issue. After emigration dropped precipi-

tously in 1974-75, other compelling pressures quickly forced Moscow to reverse itself and to start pushing emigration rates back up.

(U) After the low point in 1975, emigration increased somewhat in 1976, gathered speed in 1977, and almost doubled in 1978. The considerations that influenced Soviet emigration policy during these three years, and their relative weights, cannot be determined precisely. But the correlation between some internal and external developments and the rates of emigration is highly suggestive.

(U) At first, when the level of emigration began to rise in 1976 and 1977 from the low point of 1975, monthly rates went up and down erratically. Only after August 1977 did the monthly rates begin a fairly steady upward climb. The CSCE review conference opened in Belgrade in October 1977.

(U) When the Belgrade conference adjourned in March 1978, there was no break in the upward spiral of emigration, as might have been the case if Moscow had been motivated solely by a desire to impress the conference favorably. As a result, emigration reached about 30,000 in 1978, making it the best year since 1973.

(U) The correlation between the Belgrade conference and the intensity of Soviet repression of organized dissent reveals a different pattern. The start of the conference also marked the occasion when Soviet authorities eased up on the campaign against dissent which they had initiated in late 1976. The remission lasted only for the conference period. Literally the day after the conference closed, the campaign resumed with full force. The contrast with emigration trends was most obvious in the summer of 1978, when emigration increased steadily even as the highly publicized trials of major human rights activists were taking place.

(U) Thus, it is apparent that Soviet authorities compartmentalized their emigration policy and their repression of dissent, applying to each a different standard of measure.

Linkage Between Detente, Emigration, and Dissent

(C) When US-Soviet bilateral relations began to deteriorate as a result of the USSR's involvement in Africa, human rights, and other issues, Soviet concern mounted that US disillusionment with detente could jeopardize SALT and push Washington toward closer relations with China.

(C) These pressures, already perceptible in 1975, began to build rapidly during 1976 and 1977. Soviet officials, who had retaliated against the Jackson-Vanik amendment by slashing emigration, discovered that their action was not serving larger Soviet interests. Because any sudden return to high emigration rates would appear to be an admission of failure, the Soviets obscured their backtracking by erratic ups and downs in monthly emigration rates during 1976 and early 1977.* Then the Belgrade conference provided an occasion for a steady upward trend. By the time the conference ended, detente concerns had mounted to such a level that Moscow evidently concluded that the situation called for more emigration, rather than less.

(U) If emigration was an issue on which Soviet leaders could make substantial concessions, organized political dissent was not. Despite its modest (to Western eyes, almost insignificant) scale, Soviet authorities treat such dissent as though it were an immediate threat to their monopoly of power. That the US made human rights, like Jewish emigration, a factor in US policy toward the USSR, presented a particularly delicate problem for the Soviet leaders. Unwilling to make any significant changes in attitude or policy, they resorted to essentially cosmetic devices:

--temporary tactical adjustments (as during the Belgrade conference);

--propaganda counterattacks (portraying the USSR as a defender of human rights, and the US as their violator);

--appeals to larger joint interests (in portraying US policy on human rights as jeopardizing the detente relationship); and

* The possibility that these fluctuations reflected a random pattern of monthly compilations of applications processed by various regional emigration offices (OVIR's) is unlikely. Given the Soviet sensitivity on emigration policy, month and annual rates are not likely to be left to chance. They probably are managed by the assignment of quotas to regional OVIR's. OVIR is the Soviet acronym for the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' Department of Visas and Registrations, the agency responsible for emigration matters.

--carefully calculated gestures (i.e., giving severe, but less-than-maximum sentences to convicted dissidents or responding to US approaches by allowing an occasional dissident or refusenik to emigrate).

(U) The policy of treating Jewish emigration and domestic dissent as separate problems was never more apparent than during 1978, especially during the series of major dissident trials that spring and summer. These trials* aroused widespread indignation in the US and Western Europe. The fact that some of the accused were Jews raised the likelihood that charges of anti-Semitism would inflame foreign reaction even further, damaging Moscow's image and interests abroad. But by maintaining Jewish emigration rates at a high level and even increasing them during the trials, the Soviets muted the issue. Emigration rates after conclusion of the trials did not drop--they continued to climb, indicating that the propaganda advantage that they provided during the trials was a byproduct of a policy keyed to other considerations.

Internal Pressures

(U) There is little doubt that beginning in late 1977, Soviet Jews began to apply for emigration in increasing numbers:

--the period of the Belgrade conference (October 1977-March 1978) was regarded by many Jews as a favorable time for emigration;

--as word spread that emigration rates were high and rising, many hitherto hesitant Jews were encouraged to apply;

--the political trials of 1978, the strident official campaign against "Zionism," and the blatantly anti-Semitic overtones of official policies in hiring and education probably convinced many Soviet Jews that they had no future in the USSR;

* They included such highly publicized cases as those of Yuriy Orlov (Moscow Helsinki Group), Zviad Gamsakhurdia (Georgian Helsinki Group), Anatoliy Shcharanskiy (Jewish refusenik and member of Moscow Helsinki Group), Aleksandr Ginzburg (Moscow Helsinki Group and Solzhenitsyn Fund administrator), Aleksandr Podrabinek (psychiatric abuses monitoring group), and many lesser known figures.

--the final negotiations on SALT II were regarded by Soviet Jews as a factor contributing to official leniency in passing on emigration applications.

(U) In any case, reports from many cities described long lines of applicants and hectic scenes at OVIR offices. The authorities responded to the pressure of applications by modernizing OVIR offices in some cities and opening new ones to handle the increased load.

(U) But if the Soviet authorities determine the rate of emigration primarily for its effect on other policy considerations, how, then, is the rate at which exit visas are issued affected by fluctuations in the rate of applications?

(U) Obviously, the considerations guiding Soviet Jews in deciding whether to emigrate or not, and in selecting the most propitious moment for applying, are not the same as those the authorities take into account in deciding whether to increase or lower emigration during a given period. The prospective applicant tries to second-guess the intentions of the authorities; he is also influenced by recent emigration trends and by his own political prognosis.

(U) The authorities can raise or lower emigration within a range limited at the high end by the current rate of applications and OVIR's administrative capacity for processing them. In practice, emigration rates can be manipulated by:

--interfering with the delivery of vyzovs (invitations) by the Soviet mails;

--making the process of applying as lengthy and difficult as possible;

--intimidating potential applicants with the possible consequences of their action; and

--controlling, as needed, the rejection rate of applications.

(U) In issuing exit permits, Soviet authorities clearly give priority to less educated Jews, especially those living in traditional areas of Jewish settlement. The vast majority of applicants who currently receive exit visas are Jews from the western and southern Ukraine, Georgia, and Central Asia. Better educated, urban Jews from the Moscow and Leningrad areas have not been receiving exit permission in like numbers.

(U) A sharp increase in the rate of applications confronts the authorities with a dilemma. Some spokesmen of the Soviet Jewish community argue that the authorities can hold down the number of applications by various extralegal methods, but only up to a point: OVIR's cannot prevent a huge rush of applications without resorting to drastic measures. Spokesmen also argue that the authorities would face an awkward situation if they allowed an excessive gap to develop between the emigration rate and an increasing backlog of applicants.

(U) The decision to apply for emigration is, for a Soviet citizen, a point of no return: a psychological breaking point at which passive disaffection becomes an overt act of rejection of the Soviet system. The authorities view him as an outcast, a troublemaker, and a poor prospect for reintegration into socialist society. Allowing a large, vocal, and disaffected group of such citizens to form would:

--spread alienation wider;

--tend to revive a sense of Jewish identity among Jews who otherwise would have remained assimilated Soviet citizens without any compelling urge to emigrate; and

--inevitably encourage anti-Semitism and thus contribute to a new spiral of emigration pressures.

(C) As one example of the kind of predicament that the authorities face, refuseniks report that loss of job is now somewhat less common in Moscow for those who apply to emigrate. Moscow city boss Grishin reportedly instructed local party officials not to fire Jews who applied for emigration unless their jobs were sensitive. The reason? They would spread the contagion by finding jobs elsewhere.

(U) Thus, the authorities must balance the advantages and the costs of allowing emigration to go up.

(U) Refuseniks represent a special problem. These are Jews who were refused permission to emigrate on grounds of state security, who incurred official displeasure for other reasons, or who simply became victims of the vagaries of Soviet bureaucracy. The hard core is a fairly small group of perhaps a thousand urban professionals, including scientists and scholars.

(U) The frequent examples of animosity and even vindictiveness with which authorities treat refuseniks emphase the

status of refuseniks as scapegoats upon whom the system vents its wrath.

--They serve as an object lesson intended to intimidate and deter other highly trained, well-educated Jews from applying to emigrate.

--They can also be displayed as evidence that the USSR does not respond to foreign pressure in exercising its sovereign right to set and enforce migration standards.

(U) At the same time, refuseniks perform a vital role within the Jewish community by:

--providing leadership;

--developing the intellectual resources and initiatives for the revival of Jewish cultural identity among Soviet Jews;

--functioning as an informal but highly effective organization for disseminating information and furthering Jewish interests within the Soviet Union and abroad.

Many refuseniks have demonstrated their effectiveness by receiving unexpected exit permits or imprisonment in remote labor camps.

The "Sin" of Emigration

(U) The very notion of emigration goes against the instincts of Soviet officials. Even when the emigration flow became a fact of life, the OVIR bureaucracy tended to function sluggishly. The numerous traps built into the emigration process for the unwary applicant were in part designed to allow various institutional interests to exercise a veto on individual applicants. But they also reflected a generalized establishmentarian hostility toward anyone wishing to opt out of socialism. Also galling to Soviet officialdom was the fact that Jews, in being allowed to go abroad, received a right enjoyed by no other group in the Soviet Union.

(U) Emigration is prima facie evidence that thousands of Soviet citizens find Soviet life to be considerably less than the paradise it is advertised to be. Consequently, the desire to emigrate is viewed as disloyalty. The requirement, for instance, that emigration applications must be

supported by numerous documents and affidavits (the notorious spravki) means that the applicant finds himself at the mercy of self-important but fearful functionaries. The latter often shrink from the responsibility of issuing a document, however innocuous, which could serve as evidence that they had assisted an ideological renegade.

(C) Such attitudes within the bureaucracy may constrict the processing of emigration applications even to the point of frustrating the intentions of higher officials. Observers have noted, for example, that some OVIR's (usually in areas of prevalent anti-Semitism) are notorious for their high rejection rates of emigration applications, while others, such as those in the Baltic states, enjoy a reputation of relative liberality.

(C) If variations reflecting attitudes of local officials appear inconsistent with centralized control exercised through directives and the imposition of quotas, they are quite consistent with the larger realities of Soviet life. In the Soviet Union, the techniques of the bureaucracy for thwarting unwelcome policies are usually a step ahead of the techniques used by policymakers for enforcing compliance. Officials of regional OVIR's are probably as adept in evading directives from the center as managers of Soviet economic enterprises are in manipulating planned production goals.

(C) Indeed, it is likely that senior officials monitor the implementation of their emigration policy closely not only for its effect on foreign policy considerations, but also because they know that it conflicts with the values and operational style of the Soviet system and might grind to a halt if not pushed.

Soviet Jews as Lobbyists and Tacticians

(U) Leading members of the Soviet Jewish community have become accustomed to having US officials, Members of Congress, scientists, and other prominent Americans call on them during visits to Moscow. They also maintain close contacts with representatives of the American Jewish community and have access to US journalists and diplomats in Moscow. Thus they not only are well-informed on the role of Jewish issues in US domestic politics but seek to influence US policy by presenting their views to policymakers and public opinion. These views occasionally take the form of written statements drafted after lengthy discussion and signed by prominent members of the refusenik community.

(C) For years, Soviet refuseniks were solidly united in support of the Jackson-Vanik amendment as the most effective single measure responsible for forcing the USSR to permit Jewish emigration. The possibility that Congress may soon consider modification or repeal of the amendment has aroused their deep concern. In a letter of February 11, 1979, 68 prominent Soviet refuseniks appealed to Congress not to repeal the amendment, arguing that it is "the only legislative enactment which, to some extent at least, acts as an obstacle to the unbridled tyranny of the Soviet authorities in their emigration policies."

(U) Yet, as emigration rates have gone up, the intellectual rationale for this position has eroded. On the one hand, refuseniks explain recent increases in emigration as a result of increased applications, which, they argue, the authorities can hold down but cannot control. Yet their defense of the Jackson-Vanik amendment rests on the premise that the authorities can increase or decrease emigration at will.

(U) The contradiction was acknowledged, but not resolved in the letter of February 11:

> "During the discussions of the Amendment and its acceptance, there was both an increase and a reduction in the number of exit permits granted, as well as a lessening and a hardening of the repressive acts. But we who have been living in this country all our lives, and who for many years have been feeling on our backs every change in the political wind of the leaders of this country, are deeply convinced that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment has played, is playing, and we hope will continue to play, a great significant and positive role in restraining the Soviet authorities from committing the severest of repressive acts."

(U) The refusenik argument thus comes down to an unprovable negative--that while the Jackson-Vanik amendment may not have improved the situation, it has kept it from getting worse. Many Soviet Jews argue that repeal of the amendment would result in a drastic cut in Jewish emigration--that having achieved their goal, Soviet leaders presumably would no longer feel any compelling need for keeping emigration at a substantial level. The logic of this reasoning is open to question. Moscow is not likely to respond to a US concession by taking an action it would regard as likely to cause US retaliation.

(U) The controversy over the amendment has deeply divided the refusenik community. Some refuseniks did not sign the letter of February 11 because they considered its lecturing tone inappropriate to be addressed to the US Congress; others maintain that concern over emigration should be rooted in international law and agreements rather than in legislation affecting bilateral relations.

(U) In any case, the fact that spokesmen for the Soviet Jewish community have abandoned the emigration rate as the main criterion for judging Soviet performance has had the effect of shifting their focus to emigration procedures. In a letter of January 29, 1979, to President Carter, the US Congress, and "all people of goodwill," veteran refusenik and Georgian Helsinki Group member Isai Goldman argued that:

> "The main criterion of an easing of emigration policy and procedure should not be the actual number of exit permits issued, but the calling of a halt to the arbitrary and tyrannical method of issuing of permission and an end to the harassment of those who apply to leave."

(U) The procedural reforms demanded by refuseniks generally include the following:

--an appeal procedure for exit visa refusals which involves institutions other than the one that initially gave the refusal;

--published laws and regulations covering all aspects of the emigration process;

--establishment of categories of refusals on security grounds, with fixed terms for duration of refusal in each category;

--assignment of military draftees who have applied to emigrate to positions unconnected with classified information, to remove a potential ground for later exit visa refusal.

(U) The current emphasis on procedural reforms is understandably of paramount importance to refuseniks, who are, after all, victims of arbitrariness. Constant pressure and publicity may, in time, succeed in alleviating some of the more flagrant abuses in Soviet emigration procedures. Attainment of reform, however, will be difficult because arbitrariness is deeply ingrained in the Soviet system. Its elimination, even in one sector of the system, in effect requires the regime to reform itself.

(U) At this point, Soviet Jews arrive at a tactical crossroads where their interests merge with those of the Soviet human rights activists. Relations between the two groups have generally been cordial and mutually supportive, although their tactics have often differed because of a basic difference in their goals: one group seeks to change the Soviet system; the other seeks to escape it. This problem has long been debated by Jewish activists, some of whom advocate joint action with the human rights activists while others favor keeping human rights activists at arm's length so as not to antagonize Soviet authorities unnecessarily. Some Jewish refuseniks--such as Shcharanskiy, a member of the Moscow Helsinki Group--regard themselves as members of both groups. Other prominent Soviet Jews feel that leading refuseniks have devoted too much attention to problems of emigration and have neglected the interests of Jews who prefer to remain in the USSR provided they can exercise their rights as Soviet citizens in expressing and preserving group identity.

(U) Some refuseniks have also become increasingly skeptical of the long-term value of having Western leaders make extraordinary efforts on behalf of specific individuals or lists of specific individuals. Such efforts, in their view, do nothing to lessen the essential arbitrariness of Soviet decisionmaking or to improve the general situation of refuseniks and potential emigrants. By responding to Western pressure in specific cases, Soviet authorities continue, in effect, a policy of toying with the lives of individual applicants.

(LOU) Soviet authorities do not welcome outside intercession on behalf of individual dissidents, whether in the form of public pressure accompanied by publicity or through quiet bilateral approaches. But if faced by a choice between the two they find the latter far less objectionable: they are aware that an occasional favorable action on a request by an important visitor can improve their image. By subtly encouraging foreign officials to believe in the greater effectiveness of quiet diplomacy, Soviet leaders can also hope to avoid public campaigns, which they find highly embarrassing and difficult to withstand.

How Much Longer?

(U) During periods of decline in the emigration rate, Soviet media often cited the drop as evidence that most Jews who wanted to leave had done so and that the pool of applicants was getting smaller. Such assertions invariably

aroused apprehensions among Jews that the authorities might terminate emigration by gradually reducing the rate while claiming that it was dwindling for lack of applicants. Rumors during 1978 that emigration would end as of January 1, 1979, contributed to the surge of applicants in late 1978 without any apparent effect on application pressure in early 1979. For the moment, there is no sign that Soviet leaders are contemplating such an action.

(C) Current concern that emigration will somehow be affected by the 1980 Soviet Olympic Games is not supported by evidence. The strain on transportation and other facilities may, of course, prove to be a factor. There is, however, some indication that authorities may act to clear Moscow and other Olympic sites of Jewish activists and other dissidents for the duration of the games.

(U) Some 175,000-180,000 Jews have emigrated from the Soviet Union since the Soviet census of 1970, which reported a Jewish population of 2.1 million. Results of the census completed in January 1979 are not yet available. According to one estimate, the number of Soviet Jews may show a decline to about 1.9 million. The figure cannot be predicted with assurance, however, because it will reflect not only the effect of emigration but also possible changes in national identification by respondents in census declarations. What proportion of the total may be regarded as potential emigres is a question of interest not only to Western observers and Israeli authorities, but undoubtedly to Soviet authorities as well.

(U) In any case, the force of the emigration wave has not yet been spent; indeed, it appears to be still gathering strength. As families leave and become established abroad, they persuade their relatives and friends to apply. Fears and uncertainties among Soviet Jews as to what they can expect after emigrating are visibly receding as information filters back into the Soviet Union about life and opportunities in the West.

(U) The number of Jews who have no interest in emigrating and who would prefer to remain in the Soviet Union as Soviet citizens--provided they can live and work there without penalty or discrimination--is still very large. Their future attitudes will be shaped primarily by their personal experiences and their perception of current trends--especially their assessment of whether the resentment generated in the USSR against Jews as a result of their desire to emigrate will recede or, on the contrary, gather in

strength. Judging by past performance, the authorities are far more likely to add to the spiral of emigration pressures than to diminish them.

The Dilemma of Anti-Semitism

(U) The attitude of Soviet authorities toward Jews is without question a complex one, full of ambiguities and contradictions. Virtually all problems are exacerbated by the constant factor of anti-Semitism.

(U) It is useful to distinguish between two varieties of Soviet anti-Semitism, although the line between them is not sharp and often disappears. The first type is purveyed by the authorities and reflects their ideological dislike of "Zionism" and hostility toward Jews who wish to emigrate. These attitudes inevitably lead to suspicion of and discrimination against all Jews and in practice are indistinguishable from the second type of anti-Semitism, which is of the endemic, popular variety. Official actions often exploit or reflect popular anti-Semitic attitudes either in a calculated way or simply because individual officials express their personal anti-Semitism in their official actions. At the same time, the authorities are wary of popular anti-Semitism and its explosive potential, as they are of any spontaneous expression of popular attitudes.

(U) Soviet officials must also observe certain proprieties since Soviet law forbids any expression of national or racial hostility. Overt anti-Semitism, moreover, would arouse indignation abroad and damage the Soviet image. The government carefully maintains the pretense that Soviet Jews have every right and opportunity to develop their national culture, and it ostentatiously displays evidence about the flourishing state of Jewish culture for foreign and domestic consumption.

(U) In practice, the authorities constantly face the dilemma of their actions and attitudes producing results diametrically opposite from the ones they seek.

(U) The government clearly hopes to reduce emigration to the lowest possible level by persuading Jews that life in the USSR is better than their prospects abroad. The methods of persuasion it employs, however, are the counterproductive ones of crude propaganda, intimidation, and threat. As a result, Soviet leaders confront the possibility of a massive Jewish exodus.

(U) Despite its counterproductive actions, the government has cogent reasons for seeking to avoid an exodus:

--Based on percentage of total population, Soviet Jews have made a disproportionately important contribution to the culture, science, and economy of the USSR; their talents are widely recognized.

--They are disproportionately represented in the technical, economic, professional, and skilled-worker categories of the Soviet labor force.

--Given the current acute manpower shortage experienced by the USSR, especially in its European regions, and the expectation that it will become even worse in the next decade, the withdrawal of Jews from the labor force could seriously affect plans for developing the economy and increasing productivity.

--Finally, a Jewish exodus could trigger greater demands by other national and religious groups for the right to emigrate.

(U) To stop the emigration spiral, the authorities would have to take actions that thus far they have evidently found to be either unnecessary or unacceptable:

--Assure Soviet Jews that they will not experience discrimination in employment, career opportunities, promotions, and education, including specialized higher education--and end current discriminatory practices;

--Condemn anti-Semitism publicly and enforce existing laws forbidding it;

--Permit the revival and maintenance of Jewish cultural identity by providing Jews with rights and opportunities no less than those enjoyed by other Soviet nationalities, including the practice of Judaism and the use and teaching of Yiddish and Hebrew.

(U) That the authorities realize the need for such measures is indicated by a few recent, though inadequate, acts. These include the organization (in Birobidzhan) of a well-publicized traveling Jewish musical theater; the publication of a novel depicting sympathetically the experiences of Soviet Jews during World War II; some gestures of support for the Yiddish language in the context of criticism

of Hebrew as an alien, "Zionist" import; and the appearance of press articles purportedly written by "loyal" Jews and describing the flourishing state of Soviet Jewish culture. Although ineffective in reassuring Soviet Jews, such measures are widely used in propaganda directed abroad.

A Distant Perspective

(U) Lying in the future is the question of how Jewish emigration might be affected by events in the Middle East.

(LOU) If the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt results in the gradual normalization of Arab-Israeli relations and makes Israel a more attractive destination, the number of Jews going there could rise significantly. Currently, about 65 percent of the Soviet Jews who arrive in Vienna with an Israeli visa exercise their right to "change direction"; most of those who do so go to the US. Of the latter, 80 percent have or claim to have US relatives.

(U) If, however, stabilization of the Middle East also leads to reestablishment of Soviet-Israeli relations, the effect on emigration could well be discordant. The possibility of direct emigration to Israel would then obviate the need for Soviet Jews to go first to Vienna. This would serve both Soviet and Israeli interests, but not necessarily the interests of those Soviet Jews who desire to emigrate but have no interest in going to Israel.

(U) Currently, such emigrants receive aid in Vienna to go to the destination of their choice. Their situation would presumably become less attractive if they were required to go directly to Israel as a condition of emigration. They would no longer enjoy refugee status upon arrival in Israel, nor could Israeli authorities be expected to be very responsive to their desire for onward travel. And under Israeli law, any delay they experienced in leaving Israel could result in automatic acquisition of Israeli citizenship.

Prepared by I. Belousovitch
x29204

Approved by R. Baraz
x29194

Appendix

EMIGRATION STATISTICS

(C/NF) The existence of two basic methods for estimating the number of Soviet nationals leaving the USSR on Israeli visas accounts for frequent discrepancies in statistics from different sources. The Soviet Government does not publish periodic statistics on the number of exit visas it issues for Israel. That total, however, is reflected closely in the number of Israeli visas issued by the Netherlands Embassy as the representative of Israeli interests in Moscow. Identification of the Netherlands Embassy as the source of these statistics, as well as the statistics themselves, if not rendered in round numbers, is classified data.

(U) Because all Israeli visa holders go first to Vienna, estimates of Jewish emigration can also be based on the number of arrivals in Vienna during a given period.

(C) Discrepancies between the two sets of figures are explained by the fact that the number of arrivals in Vienna during a given period reflect the number of visas issued in a previous period. Thus, if a sharp change occurs in the number of Soviet exit permit holders who receive Israeli visas at the Netherlands Embassy during a given month, that fact would be reflected in the number of arrivals in Vienna during the subsequent month or two.

(C) Hence, while statistics on Vienna arrivals represent the number of emigres leaving the USSR during a given period, Netherlands Embassy figures reflect more accurately Soviet emigration policy and its fluctuations. Neither set of figures, however, provides an absolutely accurate total of Soviet Jewish emigration.

(U) Some Soviet Jews also emigrate on US visas, to be reunited with US citizen or resident alien relatives. In this category, which includes all Soviet nationalities, Jews have constituted about 25 percent of the total during the past three years.

1976 - 650 Jews (25.3 percent of the total)

1977 - 493 Jews (24.8 percent)

1978 - 430 Jews (25.1 percent)

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(C) Moreover, many non-Jews emigrate with Israeli visas as:

--members of mixed marriages;

--individuals who are pressured to emigrate through the Jewish channel by Soviet authorities; and

--non-Jewish recipients of a Jewish vyzov who then succeed in convincing Soviet authorities of their eligibility to emigrate.

(C) The number of non-Jews who emigrate through the Jewish channel is difficult to estimate but may run as high as 10 percent.

	(C/NF) Number of Israeli Visas	(U) Number of arrivals in Vienna
1970	about 1,000	
1971	about 14,000	13,022
1972	31,413	31,601
1973	34,780	33,461
1974	20,200	20,700
1975	13,209	13,290
1976	14,064	14,273
1977	17,146	16,737
1978	30,379	28,864
1978 (monthly)		
Jan	1,946	
Feb	2,131	
Mar	1,835	
Apr	1,870	
May	1,919	
Jun	1,943	
Jul	2,211	
Aug	2,540	
Sep	2,845	
Oct	4,087	
Nov	3,427	
Dec	4,645	
1979 (monthly)		
Jan	4,040	
Feb	4,126	
Mar	4,019	
Apr	5,000 (est.)	

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RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL Ø519
RUDTO/ AMEMBASSY LONDON Ø5ØØ
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 754Ø
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 7ØØ6
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN Ø163
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E.O. 12Ø65; XDGS-1 Ø6/Ø7/99 (TOON, MALCOLM) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ENRG, EEWT, UR, IR
SUBJECT: (C) SOVIET MFA IRANIAN DESK OFFICER DISCUSSES IRANIAN DEVELOPMENTS

REF: MOSCOW 13979 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING JUNE 5 CONVERSATION BETWEEN EMBOFF AND MFA MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR N.I. KOZYREV (IRAN). LATTER MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--SOVIETS HAD HOPED THAT RECENT SKACHKOV (CHAIRMAN OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS, GKES) TALKS IN IRAN WOULD BE MORE DETAILED THAN THEY WERE, BUT IT WOULD BE INCORRECT TO LABEL THE TALKS A FAILURE, SINCE THEY WERE ONLY EXPLORATORY IN NATURE. IRANIAN SIDE HAD PLEASED DIFFICULTY IN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS UNDER PRESENT UNCERTAIN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. MATTER OF PRICE FOR IRANIAN GAS PIPED TO SOVIET UNION WAS NOT EVEN BROACHED, ALTHOUGH SOVIETS EXPECT IRANIANS WILL EVENTUALLY ASK FOR MORE MONEY FOR THIS GAS.

--CURRENT LEVEL OF GAS FLOW TO SOVIET UNION IS APPROXIMATELY 5Ø-7Ø PERCENT OF NORMAL. DIFFICULTY IN BEING MORE PRECISE IS THAT GREAT ELUCTUATIONS HAD OCCURRED AND WERE STILL OCCURRING BECAUSE OF FLUCTUATION IN IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTION. IN ADDITION, ONE PIPE WAS RECENTLY COMPLETELY CLOSED WHILE PROBE WAS RUN THROUGH ITS LENGTH.
--SOVIETS ARE AWARE OF GROWING RATHER THAN LESSENING INTERNAL POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN IRAN AND ARE STILL UNCERTAIN WHAT FUTURE WILL BRING. CURRENT SITUATION IS STILL ONE OF CHAOS. PROBLEM OF INTERNAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN RANKS OF TOP RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR SOVIET EXPERTS TO ASSESS. SOVIETS ALSO FEEL THAT PROBLEM OF NATIONALISTIC ASPIRATIONS ON PART OF IRANIAN MINORITIES IS PARTICULARLY EXPLOSIVE ONE FOR NATIONAL LEADERSHIP. MOSCOW IS AWARE THAT SOVIET-MANUFACTURED ARMS HAD BEEN PUT IN HANDS OF KHORRAMSHAHR ARABS BUT HAD CERTAINLY NOT CONDONED THIS. NOR DID MOSCOW HAVE ANY PROOF THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN ULTIMATE SOURCE, ALTHOUGH IT DID SEEM THAT IRAQ WAS CARRYING OUT A PROVOCATION POLICY TOWARD IRAN. KALASHINKOV AUTOMATIC RIFLES WERE ALL OVER THE REGION AND THERE WERE MANY "ENEMIES" OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION WHO WOULD LIKE TO NOT ONLY CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR IRANIAN CENTRAL AUTHORITIES, BUT ALSO PROBLEMS BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND IRAN.
--AN ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE POINT IS THE KURDISH PROBLEM, SINCE IRANIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE KURDS ALSO AFFECTS KURDISH-RELATED SENSITIVITIES IN IRAQ AND TURKEY. IT IS SIMPLY NOT LOGICAL TO THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SUPPORT VIOLENT ACTION ON THE PART OF THE KURDS IN TURKEY OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE REGION, SINCE MOSCOW WAS OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO MAINTAIN AND TO IMPROVE ITS NORMAL STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH ALL THE COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE KURDS LIVE.
3. COMMENT; DESPITE KOZYREV'S ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE LACK OF CONCRETE SUCCESS OF SKACHKOV'S TALKS, WE STILL BELIEVE THAT THE TALKS WERE A DISAPPOINTMENT TO THE SOVIETS (REFTEL). THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE (PROTECT) INFORMED US THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN WAS TOLD BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT THE SKACHKOV TALKS PRODUCED NO RESULTS AND THAT HE, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, HAD ACTUALLY COUNSELED AGAINST THE VISIT BEFORE IT TOOK PLACE.
4. KOZYREV SEEMED MUCH LESS FORTHCOMING THAN USUAL IN THIS SHORT CONVERSATION AND WHEN CONVERSATION TURNED TO THE IRANIAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, FORQAN, AND TO SOVIET PRESS REPLAY OF IRANIAN CHARGES OF CIA INVOLVEMENT WITH IT, KOZYREV RATHER OBVIOUSLY BROUGHT THE CONVERSATION TO A CLOSE. TOON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 6157

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/13/85 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PLST, IR, UR
SUBJECT: BLOC INTEREST IN IRAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.)

2. AT SMALL DINNER GIVEN BY DEP FIRST SECRETARY FOR DEPARTING POL OFFICER STEMPEL, EMBASSY POLOFFS STEMPEL AND BARRETT WERE BESIEGED BY FOUR OR FIVE BLOC INTELLIGENCE/POLITICAL TYPES FOR U.S. VIEWS ON IRAN AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT EXCHANGES OVER AMBASSADOR CUTLER'S NOMINATION. LONG-TIME SPECIAL CONTACT, SOVIET DIPLOMAT KAZANKIN WAS PARTICULARLY PUSHY IN PROBING FOR U.S. VIEWS. CZECH AND ROMANIAN WERE ALSO INTERESTED AND KEPT POLOFFS BUSY FOR LARGE PART OF EVENING. QUESTIONS CENTERED AROUND WHAT U.S. WOULD DO (EMBOFFS GAVE STANDARD REPLIES ABOUT GRADUALLY IMPROVING RELATIONS), INTERLARDED WITH SHARP PUSH AT SOVIET PROPAGANDA ABOUT U.S. INTERFERENCE), AND BLOC U.S. SAW EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. BOTH QUESTIONS AND BLOC OFFICIAL COMMENTS INDICATED SOVS AND THEIR FRIENDS ARE UNCERTAIN, SOMEWHAT AT SEA IN ASSESSING ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, AND HUNGRY FOR U.S. VIEWS.

3. SOVIET OFFICERS PRESENT, HOWEVER, EXHIBITED MUCH CONFIDENCE ABOUT EVOLUTION OF SITUATION, AND KAZANKIN SAID HE WOULD BE EXTENDING HIS TOUR THROUGH THE SUMMER "TO BE HERE FOR IRAN' OCTOBER REVOLUTION." (KAZANKIN SAID KHOMEINI'S REVOLUTION HAD BEEN BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC, BUT ADDED THAT SUCCESSOR HAD LEFT SOVIETS IN MUCH BETTER POSITION, WITH U.S. LISTENING POSTS ON SOVIET BORDER CLOSED. NEW SOVIET OFFICER NIKOLAI N. SURASOV WAS INTRODUCED AS NEW MAN IN SCIENCE AREA; HE WAS FORMERLY ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT FOR THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCE AND HAD WORKED ON SEA ENVIRONMENT PROBLEMS. HE EXPECTS A THREE-YEAR TOUR IN IRAN, AND SPOKE WELL OF HIS CONTACTS WITH JAMES WILKINSON, WHO IS DESCRIBED AS BEING DEPUTY HEAD OF SOVIET DESK IN STATE DEPARTMENT.

4. ROMANIAN GEORGE CRISSAN, SOMEWHAT ANNOYED BY SOVIET ENTHUSIASM, HAD A GREAT DEAL TO DRINK AND EXHIBITED A SPECIAL CASE OF BALKAN PESSIMISM ABOUT IRANIAN REVOLUTION'S POSSIBLE VALUE TO MARXIST-LENINIST "WAVE OF FUTURE."
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE — CHRON

AIRGRAM

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HANDLING	CLASSIFICATION	MESSAGE REFERENCE NO.
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TO: ADDIS ABABA, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KUWAIT, MOGADISCIO, MOSCOW, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI

CLASSIFIED

FROM: Department of State

DATE: 1979 JUN 14 PM 4:15

E.O. 11652: GDS 6/13/85

TAGS: PRES, XF, XJ, XD, XH

SUBJECT: Department of State Clearance of Research Project: "Projecting the Soviet Threat in the Middle East"

REF: A-2903, August 16, 1978

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SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION:

LIMDIS RESEARCH

The Department has approved Department of Defense (DOD) sponsorship of the subject project on the understanding that most of the work overseas will be done by 3rd country nationals, and on condition that 1) the Department is notified in advance of any travel of U.S. researchers to the area, and 2) the final reports are classified "Confidential" or higher.

It has been pointed out to DOD that in the wake of the Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty there has developed intense sensitivity in many Arab countries to any suggestion that the U.S. is attempting to create an Egyptian/Israeli security axis. Soviet propaganda has focused on alleged U.S. plans to establish bases in the area. This project could be interpreted as preliminary to such action by the U.S. and have a negative impact on the coming West Bank and Gaza negotiations plus give credence to Soviet propaganda claims.

Attached is a copy of the project proposal for the information of addressee posts. Relevant posts will be advised of the travel plans of any U.S. participants to their area. If 3rd country researchers should get in touch with any of the posts, Embassy briefings are to be on an unclassified basis.

Note that the conditional clearance of this project does not constitute State endorsement of the need, method, or value of the project.

Enclos : Project Proposal

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FORM OS-323
11-72

PROJECTING THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A HERO Proposal

Objective

The Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), a division of T.N. Dupuy Associates, Inc. (TNDA), proposes to undertake a reassessment of Soviet objectives and likely courses of action in the Middle East in the light of current political developments, and perception by Middle Eastern scholars and government officials of the dangers in the situation, including the possible use of nuclear weapons by any of the parties concerned.

Background

TNDA's Executive Director, on a recent visit (September-October 1978) to Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, discussed the strategic problems of Soviet involvement in the Middle East and neighboring Africa with a number of scholars, military specialists and government officials. These are some of their comments:

> Egyptian general officer and senior staff planner: "The United States does not adequately appreciate the danger of Soviet influence in South Yemen, and the relationship of this to Ethiopia, the Dhofar region, Iran, and--for us--the threat to Bab el Mandeb. Early action is imperative."
>
> Senior military official in the Arab League: "We wish to collaborate with your organization on strategic studies, and are particularly concerned with the non-Israeli threat."
>
> Director of Arab strategic studies institute in Cairo: "We wish to collaborate with you in defense and strategic studies on such matters /security of the Middle East/.
>
> Anti-Israeli, anti-Camp David, non-PLO Palestinian, with close ties to Jordan Government: "The Soviet threat, now present in South Yemen, is far more serious than the threat of Zionism."
>
> Director of Israeli academic research institute: "We are concerned by what is going on in Afghanistan and Iran, and the potential relationship of this to South Yemen and Ethiopia; we are prepared to collaborate with HERO on studies of such issues."

Any change in the political situation in the Middle East, including the current events in Iran, may be expected to be exploited by the Soviet Union.

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ere can be no doubt that by subversion, propaganda, and perhaps even by pen intervention, direct or by proxy, the Kremlin, when it suits its obje ives, will support no only left-wing radical revolutionary movements, bu lso rightist ultra-co ervatives and fundamentalist religious groups. Th all of a government friendly to the United States is in itself a victory he USSR, and such a change of status in the oil-producing states could eriously endanger the well-being of the country and national security.

There has for several years been widespread speculation in the public ess about Israeli possession of nuclear weapons. There have also been r ports of efforts by some Arab nations to purch e nuclear weapons. Obviou such press coverage will have some influence on the perceptions of Arab an Israeli scholars and cause them to consider seriously the possibility that nuclear weapons might not only be employed in renewed Arab-Israeli hostili ties, but also in other conflicts which might break out in the Middle East Such perceptions, of course, would be influenced by the undoubted capabili of both the US and USSR to reach the Middle East with home-based nuclear eapons, and the known interrelated interests of India, Pakistan, and Ira in acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

During the last several years members of the HERO staff, through var projects involving countries in the Middle East, have established close c tacts with political and military scientists and scholars, particularly i Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, who have considerable knowledge of regional af In researching materials for his recent book, Elusive Victory, The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974, Col. T.N. Dupuy, USA Retired, the Executive Dire of HERO, has travelled extensively in the Middle East, where he interviewe political and military leaders, many of whom have become personal and pro sional friends. In both Egypt and Israel the staffs of research institut have expressed interest in cooperating with HERO in future projects.

Concept

In order to assist US policy makers in projecting immediate and long-range Soviet objectives in the Middle East, and Soviet political military and subversive actions in that region, HERO proposes to study the Soviet strategic threat to the Middle East as perceived by responsible Arab and Israeli scholars, experts, and government officials, and HERO's own speci ists and consultants, with special reference to the perceptions of the possible use of nuclear weapons by any of the interested parties.

HERO will elicit assistance from members of the Al- Ahram Institute Strategic and Political Studies in Cairo, the Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, the Russian and East European Institute, and the Shiloah Cent for Middle East and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, and from other knowledgeable people in Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. Each of these will be asked to respond to requests for comments on various subjects, both genera and specific, preparing written comments and papers. From these HERO wi prepare a study which will summarize, compare and contrast the views and opinions of the participants on various aspects of an assessment that wil include--but not be limited to--such issues as the following:

- the extent of Soviet presence and influence in the Middle East;
- the relationship of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the perceived Soviet threat;
- implications of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty;
- implications of recent events in Iran;
- the stability of present governments in the restion, and the reliability of existing ties to the United States and the West;
- likely Soviet objectives and course of action, particularly in the Persian Gulf region;
- the possibility of terrorist use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons;
- optional courses of action open to Middle East nations and the United States (separately or jointly) to thwart perceived inimical Soviet objectives, with particular consideration to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons.

Although this list is not intended to be exhaustive, each of these issues is elaborated briefly below to indicate the proposed thrust of the study. It must be stressed that the examination of these issues will be in terms of the perceptions of Middle East participants, although HERO participants will collaborate and comment as appropriate.

Extent of Soviet Presence and Influence

Recent Soviet official, unofficial, and covert activities in or relating to the Middle East will be reviewed to assess whether the Soviets appear merely to be exploiting targets of opportunity as these occur, or whether they have been masterminding and fomenting the various revolutionary activities which can be to their benefit. The examination will consider particularly the modus operandi of diplomatic, military, and trade missions, civilian and military advisory groups, and cultural exchanges, the importance of local Soviet friendship associations, Soviet radio propaganda, and the availability of Soviet academic institutions for undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate studies.

The feelings of local officials and other citizens toward Soviet behavior, attitudes, and presence will be assessed. If possible, groups and organizations on which the Soviets rely, and through whom they try to influence the events in the Middle East, will be identified. An examination will be made of how the Kremlin tailors its approach to the diverse political, social, and religious movements, ranging from leftist revolutionaries to rightist conservatives and religious fundamentalists. Special attention will be paid to the extent of Soviet influence in unrest and insurgency in such countries as Iran and North Yemen, and how the presence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia and elsewhere in or contiguous to the region has increased the overall Soviet threat.

To present a comprehensive perspective of Soviet influence in the region, HERO will also survey the situation in fringe and contiguous countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, and discuss how Soviet military and economic assistance to Ethiopia has affected Moscow's image in the Arab world. Particular attention will be given to the effect of events in Eritrea on neighboring Moslem-Arab states.

Relationship of Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Soviet Threat

From an American point of view there are several ways in which the Israeli conflict has obvious relationships to the Soviet threat. For in

-the continuation of the conflict contributes to Soviet influen Libya, Syria, and Iraq;

- resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict could substantially r Soviet opportunities for mischief-making;

- concentration on the problems of Arab-Israeli tensions may l Arab governments to overlook Soviet or Soviet-influenced activities or i fluence in nearby areas;

- resolution of the conflict will assure relative stability in least one part of the region, and facilitate cooperation with Arab stat elsewhere in the Middl. ast.

Middle East participants will be asked to examine these and compar issues from their points of view.

Implications of Recent Events in Iran

It is clear that the Soviets have been very cautious in their over actions and positions relating to the recent revolutionary events in Ir While it is doubtful if the Middle East participants in this study can vide evidence or information that is not already available to informed agencies within the US government, they may be able to provide--individ and/or collectively--insights and perceptions to permit a better assess of what the Soviets have or have not been doing, and what they may be e pected to do in that troubled country in the future.

Current Stability and Ties to the United States and the West

The strength and vitality of opposition forces in Middle East cou will be assessed, as will the impact of foreign workers (especially Pal ians) on domestic policies, rival ideologies, the characteristics of th emerging new leaders, and the destabilizing factor of Soviet activities Arab and Israeli views of the basic logic behind keeping close ties wit United States will be assessed, and efforts will be made to ascertain w developments may lead to a change in this attitude.

Likely Soviet Courses of Action

Likely Soviet objectives, and the procedures which could lead to t overthrow of the present moderate pro-western regimes in the region wil presented. Soviet objectives and activities vary from state to state. the survey will deal separately with each country. In addition, becaus such common factors characteristic to the entire region as instability, nerability, and strategic location, a detailed description will be prep of the overall Soviet strategic objectives for the area as a whole.

Minimum and maximum Soviet goals, as well as short- and long-range objectives will be thoroughly examined and conclusions drawn. Particular attention will be given to past statements of grave concern by responsible Arab and Israeli leaders, scholars, military and political scientists, etc., about the obvious possibility that the oil-rich Middle East countries could be encircled by the pro-Soviet states and then turn Communist themselves. A thorough elaboration of such concepts will be sought from the participants.

Optional Courses of Action to Oppose Soviet Objectives

The Arab and Israeli participants will be encouraged to state clearly and precisely what measures they think should be taken by the United States and local governments to stop Soviet penetration and reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East. As no single approach can be applied to a group of countries as disparate as those of the Middle East, a variety of options must be examined.

Nuclear Implications

A particularly important consideration in this analysis is the perception of the Middle East Study participants of implications if pro-Soviet states acquire nuclear weapons, and of the possibility of employment of nuclear weapons should hostilities eventuate from the activities of the USSR or Soviet clients in the region. Relevant to this consideration are the following:

a. The presumed existence of an Israeli nuclear capability;
b. The potentiality of acquisition of nuclear weapons by Soviet clients (with or without Soviet approval or connivance), particularly such oil-rich states as Iraq and Libya;
c. The potentiality of acquisition of nuclear weapons by states considering themselves targets of Soviet or Soviet-sponsored threats, particularly significant in this category might be such oil-rich states as Saudi Arabia, Kuweit, and the Arab Gulf Emirates;
d. The potentialities for nuclear terrorism.

* * *

General

HERO will seek details and specifics from the Middle East participants, not generalized statements like "The United States should increase its interest in the Middle East," or "The United States must act more forcefully." Should there be an increased military presence, for example, or more economic aid? What kind of presence? How can economic assistance be related to the potential already available in the oil-producing states? Which areas are especially important for US attention? How can the US image be improved? How can the United States participate actively without encountering damaging opposition from those who would perceive such participation as imperialism?

Response to these and other questions and other comments will be organized and to a limited extent evaluated by the HERO staff.

Methodology and Work Plan

In view of the urgency of this project, HERO will make a major effor to finish it in the shortest possible time. The study will require six months for completion from the time of award of the contract to the submission of the final report. An interim report and briefing will be delivered after four and a half months from the commencement of the work. Informal briefings will be provided as seems desirable. A time-phased schedule is shown in Appendix A.

There will be three kinds of inputs from the Middle East:

(1) Papers from participating academic institutions;
(2) Papers from selected individuals;
(3) Interviews with knowledgeable and influential people in Egyp Jordan, and Israel, who either cannot present their ideas in written Engl or will not (like some government officials) write for the record. If po sible, HERO through its contacts in Egypt and Jordan, will get in touch w data and quotations will be required to show sources. The reliability o sources will have to be assessed.

At the same time, preliminary consultations will also be held with those to be interviewed to acquaint them with the topics on which they be asked to comment in the future. After the return of the HERO partici to the United States from the Middle East, HERO will present a short wri report on actions taken and the results of the preliminary discussions. formal briefings can also be provided if desired.

Nine weeks after the commencement of the work on the project by the Middle East participants (at the beginning of the 14th week of the study HERO staff members will again visit Egypt, Jordan, and Israel to review the progress made, receive the papers prepared by participants, make nec modifications, and to discuss their work. Interviews will be held with appropriate people.

From information acquired from the interviews, preliminary review o papers prepared by the Middle East participants, and from analysis of in view notes and papers, HERO will prepare an interim report and briefing the end of the 18th week of the study. Comments on it and suggestions f the client will be acted on in the final stages of the work.

The various papers and interview notes will be consolidated as the for a draft final report to be delivered to the client, and sent (in whol in part) to the various participants at the end of the 22d week. Member the HERO staff will visit the Middle East during the 23d and 24th weeks, discuss the draft report with participants and interviewees. Comments a non-concurrences will be included in the final report, perhaps in an app

Comments from the client on the draft will be expected during the 2 week. At the end of the 30th week, or four weeks after receipt of the c comments, a final report will be submitted. A briefing on it will be pr to be presented on call at any time after submission of the report.

Performance of this study will require an effort of 390 professional man-days over a period of six working months.

Participants

From HERO:
T.N. Dupuy, Colonel, USA, Retired, Executive Director of HERO
Grace P. Hayes, Director of Research
Paul Martell, Senior Staff Associate (coordinator of the study)
Gay M. Hammerman, Senior Editor
Marie A. Shmaruk, Research Assistant
Robert O. Freedman, PhD., Consultant
Gordon S. Brown, Consultant

(See Appendix B for the resumes of HERO staff participants)

From the Middle East:
Al-Ahram Institute for Strategic and Political Studies, Cairo
The Russian and East European Institute, Tel Aviv University
Shiloah Centre for Middle East and African Studies, Tel Aviv
Institute for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv

Individual participants will be selected from the following list:

Egypt

Sayed Yassin, PhD, Director of the Al-Ahram Institute
Hassan el Badri, historian, retired army officer
M.D. Zohdy, retired army officer
Taha el Magdoub, Ambassador
Adly Hassan el Said, Military Secretary of the Arab League
Adel Youssri, Deputy Director Military Arab Research Center, Arab League
Samih Sadek, Political Directorate, Arab League
Hossan Hossni, Research Directorate, Egyptian Armed Forces

Jordan

Hail Srour, principal Sheikh of the Jebelli tribes
Ata Ali, retired army officer
George Hanna, retired army officer
Yussuf Khawash, retired army officer
Amer B. Khamash, senior official of the Royal Court
Hassan S. Dia, Royal Jordanian Armed Forces
Fouad Tahboub, Palestinian leader
Anton Attalla, PhD, Palestinian leader

Israel

Ze'ev Schiff, author
Meir Pa'il, member of Knesset, political leader
Aharon Yariv, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies

Shlomo Shamir, PhD, Director of the Shiloah Institute
Yaacov Ro'i, PhD, Director Russian and East European Research Ce
Matitiahu Mayzel, PhD, political and military analyst
Eliesor Rimon, Israeli Defense Forces
Dov Sion, Israeli Defense Forces
Aryev Shalev, retired army officer
Bishop Eesmahiht Luca, Syrian Orthodox Church, Jerusalem

Additional names will be added after consultation with Middle East specia

Budget

The total budget for performing this study over a six month period, w
an effort of 390 professional man-days, will be $79,760 (see appendix C).
proposes that this work be performed under a fixed price contract, with si
monthly payments of $10,500 and a final payment of $16,760 upon submission
the final report.

Appendix A

TIME-PHASED SCHEDULE



Appendix C

BUDGET

Direct Costs		
Professional Labor 390 professional man-days @$80/day average		$31,200
Other direct costs		$12,450
Travel: local and to the Middle East	$4,000*	
Per diem: 98 days @ $75/day	7,350	
Reproduction of documents	100	
Preparation of final report	1,000	
Indirect Costs		
Overhead @ 92.5% professional labor		$28,860
Total Direct and Indirect Costs		$72,510
Fee @ 10% of Direct and Indirect Costs		$ 7,250
TOTAL PRICE		$79,760

* Based upon budget air fares, assuming time to make reservations three w
in advance.

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7691
INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 6140
RHOMJU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0992
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0365
RUFNOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 7906
RUFSOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0983
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1447
RUETC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0529
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7571
RUEHNA/USMISSION USNATO 7037
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0177
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 15614

E.O. 12065: GDS (GERMAN, ROBERT K.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR, UR
SUBJECT: (U) SEMI-AUTHORITATIVE PRAVDA ARTICLE ON IRANIAN EVENTS

REF: JIDDA 4451 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY WISHES TO DRAW TO ATTENTION OF DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY TEHRAN A JUNE 17 PRAVDA ARTICLE ON IRAN BY "A. PETROV" (A PSEUDONYM RESERVED FOR ARTICLES OF A SEMI-AUTHORITATIVE NATURE). THIS PIECE, WRITTEN IN AN EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS STYLE, CRITICIZED THOSE UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD PLAYED AN "IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE" ROLE IN REVOLUTION WHICH OVERTHREW THE SHAH, BUT WHO WERE NOW INCLINED TO TURN FROM FRIENDS (READ MOSCOW) AND TOWARD FORMER ENEMIES (READ WASHINGTON). IN PASSING, PETROV ALSO RAISED AND DISMISSED RUMORS SPREAD IN IRAN ABOUT "IMAGINARY" HAND OF MOSCOW IN INTERNAL DISTURBANCES AND ABOUT RECENT TRANSFERS TO IRAN OF SOVIET WEAPONS.

3. COMMENT. ON THE SURFACE, PETROV SEEMED TO SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI FROM INCLUSION IN THIS LIST OF IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARIES UNFAITHFUL TO MOSCOW. HOWEVER, TO THOSE FAMILIAR WITH RECENT LECTURE WHICH KHOMEINI GAVE AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV (REFTEL), IT WOULD SEEM THAT EVEN IF PETROV'S ARTICLE WERE NOT

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SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED AGAINST KHOMEINI, IT AT LEAST SET THE STAGE FOR FUTURE CRITICISM SHOULD KHOMEINI AGAIN JOIN THOSE "INCLINED TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF DEVELOPMENT," AS PETROV PUT IT.

4. AN IRANIAN DIPLOMAT HERE TOLD US WITH SOME GLEE THAT KHOMEINI HAD REQUESTED VINOGRADOV TO SEE HIM AT 0800 IN QOM. THIS APPARENTLY MEANT A 0400 DEPARTURE FROM TEHRAN FOR QOM, UNPLEASANT IN ITSELF, WHICH RESULTED IN KHOMEINI'S TONGUE-LASHING AND AN IMMEDIATE RELEASE TO THE PRESS OF THE IRANIAN VERSION OF THE ENCOUNTER. WHILE WE HAVE NNOT YET SPOKEN TO KNOWLEDGEABLE SOVIETS ABOUT THIS INCIDENT, WE HAVE NO DOUBT OF MOSCOW'S ANGER OVER IT.

5. THE PETROV PIECE THUS IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING IF, AS WE SUSPECT, IT REPRESENTS MOSCOW'S DELAYED AND OBTUSE REACTION TO THE VINOGRADOV-KHOMEINI MEETING. WE ARE INCLINED TO INTERPRET THE ARTICLE AS A VIRTUAL ADMISSION BY MOSCOW THAT ITS INTERESTS IN IRAN ARE OF SUCH VITAL IMPORTANCE THAT IT WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO TAKE ITS LUMPS UNTIL IT IS IN A BETTER POSITION TO INFLUENCE EVENTS THERE. GERMAN

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RUQMHR AMEMB TEHRAN IRAN
ZEN/INFO WSDAO PRAGUE CZECHOSL OVAZIA
ZEN/INFO USDAO BUDAPEST HUNGARY
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ZEN/INFO USDAO THE HAGUE NETHERLANDS
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S E C R E T NOFORN
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PLEASE PASS TO GEN GAST.
SUBJ: USEUCOM INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY CABLE (EIS() 99-79, (U)
THE 22 JUNE EISC CONTAINS FOUR ITEMS.

PAGE 2 RUSNAAA1147 S E C R E T NOFORN

1. USSR: MISSILE PRODUCTION (1978) (SECRET/NOFORN)
2. NIRTH YEMEN: ARAB HARDLINER SUPPORT. (SECRET/NOFORN)
3. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)
4. I&W STATUS: NO CHANGE. (U)
5. (SECRET/NOFORN - ALL PARAS) USSR: THE ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MISSILES IN THE USSR REFLECTED AN INCREASE OF SLIGHTLY OVER THREE PERCENT IN 1978; FROM THAT OF THE PREVIOUS YEAY. TOTAL PRODUCTION IS ESTIMATED AT OVER 83,000 MISSILES IN 1978 COMPARISON WITH A LEVEL OF ABOUT 80,500 IN 1977.
DIFFERENCES IN THE ESTIMATED LEVELS REFLECT A DECREASE IN ICBM PRODUCTION FROM 305 IN 1977 TO 205 IN 1978 AS SERIES PRODUCTION OF THE SS-11 AND SS-16 ENDED. MEANWHILE, PRODUCTION OF THE SS-20 IRBM ALMOST DOUBLED, REACHING 130 MISSILES. PRODUCTION OF THE SS-21 AND SS-22 SREM'S SHOWED INCREASES AS WELL, WHILE THE SS-X-23 IS ESTIMATED TO BE IN PRESERIES PRODUCTION.
EVEN THOUGH THE OVERALL PRODUCTION OF ICBM'S DECREASED, PRODUCTION OF THE NEWEST SLBM, THE SS-N-L*, IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE INCREASED BR FIVEFOLD,FROM 20 IN 1977 TO 100 IN 1978.

PAGE 3 RUSNAAA1147 S E C R E T NOFORN
ALSO, A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN SAM PRODUCTION WAS ESTIMATED, THE TOTAL ROSE FROM ABOUT 5Ø,7ØØ FOR THE PRECEEDING YEAR TO 53 DURING 1978.
NO CHANGE IN PRODUCTION RATES WERE ESTIMATED FOR HAVAL CRUISE MISSILES, ANTI-TANK MISSILES, OR FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, ESTIMATES ARE AVAILABLE FOR AIR TO-AIR MISSILE PRODUCTION, (SOURCE; DIA)
2. (SECRET/NOFORN - ALL PARAS) NORTH YEMEN: IRAQ AND LIBYA RECENTLY AND SOMEWHAT UNEXPECTEDLY ANNOUNCED ECONOMIC SUPPORT NORTH YEMEN. THIS WAS APPARENTLY TO THE DETRIMENT OF SOUTH YE AND IT MAY REQUIRE SANA TO ASSUME MORE BALANCED RELATIONS WITH ARADIA AND THE U.S.
IN EARLY JUNE, NORTH YEMENI PRIME MINISTER AL-QHANI SECURED A PLEDGE OF 3ØØ MILLION DOLLARS IN IRAQ AID EXTENDED OVER THE NE FIVE YEARS. NUMEROUS SOURCES INDICATE THE IMPROVED IRAQ-NORTH YEMEN RELATIONS REFLECT BAGHDAD'S DISPLEASURE WITH SOVIET INRO IN SOUTH YEMEN AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT SANA IN ITS CONFL WITH ADEN. MORE RECENTLY, AL-QHANI VISITED LIBYA WHERE, AFTER

RECEIVING AN EXCEPTIONALLY CORDIAL WELCOME, HE SIGNED A NUMBER

PAGE 4 RUSNAAA1147 S E C R E T NOFORN
AGREEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, LIBYA WAS IN AS RECENTLY AS OCTOBER IN ATTEMPTS TO UNSEAT THE SANA GOVERNMEN AND ITS WARMING TO SANA COMES AS AN INTERESTING SURPRISE.
DIA BELIEVES IRAQ AND LIBYA ARE BEING NOTIVATED, AT LEAST IN P BY THEIR COINCIDENT DESIRE TO LIMIT U.S. AND SAUDI INFLUENCE IN NORTH YEMEN, AND TO ENSURE THAT SANA CONTINUES TO BE RESPONSIVE THE ANTI-SADAT BAGHDAD AXIS. PRESIDENT SALIH, WHO APPEARS SKEP ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U S AND SAUDI SUPPORT, MAY FEEL COM BY THE HARDLINERS TO MODERATE HIS RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AND DIVERSIFY HIS SOURCES OF ARMS SUPPLY. (SOURCE: DIA)
3. (C/NOFORN) OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:
A. (C) FORWARD AREA: YESTERDAY, CINC GSFG DECLARED TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA) ØØ1-79 IN SOUTHWEST EAST GERMANY EFFECTIV 22JUNE - 2 JULY. THIS IS THE FIRST SOVIET DECLARES TRA SINCE JULY 78. (USAREUR)
B. (U) POTUGAL/YUGOSLAVIA: PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT EANES TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA, 25-28 JUNE. (PRESS)
C. (C) TURKEY, WITH THE LATEST SHIFT OF AN INDEPENDENT DEPUTY TO THE RULING REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY, THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSI NOW CONTROL 222 SEATS EACH. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE OPPOSITION

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AGE 5 RUSNAAA1147 S E C R E T NOFORN
HANGES OF BRINGTNG THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT DOWN PRIOR TO THE SUMMER
SCESS ON 3 JULY HAVE DIMINISHED. (AMEMB ANKARA)
. (C) IRAN: FURTHER INFORMATION ON GENERAL TOUFANIAN'S ARREST IN-
ICATES IT WAS HIS BROTHER HADI WHO WAS ARRESTED BY REVOLUTIONARY
RCES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT GEN TOUFANIAN IS IN TRAN.
USDAO TEHRAN, USEUCOM J2)
. (C/NOFORN) UGANDA: AN ESTIMATED 5;ØØØ UGANDANS DEMONSTRATED IN
AVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT LULE YESTERDAY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS AN-
OUNCED THAT DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ILLEGAL AND WOULD BE DEALT WITH AS
UCH. PRESS REPORTS OF SEVEN INJURIES HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED. A
ROWD WAS REPORTED QATHERING LATER IN THE MORNING AT THE PARLIAMENT
UILDING, AND A GENERAL STRIKE WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN CALLED THROUGH-
UT MOST OF SOUTHERN UGANDA. (DIA)
. (U) INDICATIONS AND WARNING (I&W) STATUS: THERE ARE NO
HANGES TO THE I&W STATUS SECTION FOR TODAY, 22 JUNE 79,
(SOURCE: USEUCOM J2)
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RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 3125
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22 JUN 79 18 56Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 160932

E.O 12065S, 6/22/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: IR, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER CALL

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SOVIET EMBASSY FIRST SECRETARY GOROVOY CALLED ON NEA/IRN (PRECHT) FOR PERIODIC REVIEW OF IRANIAN SITUATION. AS USUAL HE HAD VIRTUALLY NOTHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO EXCHANGE. AFTER QUESTIONS DEALING WITH ITEMS PROMINENTLY FEATURED IN PRESS (AMBASSADOR CUTLER APPOINTMENT, SENATE RESOLUTION, ETC.) HE GOT DOWN TO THREE QUESTIONS WHICH PROBABLY PROMPTED HIS VISIT:

-- HAD PGOI BEEN IN TOUCH WITH US ABOUT CANCELLATION OF 1959 AGREEMENT? WE SAID WE HAD NO WORD OTHER THAN YAZDI'S STATEMENT THAT AGREEMENT, LIKE SOVIET TREATY OF 1921, WAS UNDER STUDY. GOROVOY DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE WHETHER IRANIANS HAD RAISED 1921 TREATY WITH SOVIET EMBASSY IN TEHERAN.

-- WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO US TRADE WITH IRAN? WE SAID SALES OF WHEAT AND OTHER FOOD COMMODITIES WERE MOVING NORMALLY, BUT THERE WAS LITTLE OTHER BUSINESS. GOROVOY THOUGHT SOVIET TRADE WITH IRAN HAD NOT RESUMED AND TECHNICIANS WHO HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN HAD NOT RETURNED. SOME TECHNICIANS, HOWEVER, HAD REMAINED THROUGHOUT CRISIS PERIOD. GOROVOY IMPLIED SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO RESUME SHIPMENTS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BUT WERE AWAITING IRANIAN RECIPROCITY ON GAS SALES.

-- DID WE NOT AGREE THAT KHOMEINI'S INFLUENCE WAS SLIPPING BADLY? WE AGREED FISSURES WERE APPEARING IN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT BUT THOUGHT KHOMEINI'S HOLDWAS STILL STRONG. GOROVOY [illegible]CLINED TO COMMENT ON KHOMEINI'S PUBLIC TONGUE-LASHING O[illegible]MBASSADOR VINOGRADOV.
VANCE
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#0932

CONFIDENTIAL

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DE RUFHNA #5423 2Ø817Ø6
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271653ZJUL 79
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1384
INFO RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 7164
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN Ø794
RUDTS/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9525
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 64Ø5
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6633
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN ØØØ9
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO Ø5423

E.O. 12Ø65; RDS-1 Ø7/27/89 (LEGFRE, LAURENCE) OR-P
TAGS: NATO, IR, UR
SUBJECT: (C) POLADS DISCUSSION OF IRAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AT JULY 26 POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, BELGIAN REP SAID BELGIAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD REPORT THAT IRANIAN EMBASSY THERE HAD FORWARDED A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO BREZHNEV BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO LEARN SUBSTANCE OF REPORTED MESSAGE. HE ASKED IF ALLIES HAD INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THIS REPORT.

3. ADDITIONALLY, FRG REP CIRCULATED FOLLOWING PAPER ON SOVIET VIEWS ON IRAN.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: ANY INFORMATION WASINGTON OR MOSCOW MAY HAVE ON REPORTED KHOMEINI-BREZHNEV MESSAGE.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF FRG PAPER:

A. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE SOVIET POSITION ON IRAN IS CONTRADICTORY AND, ON THE WHOLE, ANYTHING BUT CLEAR. THUS, IT REFLECTS THE UNCERTAIN PERSPECTIVE OF IRAN'S FUTURE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND - DEPENDENT ON THIS - HER FOREIGN-POLICY ORIENTETION. THE INITIALLY AS IT SEEMED - UNRESERVED SOVIET SYMPATHY FOR THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION IS INCREASINGLY GIVING WAY TO GREATER CONCERN AT THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT HETEROGENEOUS IRANIAN 'LEADERSHIP' IS NOT OPENING HERSELF TO MOSCOW'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC WOOING TO THE EXTENT WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD HOPED FOR.

B. THUS, IT IS EMERGING MORE AND MORE CLEARLY THAT ALMOST THE ONLY DETERMINING ELEMENT OF A POSITIVE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION IS THE FACT THAT IT HAS CAUSED THE LOSS OF WESTERN POSITIONS IN IRAN AND IN THE REGION. HOWEVER, THIS IS COUNTERBALANCED BY THE SOVIET CONCERN AT THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN AND THE RESULING DANGER TO SOVIET REGIONAL INTERESTS (E.G., AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ).

C. THE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THE NO INTERFERENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS PROBABLY ENDS WHERE HER OWN INTERESTS BEGIN. UND THIS ASPECT IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO NOTE THE OPINION OF SOME SOVIET OFFICIALS THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN ARE AT PRESENT A SOURCE OF CONCERN BOTH TO WESTERN AND TO SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THAT KHOMEINI'S WISH TO CREATE AN ISLAMIC COUNTRY WITH THE HELP OF AN ISLAMIC UNITY PARTY REPRESENTS , HISTORICALLY SPEAKING, A STEP BACKWARDS.

D. THIS OPINION ALREADY GOES BEYOND WHAT CAN BE QUALIFIED - BASED ON OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENTS - AS THE CAUTIOUS BEGINNING OF A SOVIET DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE PRESENT IRANIAN 'LEADERSHIP'. A NUMBER OF REMARKS BY THE IRANIAN MULLAHS AND GOVERNMENT ARE GIVEN MORE AND MORE COVERAGE IN THE SOVIET MEDIA AND ARE USED AS A BASIS FOR INCREASINGLY OPEN CRITICISM OF GROUPS CLOSE TO THE PRESENT IRANIAN LEADERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MEDIA MAKE AN EFFORT TO PLACE POSITIVE COMMENTS ON CERTAIN EVENTS IN IRAN - SUCH AS DECISIONS TO NATIONALIZE CERTAIN INDUSTRIES - AS PROOF OF THE CONTINUING SOVIET SYMPATHY FOR THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

E. WHILE KHOMEINI IS NOT YET BEING OPENLY CRITICIZED OR ATTACKED IN SOVIET MEDIA, HE IS HARDLY EVER MENTIONED OR QUOTED IN A SENSE POSITIVE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE CRITICISM IS DIRECTED AGAINST HIS ADVISERS, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR DIRECT CRITICISM OF KHOMEINI. THIS SOVIET SELF-RESTRAINT IS OF A TACTICAL NATURE AND NOT A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS LITTLE - AND IDEOLOGICALLY NOTHING - IN COMMON WITH KHOMEINI AND HIS ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. IN SOVIET EYES, HE FULFILLED HIS 'PROGRESSIVE' HOLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION WHEN HE CONTRIBUTED TO ELIMINATING THE WESTER INFLUENCE IN IRAN. KHOMEINI WILL BE OFFICIALLY DROPPED BY THE SOVIET UNION WHEN THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION BEGINS TO THREATEN VITAL SOVIET INTERESTS. THIS IS ILLUSTRATED BY REPEATED SOVIET CRITICISM OF ALLEGED IRANIAN INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS. END TEXT.
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R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL
2-W 12657
NING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
J: USEUCOM INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY CABLE (EISC) 106-79. (U)
5 JULY EISC CONTAINS FOUR ITEMS.
USSR: OUT OF COUNTRY VTA ACTIVITY. (S)
FRANCE: FOREIGN INTERVENTION FORCE. (S/NOFORN)

2 RUSNAAA2968 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL

OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/WNINTEL)
I&W STATUS: NO CHANGE. (U)
(SECRET - ALL PARAS) USSR: IN THE PAST MONTH, THE USSR HAS
N INCREASED ITS DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION
RAFT ABROAD WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF 8 AN-12 CUB AIRCRAFT TO
ANISTAN. THIS BRINGS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT
OYED TO 35.
LE THIS REPRESENTS ONLY A FRACTION OF THE VTA CUB INVENTORY
60, AND A SMALLER PORTION OF THE MORE THAN 700 MEDIUM AND
Y TRANSPORTS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO VTA, IT IS THE HIGHEST
ER OF SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT EVER DEPLOYED OUT OF COUNTRY.
LSO APPEARS THAT MOSCOW'S CONFIDENCE IN VTA OPERATIONS
DAD IS GROWING AND THAT THE USSR WILL CONTINUE TO USE THIS
E AS A HIGHLY VISIBLE AND RELATIVELY LOW-RISK INSTRUMENT TO
PORT CLIENT STATES, PROJECT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD
LD, AND CREATE THE FOOTHOLD FOR A SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE
LE LEAVING THE OPTION OPEN FOR A DEEPER COMMITMENT.
URCE: DIA.)

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PAGE 3 RUSNAAA2968 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINT
2. (SECRET/;,9194, - ALL PARAS) FRANCE: ALTHOUGH THE FREN
REORGANIZATION OF 1976 ASSIGNED THE 20,000 FRENCH TROOPS
DESIGNATED FOR OVERSEAS INTERVENTION A PRIMARY ROLE OF REIN
THE FIRST ARMY IN A NATO CONFLICT, THE ARMY HAS PRESERVED I
QUICK-REACTION POTENTIAL TO INTERVENE IN THE THIRD WORLD.
BECAUSE MOST OF THE INTERVENTION TROOPS ARE EITHER AIRBOR
OR AMPHIBIOUS -- AND THUS LIGHTLY-ARMED AND MOBILE -- THEY
LIKEWISE WELL SUITED TO THEIR REINFORCEMENT ROLE. THEY WOU
HOWEVER, HAVE LITTLE STAYING POWER IN A LARGE-SCALE ENGAGEM
AND THEY HAVE NEITHER THE EQUIPMENT NOR LGISTICS TO CONDUCT
INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS OVERSEAS AGAINST A MAJOR OPPONENT.
FRENCH DIVISIONS, THE 11TH AIRBORNE AND THE 9TH NAVAL INFAN
PLUS A GROUP OF FOREIGN LEGIONNAIRES CONSTITUTE THE FORCE
DEDICATED TO OVERSEAS INTERVENTION. THE 11TH AIRBORNE DIVI
IS DIRECTLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHO
AND KEEPS ONE COMPANY ON ALERT FOR OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT. AL
FOREIGN LEGIONNAIRES MAKE UP LESS THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE IN
VENTION FORCE, THEY ARE CONSIDERED TO BE AMONG THE MOST PRO

TROOPS IN THE FRENCH ARMY. ONE OF THE FOREIGN LEGION REGIM

PAGE 4 RUSNAAA2968 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINT
WAS PARACHUTED INTO KOLWEZI WITHIN A MATTER OF HOURS OF THE
DECISION TO ASSIST ZAIRE IN 1978..
MORE THAN 4,000 OF THESE TROOPS ARE GARRISONED ON A ROTATI
BASIS IN FORMER FRENCH COLONIES AND IN FRENCH OVERSEAS TERR
THIS EXPERIENCE PROVIDES THE FORCE WITH FAMILIARIZATION AND
TRAINING IN AREAS WHERE THE TROOPS MAY BE CALLED UPON LATER
INTERVENE. THEIR TRAINING IS SO COMPREHENSIVE THAT THESE
FORCES DISTINGUISH, FOR EXAMPLE, BETWEEN TACTICS TO BE EMPL
AGAINST ARAB FORCES IN THE MANGREB, AND EX-KATANGAN GENDARM
ZAIRE. THE BASIC WEAKNESS OF THE FORCE IS THE FRENCH INABI
TO DEPLOY THESE FORCES TO DISTANCES GREATER THAN 2,000 MILE
DUE TO A PAUCITY OF LONG-RANGE COMBAT TRANSPORTS.
SIMILARLY, THE 48 JAGUAR FIGHTER-BOMBERS ASSIGNED TO SUPP
THE INTERVENTION FORCE MUST OPERATE FROM FRIENDLY AIRFIELDS
BECAUSE OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE FRENCH TANKER FLEET, LARGE N
OF AIRCRAFT COULD NOT SIMULTANEOUSLY DEPLOY OVERSEAS.
THE FRENCH ARE PURSUING SEVERAL SOLUTIONS TO THESE DEFICI

INCLUDING A POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF LONG RANGE C130 OR C-141
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.

PAGE 5 RUSNAAA2968 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL

DESPITE THESE SHORTFALLS, THE IMAGINATIVE SELECTION OF TACTICS AND REALISTIC TRAINING, PLUS THE RECENT COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA, ARE HELPING TO PRESERVE FRANCE'S EFFECTIVENESS FOR OVERSEAS INTERVENTION.

IN ADDITION, PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTANG HAS TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE OVERSEAS INTERVENTION FORCES AND CONSIDERS THEM A MAJOR ASSET TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY. (SOURCE: DIA)

3. (SECRET/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/WNINTEL) OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:

A. (U) ALGERIA: PRESS REPORTS THE RELEASE OF FORMER PRES. AHMED BEN BELLA FROM HOUSE ARREST. HE HAD BEEN CONFINED SINCE JUNE 1965 WHEN HE WAS OVERTHROWN BY THE LATE PRES. BOUMEDIENNE. (PRESS)

B. (U) GHANA: STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN SUPPORT OF CONTINUED EXECUTIONS IN THE CITY OF KUMASI, ON MONDAY. THEY PRESENTED AN

AFRC REPRESENTATIVE AN 8 POINT ULTIMATUM CONDEMNING OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN GHANA'S AFFAIRS. (PRESS)

C. (U) SUDAN: NUMEIRY ANNOUNCED DISCOVERY OF AN ANTI-GOVERN-

PAGE 6 RUSNAAA2968 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL

MENT PLOT TO REVIVE THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT. (PRESS)

D. (U) ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA: BLACK INSURGENTS ATTACKED THE HOME OF THE GREEK ORTHODOX ARCHBISHOP OF SALISBURY TUESDAY WITH SMALL ARMS AND AN RPG-7. LTG WALLS, COMMANDER OF THE COUNTRY'S ARMED FORCES, LIVES 500 METERS AWAY FROM THE SITE OF THE ATTACK WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED FOR HIM. (PRESS)

E. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/WNINTEL) AFGHANISTAN: DESPITE SPREADING INSURGENCY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE OPPOSITION DOES NOT SEEM TO REPRESENT AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE REGIME. ALSO BREZHNEV REPORTEDLY SAID USSR WOULD NOT ALLOW KABUL TO FALL AND WOULD INTERVENE MILITARILY IF PAKISTAN CONTINUED TO INTERFERE IN THE SITUATION. (AMEMB KABUL, DIA)

F. (C/NOFORN) JORDAN: SIGNED CONTRACT FOR PURCHASE OF 36 MIRAGE F-1'S FOR $750 MILLION WITH FIRST DELIVERY IN 17 MONTHS. (USDAO AMMAN)

4. (U) INDICATIONS AND WARNING (I&W) STATUS: THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE I&W STATUS SECTION FOR TODAY, 5 JULY 1979. (SOURCE: USEUCOM J2)

REVW 4 JUL 99

BT

#2968

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: July 30, 1979

TO: INR/RSE, EUR/SOV, Amembassies MOSCOW, TEHRAN — For the Attention of

FROM: USMISSION USNATO

TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE
- ☐ For Transmittal to Addressee at the Discretion of Post
- ☐ Post Information Only
- ☐ Transmit to Foreign Office
- ☐ Submit Report
- ☐ Reply to the Individual

TO THE DEPARTMENT
- ☐ Dept. Information Only
- ☐ CERP Publications
- ☐ Enclosure to Previous Airgram
- ☐ Reply to Department Request

☐ Transmit to: (U.S. Agency)
☐ Inform:

REFERENCE

ITEMS/REMARKS

Attached is a UK paper on the impact of Islamic fundamentalism in the USSR, circulated by the UK Delegation to members of the Political Committee.

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NUMBER AND DRAFTING OFFICE

FILE NO.	SIGNATURE
	James H. Madden
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL	OFFICE: Political Section

FORM DS-4 12-64

for ref USSR

UK DELEGATION TO NATO.

5

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE SOVIET UNION

1. During his visit to Delhi on 2-3 July Lord Carrington, the Secretary of State, was told by Mr Vajpayee, the Indian Foreign Minister, that while in Moscow last month he and Mr Desai had received strong indications that the Russians were concerned about Islamic Fundamentalism. They were worried (Vajpayee thought with reason) that the virus might spread to the Soviet Moslem population.

2. The UK view has been that the likelihood of the Soviet Moslem population being infected by the Islamic revival in Iran and elsewhere was small, principally because of the different social conditions in the USSR and the fact that Shiites account for only a small proportion of Soviet Moslems. However, the Russians, though they affect to support Khomeini, are clearly uneasy about developments in Iran, and will not have taken kindly to Iranian broadcasts in Arabic criticising the state of Islam in the USSR. The head of the Iranian broadcasting authority complained in May that the Soviet Union was jamming Iranian wave-lengths by making use of high-powered transmitters. In particular he claimed that jamming had taken place during one of Khomeini's televised speeches in Azerbayjan. If there is any truth in this it would imply an attempt to prevent Soviet Moslems in Soviet Azerbaidzhan (who are Shiites) from tuning in to the Ayatollah.

3. Soviet statements on the possible effects of the Islamic revival on the Soviet Moslem population, although rare, have started to appear. According to a report in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter of 11 June, Pachayev Allokhshukur, Imam of Baku's largest mosque and vice-chairman of the spiritual administration for the Caucasus, held a press conference for foreign journalists in Baku in the presence of representatives of the Soviet MFA Press Department. Allokhshukur said, inter alia:

(a) It was not the Moslems' business to interfere in regional or republic policy. There were other organs and other elected people to look after politics.

(b) Moslems in Baku did not hide their joy over what happened in Iran. They had sent a telegram of congratulations and welcomed Khomeini when he returned to Iran, and had sent another when the monarchy was overthrown.

(c)"I cannot see that events in Iran mean that Islam will also make new inroads in the Soviet Union. We have no need of secret societies. We work completely openly with the authorities' approval."

4. Another report broadcast recently on Moscow Radio's Swedish Service said that a journalist had asked the leader of the Kazakh Moslems whether Islam was under-going a renaissance in the USSR because of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. He had replied that there had been no drastic increase in believers, although success in neighbouring countries obviously pleased Moslems.

5. These statements indicate that the Soviet authorities wish to appear relaxed about the possibility of the Iranian and Afghan events having any serious impact among Soviet Moslems. Recent (and frequent) broadcasts stressing the freedom allegedly enjoyed by Soviet Moslems and respect on the part of the Soviet authoriti for the cultural heritage of Islam (restoration of mosques, celebrations for the new Islamic century) carry the same implicit message: the spiritual and cultural demands of the Soviet Moslems are already being met, so there need be no fear of influences fro abroad. A recent article in Kommunist (No 5, 1979) by the First Secretary of the Daghestan obkom, however, provides further evide that the Soviet party authorities continue to be sensitive to the possible effects of outside influences on Soviet Moslems. Umakha complains that "Imperialist propaganda" has latterly begun more actively to speculate on nationalist feelings and prejudices in o to set socialist nations against each other. "The ideological ce of imperialist st[illegible]s, emigre nationalist organisations which are the service of the bourgeoisie, make use of the ideas of Pan-Isla and Pan-Turkism for the purpose of intensifying subversive activi against the peoples of the North Caucasus. They place no little emphasis on religion, on using it in anti-Soviet interests. Thus its broadcasts bourgeois radio lays stress on the religious feeli of believing Moslems." Such expressions of concern arenot new (although references to Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism are rare) an probably not provoked by events in Iran and Afghanistan.

6. All this does not take us much further and we are not incli for the moment, to revise our earlier judgement. Nevertheless, t can change. Although evidence on the influence of Islamic Fundam alism on Soviet Moslems is hard to come by and difficult to inter we would welcome the views of other Allies.

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RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8033
BRS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1587
HLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 6508
EC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0658
PS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7707
HR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0206
NA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 7143

N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 19581

. 12065: GDS 8/1/85 (GARRISON, MARK) OR-M
S: PEPR, NATO, IR, UR

JECT: (C) KHOMEINI LETTER TO BREZHNEV

: USNATO 5423

(C-ENTIRE TEXT)

THE REPORT OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM KHOMEINI TO
ZHNEV THAT WAS RAISED DURING POLADS DISCUSSION OF
(REFTEL) HAS ALSO BEEN CIRCULATING WIDELY AMONG
MOSCOW DIPLOMATIC CORPS; BUT NO ONE, INCLUDING
TICIPANTS IN THE QUADRIPARTITE CHIEFS OF MISSION
TING, HAS HEARD ANY INFORMATION ON ITS SUBSTANCE.
MESSAGE WAS REPORTEDLY DELIVERED BY THE IRANIAN
SSADOR TO FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM
THE SUPREME SOVIET V. V. KUZNETSOV IN A MEETING WHICH
TED THREE HOURS.

A PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT, WHO HAD APPARENTLY QUERIED THE
IAN EMBASSY DIRECTLY, CONFIRMED JULY 31 THAT A
AGE FROM KHOMEINI WAS DELIVERED TO KUZNETSOV, BUT
THAT THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IS REFUSING TO SAY ANYTHING
T ITS CONTENTS. GARRISON

7 Aug 79 C 3

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PP RUQMER
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P 061720Z AUG 79
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1505
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3814
RUFRBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 7171
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9538
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6637
RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0010
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 05566

E.O.12065: RDS-1 08/06/89 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD) OR-P
TAGS: NATO, IR, UR
SUBJECT: (C) BREZHNEV-KHOMEINI CORRESPONDENCE

REF: (A) USNATO 5423, (B) MOSCOW 19581

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ALLIED REPS AT AUGUST 1 POLADS HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON REPORTED LETTER FROM KHOMEINI TO BREZHNEV (REFTELS) PER SE. HOWEVER, ITALIAN REP REPORTED ON A CONVERSATION BETWEEN ITALIAN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN AND SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL THERE. SOVIET HAD SAID BREZHNEV HAD SENT LETTER TO KHOMEINI. SOVIET DID NOT MENTION ANY LETTER FROM KHOMEINI OR WHAT WAS IN BREZHNEV'S LETTER, BUT DID TELL ITALIANS THAT USSR WAS UNHAPPY WITH VARIOUS ACTS OF KHOMEINI REGIME WHICH WERE "DAMAGING" BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. ACTIVITIES CAUSING RUSSIAN DISPLEASURE INVOLVED PROPAGANDA OF "ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT" WHICH WAS CRITICAL OF SOVIET UNION. GLITMAN
BT
#5566

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2206
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2105
RUFRS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0220
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL ECNI 0142
RUEHC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2307
RUEHO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0228
RUFRS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2265

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 9/6/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LPLAINGEN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 08828

E.O. 12065: GDS-1 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: NATO, [illegible]
SUBJ: [illegible] AND SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAN

REF: USNATO [illegible]

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE MESSAGE REFERRED TO BY THE BELGIAN K[illegible] PRESUMABLY WAS THE ONE CARRIED BY IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW MU[illegible]MMAD MOSLI WHEN HE RECENTLY RETURNED TO THE USSR. THE TEXT READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE IN HIS EXALTED NAME, JUNE 23, 19[illegible], YOUR EXCELLENCY LEONID BREZHNEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDIUM. I THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE AND THE KIND INTEREST YOU HAVE EXPRESSED TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. I PRAY TO ALMIGHTY GOD FOR THE PROSPERITY AND ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE USSR, AND I HOPE THAT OUR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, WHICH IS BASED ON THE UNITY OF EXPRESSION AND ON THE BASIS OF THE HOLY ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE SALMAN [illegible], WILL PLAY A WORTHWHILE ROLE IN THE UNITY AND [illegible] OF THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD WILL TRY TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND PROSPERITY, AS IT IS THE WISH OF OUR NATION AND LEADER, AYATOLLAH MOUSAVI (KHOMEINI. END QUOTE.
3. WE FOUND THE FOREGOING PAPER PRESENTED AT THE JULY 25 MEETING QUITE GOOD. WE, TOO, TEND TO SEE THE SOVIETS CONFRONTED BY CONDITIONS OF A DILEMMA IN IRAN. WE THINK THE BASIC SOVIET POSITION FACTORS THAT LED THEM TO CONCLUDE TIES WITH THE SHAH AND SEEK AN EQUALLY UNHOLY ALLIANCE WITH KHOMEINI AND HIS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. THESE INCLUDE:

- -THE LACK OF ALTERNATIVES. LAST WINTER KHOMEINI SEEMED TO HOLD ALL THE CARDS. THE PRO-MOSCOW TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY WAS WEAK AND HAD BEEN LARGELY DISCREDITED IN THE EYES OF MANY IRANIANS. THERE WERE NO OTHER PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL GROUPINGS EITHER STRONG ENOUGH TO CHALLENGE KHOMEINI OR PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS AGAINST HIM.

- -THE LOPE OF PROFITING AT OUR EXPENSE. WE WERE CLEARLY THE MAJOR OUTSIDE ENEMY OF THE ANTI-SHAH FORCES BY VIRTUE OF OUR SUPPORT FOR AND LONG ASSOCIATION

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8828/1

WITH HIM. THE SOVIETS WERE SOMEWHAT VULNERABLE ON THIS SCORE AS WELL, BUT RELATIVELY MUCH LESS THAN WE. THE PROSPECT OF CONSIDERABLE DIMINUTION OF OUR INFLUENCE IN IRAN COULD NOT BUT BE WELCOMED BY THE SOVIETS, EVEN IF THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR GAINING INFLUENCE WERE PROBLEMATIC.

--THE FEAR OF INSTABILITY ON THE USSR'S SOUTHERN FLANK. FROM OUR PROSPECTIVE IT APPEARS THAT, WHILE ALWAYS ALERT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF TURMOIL, MOSCOW DOES NOT SEEK TURMOIL FOR TURMOIL'S SAKE. WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH, KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SEEMED TO OFFER THE ONLY POSSIBILITY OF A RAPID REIMPOSITION OF STRONG CENTRAL AUTHORITY.

--THE DESIRE TO PROTECT ITS ECONOMIC STAKE IN IRAN. WHILE NOT LARGE BY COMPARISON WITH SOME OF THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS, THE USSR HAD DONE A GROWING VOLUME OF BUSINESS WITH IRAN IN RECENT YEARS. GAS PROVIDED THROUGH IGAT-I, THE SUBSTANTIAL SHARE OF CONSTRUCTION OF IGAT-II RESERVED FOR THE SOVIETS, AND THE PROFITS THEY STOOD TO MAKE FROM TRILATERAL TRADE IN GAS THROUGH IT WERE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO MOSCOW.

4. THERE STILL IS NO IMMEDIATE ALTERNATIVE TO KHOMEINI, A FACT WE ARE INCLINED TO VIEW AS THE MAIN REASON THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET REJECTED HIM AND HIS MOVEMENT. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, AMPLE REASONS WHY THEY MIGHT AT LEAST CONSIDER TURNING AGAINST HIM. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN IRAN HAVE DEALT WITH US AND THE SOVIETS IN A MORE EVEN-HANDED MANNER THAN WAS TRUE UNDER THE SHAH, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY FIND RELATIVELY LITTLE CONSOLATION IN THAT SINCE BOTH PARTIES ARE FREQUENTLY SINGLED OUT FOR CRITICISM BY THE ISLAMIC CROWD. MOREOVER, THE REALITIES OF IRAN'S SITUATION ARE BEGINNING TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON AT LEAST THE PGOI'S PERCEPTION OF WHERE ITS INTERESTS LIE AND THIS PERCEPTION DOES NOT GENERALLY FAVOR THE SOVIET POSITION IN IRAN. A CASE IN POINT IS THE CONTINUING UNREST IN KURDESTAN WHERE THE POSSIBILITY OF ETHNIC INSURGENCY HAS BROUGHT HOME THE NEED FOR A MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH IT. THIS IN TURN HAS SPARKED INTEREST IN RENEWING A MILITARY SUPPLY RELATION-BT
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0229
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0266
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 8828

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
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SHIP WITH THE U.S.

FURTHER, SIX MONTHS AFTER THE REVOLUTION, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN REMAINS IN A STATE OF FLUX. THE PGOI HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASSERT ITS PRIMACY IN MATTERS OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE INFORMAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES AND THEIR ADJUNCTS, WHICH OFTEN EXERCISE REAL POLITICAL POWER, SEEMS INCAPABLE IN TECHNICAL TERMS OF ADMINISTERING IRAN'S AFFAIRS ON A NATIONAL BASIS. THE SOVIETS MUST VIEW THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN IRAN, PARTICULARLY WHEN INSTABILITY HERE THREATENS SOVIET INTERESTS IN SUCH PLACES AS AFGHANISTAN, WITH SOME CONCERN.

6. FINALLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE FARED NO BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE IN DOING BUSINESS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. GAS SHIPMENTS THROUGH IGAT-I STILL HAVE NOT ATTAINED THE LEVEL OF VOLUME WHICH PERTAINED PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION. MOREOVER, THE IRANIANS HAVE ASKED THAT THE PRICE THE SOVIETS SAY FOR THE GAS THEY ARE GETTING BE RENEGOTIATED UPWARDS, AND THEY APPARENTLY INTEND NOT TO BUILD IGAT-II AT ALL.

7. WE AGREE WITH THE FRG PAPER THAT KHOMEINI WILL BE OFFICIALLY DROPPED BY THE SOVIET UNION WHEN THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION BEGINS TO THREATEN VITAL SOVIET INTERESTS. HOWEVER, THAT DEMARCATION IS NOT A FINE LINE EASILY DISTINGUISHED. WE SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEGUN THE PROCESS OF RE-EXAMINING THEIR POLICY TOWARDS KHOMEINI, BUT AS YET HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT IT IS TIME TO CHANGE COURSE. THE RESULT IS A CERTAIN AMBIVALENCE TOWARD IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION THAT MAY PERSIST SO LONG AS THE SITUATION HERE REMAINS AS MUDDLED AS IT HAS FOR THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS. LAINGEN
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RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1017
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0566
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1456
RUSBAE/AME -6 ,32 $3)#8 1518
RUQMHR/AHJMBASSY TEHRAN 0215
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTGURN 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 20152

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/10/85 (GARRISON, -4() OR-M
TAGS: EAID, ENRG, ETRD, AF, IR, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET AID OFFICIAL ON RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DURING AN AUGUST 8 MEETING WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS, AN OFFICIAL OF THE USSR STATE COMMITTEE FORI FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIET-IRANIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION HAS SLOWED SINCE THE CHANGE OF REGIME IN TEMDAN. WITH RESPECT TO DELIVERIES OF IRANIAN NATURAL GAS TO THE USSR, HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW SMPECTS THAT DELIVERIES OF ASSOESATED GAS THROUGH IGAT-I PIPELINE ASLL NOT RECOVER TO PAST LEVELS. HE ASSERTED THAT A FINAL IRANIAN DECISION ON THE FATE OF THE IGAT-II PIPELINE HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED. HEK TOOK A MORE OPTIMISTIC VRNE ON SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN, STATING THAT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CWKRENT INTERNAL SITUATION HAS BEEN EXAGGERATED AND THAT WORK ON MAJOR ASSISTANCE PROJECTS HAS NOT BEEN IMPEDED. END SUMMARYUM

3. EMBASSY OFFICERS CALLED AUGUST 8 ON NAMIK YAKUBLMON CHIEF OF THE MIDDLE EAST/WESTERN COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT (FOR ECONOMICQ SSISTANCE) OF THE USSR STATE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGRECONOMIC RELATIONS (GKES), WHICH ADMINISTERS SOVIET FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. ALSO PRE ENT WERE USA DESK OFFICER POL'YAKOV AND WEST EUROP AN SPECIALIST AFONIN. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-225 377

POINTS OF INTEREST TO EMERGE FROM THE DISCUSSION, WHICH FOCUS
PRIMARILY UPON SOVYT ECONOMIC RELATIONS
WITH IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN.

4. YAKUBOV ACKNOWLEDGED T AT "RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN" HAVE RESULTED IN AN OVERALL SLOWDOWN IN USSR-?84-, ECONOMIC RELATIONS BUT HAS NOT PREVENTED THE SO

ET UNION
FROM FULFILLINGRITS OBLIGATIONS TO IRAN. THE NEW REGIME IN TEHRAN IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF DEFINING ITS DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES; THESE ARE PURELY INTERNAL DECISIONS WITH WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WILL ABIDE. IRAN CURRENTLY IS-" NOT PROPONING NEW COOPERATION PROJECTS TO GKES (YAKUBOV" NOTED THAT THE JULY VISIT TO MOSCOW OF A METALLURGICAL DELEGATIYE CONCERNED ONLY TECHNIC. 03:313:-589, FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF THE ISFANHAN STZEL MILL); THE?NXKENT VISIT BY GKES CHAIRMAN SMACHKOV WAS LIMITED TO DISCUSSING "TEMPO" OF ONRMING PROJECTS. THERE HAVEJ BEEN INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, OF IRANIAN INTEREST IN VDKOPERAONON IN ELECTRIEFNERGY AND TRANSPORT (2(-8)2-6 MODERNIZATION AND AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTION). YAKUBOV ADDED THAT THE BENEFITS OFE SOVIET ASSISTANCE, WHICH, UNLIKE WESTERN AIUGN CONCENTRATES ON CONSTRUCYION OF VITALLY NEEDED INDSTRIAL OBJECTIVES, WILL NOT BE LOST ON THE IRANIANS.

5. ASKED ABOUT THE PROS[illegible]CTS FOR IRANIAN GAS DELIVERIES TO THE US$, (2-(??3; - [illegible] -5 #8 ;443,5 S,194.-589, IS T DT IRAN IS REDUCI[illegible] RUDE OIL PRODUC XAON TO BETWEEN 3:5 AND 4 MILLION BARRELSIIRJ DAY, WHICH INEVITABLY WILL REDUCE SHUPMEN5 9! -2-8-53$ &- 5#497S# 8&-5-I. THIS RELATES TO AN INTELCAL IRANIAN DECISION, AND THUS IS NOT DISCRIMINATORY. HE DID NOT COMMENT ABOUT PRICE NEGOTIATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO I
AT
88, HE MAINNAINED
ZHAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNME
T HAS NOT MADE A FINAL DECISION
ABOUT CONSTRUCTION OF THE IGAT-II PIPELINE. HE PLAYED DOWN EFFECT THAT ADECISIXN TO CANCEL IGAT-II WOULD HAVE UPON THE USSR, STATING THAT THE TRILATERAL GAS DEAL REALLY INVOLVES SHIPMENT OF IRANIAN GAS TO AFST EUROPEAN CUSTOMERS, WITH THE USSR DERIVING ONLY "A SMALL PROFIT." HE CONCEDED, HOWEVER, TT
T CANCELLATION WOULDBE
AFFECT BOTH SOVIET EXPORT COMMITMENTS TO THE WEST AND DOMESTIC GAS ALLOCATIONS.

6. YAKUBOV TOOK A MORE UPBEAT LINE ON AFGHANISTAN,O CLAIMING E REGIME'S POSITION IS MUCH MORE STABLE THAN ESTIMATED BY WESTERN OBSERVERS. THE CURREET INTERNAL SITUATION, IN ANY ISE, IS NOT LNFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-AFGHAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION. MAJOR ATTENON IS BEING PAID TO DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ON THE KDOKA RIVER (WHICH, ACCORDING TO A RECENT PRESS ACCOUNT, IS TO INCLUDE CONSTRUCTION OF A DAM, AN OIL STORAIS
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 1016502 AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9880
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2097
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1018
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0567
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1457
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 15190T
RUQMBR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0216
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 20152

DEPOT, A CEMENT FACTORY, AN AUTO-PARK, AND "OTHER PROJECTS"), EXPLOITATIOSOF NEWLY-DISCOVERED OIL RESERVES IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN (DESCRIBED BY YAKUBOV AS "MODEST"), AND LAYING OF POWER LINES./7CREDITS FOR THESE PROJECTS WILL BE EXTENDED "AS NEEDED." ASKED ABOUT THE SERIES OF BILATERAL ECOPODKE AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN MRR
L, YAKUBOV SAID THAT THE VALUE AND COMPOSITION OF BILAIERAL TRADE HAVE NOT BEEN SET, BUT THAT DELIVERIES ARE TO BE COORDINATED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE NEW AFGHAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN. THE AGREEMENT ON DELIVERY OF COMMODITIES WILL COVER SUGAR, GRAIN, OIL PRODUCTS, AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS. WITH RESPECT TO GRAIN, YAKUBOV CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO SHIP APPROXIMATELY 100 THOUSAND METRIC TONS OF WHEAT TO AFGHANISTAN THIS YEAR, BUT ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT BE SURE OF THE EXACT QUANTITY BECAUSE THE ULTIMATE DETERMINATION WOULD BE MADE BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE. HE ADDED THAT AFGHAN WHEAT REQUIREMENTS ARE UNCERTAIN NOW BECAUSE "THEY ARE HAVING A GOOD HARVEST."

7. YAKUBOV CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS POSTPONED REPAYMENT OF AFGHAN ECONOMIC DEBTS FOR TEN YEARS. HOWEVER, HE MINIMIZED THE BENEFIT THIS CONVEYS TO THE AFGHANS, CLAIMING THAT [illegible] USSR HAS NEVER RECEIVED HARD CURRENCY FROM AFGHANISTAN FOR DEBT REPAYMENT AND THAT THE DEBT POSTPONEMENT THEREFORE AMOUNTS TO A REDUCTION OF SOVIET CLAIMS UPON AFGHAN EXPORTS. (COMMENT: IF THIS IS THE CASE, THE HARD CURRENCY SAVING TO AFGHANISTAN WOULD DEPEND UPON THE EXTENT TO WHICH EXPORTS OTHERWISE DESTINED FOR THE USSR COULD BE SOLD ELSEWHERE FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE). GARRISON

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977—225 323

NNNNVV ESB055B3A25
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DE RUEHC #4957 2391817
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4270
RUCMGO/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 8592
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9270
RUDBRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 2201
RUDKDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 9907
RUDKHP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 9761
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 3744
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 5397
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5645
RUFNLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0302
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CHRON
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S E C R E T STATE 224957

E.O. 12065: RDS 8/23/99 (GOODBY, JAMES E.) EUR

TAGS: UR, US

SUBJECT: SOVIET NATIONALITY ISSUES (U)

REF: STATE 15 (NOTAL)

1. SECRET - ENTIRE T.

2. USG IS ENGAGED IN LONG-TERM EFFORT BEGUN IN MID-YEAR 1978 TO INCREASE USG KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET MINORITY AND ETHNIC NATIONALITIES. OVER ONE HUNDRED DIFFERENT PEOPLES RESIDE WITHIN SOVIET BORDERS AND, GIVEN SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES NOW TAKING PLACE, IMPORTANCE OF MINORITY NATIONALITIES COULD INCREASE AND MAY POSE PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF NATIONALITY ISSUE FOR LEADERSHIP RECENTLY UNDERSCORED BY MAJOR PRAVDA ARTICLE.

3. IN ORDER TO INCREASE USG KNOWLEDGE OF NATIONALITY ISSUES, EMBASSY MOSCOW AND CONSTITUENT POSTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED GENERAL THEMATIC GUIDANCE FOR REPORTING IN THIS AREA (REFTEL). THIS GUIDANCE IS BEING REPEATED TO ADDRESSEES FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

4. ONE ISSUE ON WHICH FURTHER INFORMATION WOULD BE APPRECIATED IS INTERACTION, ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL (I.E. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL OR CULTURAL) BETWEEN ETHNIC/

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MINORITY NATIONALITIES AND GROUPS OUTSIDE THE USSR.
ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO BE MINDFUL OF, AND TO REPORT
AS APPROPRIATE ON, CROSS-BORDER TIES OR INTERACTION
BETWEEN SOVIET NATIONALITIES AND GROUPS IN HOST
COUNTRIES. CHRISTO
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BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

MOSCOW'S PROPAGANDA REACTION TO THE "QUICK REACTION FORCE"

Since the Sinai I agreement brought a US observer group into the Middle East to monitor implementation of the accord, the Soviets have increasingly sensitive to signs of US military presence in the region. In part, their sensiti has been heightened by intermittent press disc of military intervention to seize Arab oilfiel

More to the point, however, the Soviets ha come to recognize that their own involvement i region (e.g., Southern Yemen) may have revived willingness to step in forcefully where America interests abroad are involved. They now have t reckon with the probability that sending the Constellation to the Red Sea during the recent Yemen crisis was a forerunner of things to come

Soviet neuralgia about the Pentagon's prop "Quick Reaction Force" reflects these fears and suspicions. It also reflects a Soviet suspicio that the US may have decided to up the ante in competition for influence in the Middle East an thus increase the risks for the USSR of an acti policy course there.

The propaganda campaign surrounding the Qu Reaction Force and the argumentation used to denounce it suggest that the matter weighs heav in Soviet calculations. It is, of course, a the keeping with traditional Soviet propaganda effo to tarnish the image of US "imperialism." But Moscow also seems concerned that the Quick Reac Force augurs a new US assertiveness against Sov interests globally. Given the USSR's own (and Cuba's) expanded political-military capabilitie this assertiveness would heighten the chances o direct superpower confrontation. In any event, Soviet propaganda handling of the issue has now assumed clearly defined lines.

The Line

According to the current Soviet propaganda line, "for some time" after the American failure in Vietnam, the United States officially proclaimed a policy of "no more Vietnams" and renounced direct, large-scale military involvement overseas. Now, however, the idea of intervening militarily is returning to favor. The US has adopted a "post-Vietnam" foreign policy or, rather, is returning to the pre-Vietnam concept of using its armed forces to achieve political goals.

In the Soviet interpretation, the passing of the "Vietnam syndrome" and resurrection of a strategy of military intervention was precipitated by the deterioration of US influence in the Middle East. The overthrow of the Shah posed the question of access to oil in acute form for Washington. And concern about the fate of Middle East energy resources led Washington to announce officially its intention to set up a Quick Reaction Force of 110,0(men, trained and equipped to seize oilfields if necessary.

Red Star (August 12, 1979) described this "corps," comprised of the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Airmobile Division, 2 marine divisions, plus strong support elements--fighters, bombers, transport aircraft, aircraft carriers and destroyers, tankers, and landing ships--as part of a larger contingent of US intervention forces. The larger force, it said, consists of 600,000 men, with up to 22 percent of the entire US defense budget spent on maintaining it.

Creation of this Quick Reaction Force, assert the Soviet sources, is only one part of a larger US strategy for the Middle East. Moscow also reports American press accounts of plans to create a special 5th fleet to be stationed in the northwest Indian Ocean near the Arabian peninsula, expand the US naval base on Bahrain Island in the Persian Gulf, and build a large naval base on Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean.

Middle East Ambitions

The need for this large-scale expansion of US naval strength in the Persian Gulf area is, in the Soviet view, a direct result of the deteriorating US position there. The Pentagon began "to discuss a plan for stationing American armed forces on the Arabian Peninsula and in the region of the Persian Gulf" during the Yemeni conflict in early 1979 (Izvestiya, July 3, 1979). But because "requests for the

opportunity to locate military bases in such countries as Saudi Arabia" were rejected, "Washington has been forced in most cases to plan a 'nearby' military presence" (Pravda, August 7, 1979).

As seen from Moscow, the mission of the Quick Reaction Force, while geared primarily for Middle East deployment--both to ensure the uninterrupted supply of oil from the Persian Gulf and to intimidate Middle Eastern countries by "creating a real threat of some sort of large-scale military intervention"--goes beyond that area (Radio Moscow, August 5, 1979). National Security Adviser Brzezinski allegedly spelled this out in his August 2 speech. In it, he is said to have "again campaigned for the United States to retain its role of world policeman" and to have spoken of Washington's "strategic responsibility" for not only the Near East but also Western Europe, the Far East, and the Western Hemisphere. In what Brzezinski described as "emergency circumstances," the Quick Reaction Force is to protect "Amer interests" in all the planet's "trouble spots" (Red Star, August 12, 1979).

Here too, there is to be naval backup for US forces globally. The recent Pentagon announcement that US ships and aircraft will continue to observe the traditional three-mile territorial waters limit means that "US warships will periodically head for the shores of sovereign states to 'show the flag' regardless of the limits that these states have established..." (ibid.). According to Radio Peace and Progress (August 13, 1979), American policy aims not only at protecting the US "strike forces capable of attacking and capturing other countries' oilfields..." but also at blackmailing and intimidating independent countries by bringing America's naval forces close to their shores. TASS observed (August 9, 1979): "Washington intends to use gunboats for intimidating 'self-willed' governments of the Third World countries and for backing the regimes implicitly obeying the instructions of the USA."

Armed Intervention Revisited

The USSR clearly finds this "new" American posture unwelcome and is portraying it as both sinister and ominous. It indicates, Soviet commentators claim, the administration's desire to influence developments in regions around the world "which it has arbitrarily classified as 'vital to the United States'... by means of American military power" (Red Star, August 12, 1979). American policy is also seen to be:

--"fraught with dangerous new military adventures" (Red Star, July 1, 1979). For example, "it is quite possible that special US forces are planning a provocative attack on tankers in the Straits of Hormuz" which will be blamed on the Palestinians and then used as a pretext "to justify US attempts to establish military control over the sources of oil, including those in the Persian Gulf region" (Igor Aleksandrov, Radio Moscow, August 16, 1979).

--an election ploy by a politically weak administration "to show its strength" and to demonstrate "that it will not tolerate any loss to US interests" (Radio Moscow, August 5, 1979).

--generating a major anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. In order to justify US "saber-rattling and open military interference in other countries' affairs," Washington has had to invoke a "mythical Soviet military threat" (Radio Moscow, August 16, 1979).

In short, Moscow proclaims, America's "global 'big stick' strategy" can "only intensify destabilization in the world" (Izvestiya, July 3, 1979). It is a "very dangerous symptom of an intensification of aggressive trends in US politics" (Radio Moscow, August 5, 1979).

Prepared by M. Schwartz
x20189

Approved by R. Baraz
x29194

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09646

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 8/30/79
APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
DRFTD: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHARGE POL-2 CHR
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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/30/86 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PEPR, IR, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN

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1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. BASED ON RECENT F[illegible] REPORTS FROM THE SOVIET MEDIA (BOTH OVERT AND CLANDESTINE) WE WONDER IF A RE-EXAMINATION OF POLICY TOWARD IRAN MIGHT NOT BE UNDERWAY. WHILE KHOMEINI HIMSELF STILL SEEMS ABOVE CRITICISM, THE PGOI NO LONGER ENJOYS SUCH IMMUNITY. THE LATTER HAS BEEN BLAMED FOR EVERYTHING FROM THE CLOSURE OF THE TUDEH PARTY NEWSPAPER TO THE FIGHTING IN KURDESTAN TO SELLING OUT THE REVOLUTION THROUGH ENTERING INTO TALKS ON ARMS SUPPLY WITH THE U.S.

3. IT STRIKES US THAT MSOCOW MAY BE CONSIDERING MODIFICATION OF ITS PREVIOUS POLICY OF ALMOST UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF A STANCE WHICH WILL PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN DEALING WITH A SITUATION HERE THAT CONTINUES HIGHLY FLUID. THE RELUCTANCE TO ATTACK KHOMEINI HIMSELF SUGGESTS SOVIET RECOGNITION THAT HE IS STILL THE MOST PUISSANT POLITICAL FIGURE ON THE SCENE, BUT GROWING WILLINGNESS TO CHAMPION THE CAUSES OF THE KURDS AND NON-ISLAMIC "PROGRESSIVE" ELEMENTS PUTS MOSCOW MORE IN TUNE WITH THE REALITY OF KHOMEINI'S AND THE RIGIDLY ISLAMIC IDEOLOGUES' INABILITY THUS FAR TO COME TO GRIPS WITH IRANIAN PLURALISM. IF THIS ASSESSMENT IS CORRECT, DOES IT FORESHADOW A GREATER WILLINGNESS ON MOSCOW'S PART TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS HERE THAN IT HAS SHOWN HERETOFORE?

4. WE WOULD WELCOME DEPARTMENT'S AND AMEMBASSY MOSCOW'S VIEWS. TOMSETH
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★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1979-289-344

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INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 6971
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2217
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0600
RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0229
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 21593

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 9/5/99 (TOON, MALCOLM) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET NATIONALITY ISSUES: FOREIGN BROADCASTS OF KORAN READINGS

REF: STATE 224957

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INTEREST IN CROSS-BORDER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SOVIET NATIONALITIES AND GROUPS OUTSIDE THE USSR, TWO EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO VISITED MAKHACHKALA AND BUYNAKSK IN DAGESTAN ASSR DURING AUGUST 25-27 REPORT THAT MUSLIM RELIGIOUS LEADERS PRIVATELY INDICATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT KORAN READINGS TRANSMITTED BY TEHRAN AND CAIRO RADIOS ARE WIDELY LISTENED TO BY THE FAITHFUL IN THEIR AREAS. THE GRAND MUFTI (PROTECT), WHO IS THE SPIRITUAL LEADER OF MUSLIMS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS, TOLD EMBOFFS IN MAKHACHKALA THAT YOU CAN HARDLY TURN ON THE RADIO WITHOUT HEARING THE KORAN BEING READ. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED BROADCASTS FROM TEHRAN AND CAIRO. THE GRAND MUFTI ADDED THAT HE AND OTHERS ALSO LISTEN TO VOA'S RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING.

3. DURING A VISIT TO A MOSQUE IN BUYNAKSK, MUSLIM ELDERS THERE ALSO INDICATED A BELIEF THAT RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING FROM OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION IS CONTRIBUTING TO THEIR CAUSE. WHEN AN EMBOFF ASKED THE ELDERS WHETHER THEY ARE ALSO FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN, THEY REPLIED TO THE EFFECT THAT, OF COURSE, THESE PEOPLE ARE OUR MUSLIM BROTHERS.

4. EMBOFFS WILL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY TO THE DEPARTMENT ON THEIR RECENT VISITS TO DAGESTAN AND CHECHEN-INGUSH ASSRS. TOON

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INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 7007
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0230
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 21766

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 10 SEPT 1985 (TOON, M.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR, UR
SUBJECT: (U) SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 9646

1. (LOU) AN ARTICLE BY POLITICAL COMMENTATOR ALEKSANDR BOVIN IN THE LATEST ISSUE OF "NEDELYA" (SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT OF "IZVESTIA") SHARPLY ESCALATES SOVIET CRITICISM OF DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, ATTACKING THE VERY THEOCRATIC FOUNDATION OF THE STATE AND REFERRING TO KHOMEINI PERSONALLY. ACCORDING TO BOVIN:

-- THE REVOLUTION HAS FAR FROM FULFILLED HOPES FOR IMPROVING THE ECONOMY, DEMOCRATIZING POLITICAL LIFE AND PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES;

-- IT IS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF ISOLATED MISTAKES AND FALSE STEPS;

-- THE SPIRITUAL (AND POLITICAL) ATMOSPHERE OF TODAY'S IRAN IS REFLECTED BY KHOMEINI'S SPEECHES (ON THE NECESSITY OF AN ISLAMIC VICTORY IN ALL COUNTRIES AND OF SHEDDING BLOOD FOR ISLAM) AND AYATOLLAH MONTAZER'S SPEECH(ON THE ISLAMIC LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUPERPOWER COLLABORATION AGAINST OPPRESSED PEOPLES);

-- IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE "THEOCRATIC CONCEPTION OF THE STATE" WILL HELP IRAN TO BECOME A MODERN, PROSPEROUS COUNTRY;

-- STIRRING UP RELIGIOUS FANATICISM AND ANTICOMMUNIST HYSTERIA, THE ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY FALSELY THE POLICY AND INTENTIONS OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES ARE NOT BENEFICIAL TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE;
CONFIDENTIAL

-- THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT POWER AND WITHOUT THE WILL TO POWER, IS PRACTICALLY PARALYZED.

2. (C) COMMENT: THIS ARTICLE BY ONE OF MOSCOW'S MOST RESPECTED -- AND OUTSPOKEN -- POLITICAL COMMENTATORS TENDS TO SUPPORT EMBASSY TEHRAN'S SUPPOSITION THAT A POLICY REEXAMINATION IS UNDER WAY IN MOSCOW, PARTICULARLY NOW THAT KHOMEINI IS NO LONGER SACROSANCT. BOVIN HIMSELF HAS LONG BEEN A MAVERICK, AS ILLUSTRATED BY HIS ADMISSION THAT THE SHAH'S WHITE REVOLUTION HAD PRODUCED MANY POSITIVE RESULTS IN IRAN (MOSCOW 11760). TOON
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INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6283
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0716
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 2059
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 6763
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9785
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 237685

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E.O. 12065: GDS, 9/10/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PEPR, ENRG, MASS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN-USSR RELATIONS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SOVIET FIRST SECRETARY GOROVOY PAID CALL ON DEPTOFF SEPTEMBER 10. IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS GOROVOY HAD BEEN NEUTRAL OR QUESTIONING ABOUT "KHOMEINI REGIME"; TODAY HE REFLECTED APPARENT NEW SOVIET LINE OF ANTAGONISM.

3. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, GOROVOY SAID SHIFT IN MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS IRAN HAD NOT BEEN SUDDEN AND HAD BEEN BUILDING A LONG TIME. IRANIAN OFFICIALS PUT FORWARD A SUPERFICIAL ATTITUDE OF FRIENDLINESS TOWARDS USSR, BUT THEIR TRUE FEELINGS HAD GRADUALLY EMERGED. GOROVOY RECALLED HE HAD COMMENTED EARLIER THAT ISLAMIC FAITH WAS "THE MOST DIFFICULT THING -- VERY HARD TO DEAL WITH." HE BETRAYED NO CONCERN ABOUT INFLUENCE IRANIAN CLERICS MIGHT HAVE ON SOVIET MOSLEMS (WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS AMONG THE MOST PROSPEROUS IN THE NATION) OR ON AFGHAN EVENTS (WHICH WERE BOUND SOON TO REFLECT TARAKI'S WISE LAND REFORM SCHEME).

4. BASIC PROBLEM SEEMED TO BE HOSTILE IRANIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS MOSCOW (E.G., ACCUSATIONS OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR KURDS AND OTHER DISSIDENTS) AND INSTABILITY OF REGIME. KHOMEINI HAD MADE A FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE WHEN HE DECIDED TO CRUSH THE KURDS AND OTHER NATIONALITIES. THE NATIONALITIES ISSUE WAS ALWAYS THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR A REVOLUTION AND KHOMEINI HAD UNNECESSARILY PROVOKED IT. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION WAS FAR FROM COMPLETE AND

KHOMEINI'S LEADERSHIP COULD NOT LAST. TENSIONS BETWEEN TEHRAN AND QOM AND MOSCOW WERE SURE TO RISE IN THE NEAR TERM. ONLY IN THE LONG TERM COULD GOROVOY SEE "NATURAL" SOVIET-IRANIAN FRIENDSHIP RESUMING.

5. GOYOVOY SAID GAS DELIVERIES TO THE USSR WERE RUNNING AT ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF NORMAL AND WERE UNLIKELY TO INCREASE SINCE DELIVERIES WERE LINKED TO OIL PRODUCTION. HE COMMENTED THAT IRANIANS HAD RECENTLY RAISED QUESTION OF "WORLD PRICE OF GAS," A CONCEPT NEVER BEFORE HEARD OF.

6. UNDER AGREEMENT WITH PGOI, SOVIET PROJECTS THAT WERE HALF FINISHED IN IRAN WOULD BE COMPLETED. OTHERS, LESS THAN HALF COMPLETE, WOULD BE ABANDONED. AS A CONSEQUENCE, FEW RUSSIAN TECHNICIANS WOULD RETURN TO IRAN.

7. GOROVOY HAD QUESTIONS ABOUT REPORTED SALES OF HEATING OIL AND MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN, SUGGESTING THAT USG HAD DECIDED ON A POLICY OF MORE ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR PGOI. WE ATTEMPTED TO PUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN PERSPECTIVE. VANCE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 22156

E.O. 12065: 9/14/99 RDS-1 (TOON, MALCOLM)OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR, UR

SUBJECT: (U) SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN

REF: (A) TEHRAN 9646 (B) MOSCOW 21766 (C) STATE 237685
(D) TEHRAN 8828

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. RECENT SPECULATION ABOUT A SHIFT IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN APPEARS TO BE PREMATURE. THE SOVIETS ARE RAPIDLY BACKPEDALLING IN AN EFFORT TO DISASSOCIATE OFFICIAL POLICY FROM CRITICAL PRESS COMMENTARY ON IRAN, ESPECIALLY THE BOVIN ARTICLE IN NEDELYA. THE MFA IRAN DESK OFFICE FLATLY DENIED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. THE KOSYGIN MESSAGES TO BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI WERE PROBABLY ALSO INTENDED TO DAMPEN SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ABANDONED ITS POLICY OF MAINTAINING FRIENDLY OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN HAVE NO DOUBT INCREASED SOVIET CONCERN AND IRRITATION WITH THE SITUATION THERE, BUT WE SEE THIS AS A SHIFT IN THE ALWAYS

AMBIVALENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, RATHER THAN A SHIFT IN BASIC POLICY. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT IRANIAN POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL WAIT TO SEE WHAT FOLLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING A SERIOUS REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. END SUMMARY.

3. AS NOTED IN REF A, RECENT SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARIES ON IRAN HAVE PROVIDED AMPLE GROUNDS FOR WONDERING IF A REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN MIGHT BE UNDERWAY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF BOVIN'S NEDELYA ARTICLE (REF B), WHICH BLASTED THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND PAINTED KHOMEINI (THROUGH QUOTATIONS FROM HIS OWN STATEMENTS) AS A DANGEROUS RELIGIOUS FANATIC. GOROVOY'S CONVERSATION WITH DEPTOFF (REF C) ALSO TENDS TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A NEW SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

4. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, HOWEVER, BELIE A SHIFT IN OFFICIAL POLICY TOWARD IRAN. PRAVDA ON SEPTEMBER 11 PUBLISHED SEPARATE TELEGRAMS SENT BY KOSYGIN, WHILE OVERFLYING IRANIAN TERRITORY EN ROUTE TO ETHIOPIA, TO BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI. BOTH TELEGRAMS EMPHASIZE THE SOVIET UNION'S COMMITMENT TO DEVELOP GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH IRAN, AND -- IN THE TELEGRAM TO KHOMEINI -- ON A BASIS OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

5. MFA COUNSELOR AND CHIEF OF THE IRAN SECTION STANISLAV KONSTANTINOVICH KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF SEPTEMBER 12 THAT THERE HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. HE SAID THE BASIC STATEMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY CONTINUE TO BE BREZHNEV'S SPEECHES OF NOVEMBER 19, 1978, AND MARCH 2, 1979, AND ELABORATED THAT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAN ARE BASED ON GOOD-NEIGHBORLINESS, MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. KOVRIGIN ALSO TERMED "AUTHORITATIVE" THE TASS DENIAL (PRINTED IN SEPTEMBER 5 PRAVDA) OF CHARGES OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KURDISTAN BY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND NEWSPAPERS.

6. ASKED ABOUT RECENT CRITICISM OF IRAN IN THE SOVIET PRESS, KOVRIGIN DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY CRITICISM, SAYING THE SOVIET PRESS WAS MERELY REPORTING THE NEWS THERE AS WESTERN MEDIA DO. AS FOR THE BOVIN ARTICLE, KOVRIGIN INSISTED THAT BOVIN WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEWS AND THAT NEDELYA, UNLIKE PRAVDA, IS NOT AN AUTHORITATIVE PUBLICATION.

7. BOVIN HIMSELF TOLD AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST (PROTECT)

IN AN OFF-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW SEPTEMBER 12 THAT HIS WRITINGS REFLECT HIS OWN OPINIONS AND NOT NECESSARILY THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE DENIED THAT HIS NEDELYA ARTICLE ON IRAN MEANT A REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 22156

SAYING HE DOESN'T EVEN KNOW WHAT SOVIET POLICY IS. BOVIN DESCRIBED NEDELYA AS A "POPULAR" SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT (TO IZVESTIYA) WHICH IS NOT AT ALL AUTHORITATIVE.

8. IZVESTIYA SEPTEMBER 13 CARRIED A LONG ARTICLE BY ITS TEHERAN CORRESPONDENT WHICH IIPLICITLY CONTRADICTED MANY OF THE POINTS IN THE BOVIN ARTICLE. ENTITLED "IRAN: PROCESSES OF RENEWAL," THE IZVESTIYA ARTICLE

-- OFFERED EXCUSES FOR IRAN'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, SAYING THEY WERE NATURAL FOR THE INITIAL PERIOD OF ANY REVOLUTION AND ALSO THE RESULT OF ABANDONMENT BY FORMER WESTERN ECONOMIC PARTNERS;

-- SAID THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST DIRECTION OF THE IRANIAN SUPPORT WORLDWIDE;

-- CALLED THE SEVERING OF IRANIAN MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE TIES WITH THE US A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR GENERAL DETENTE AND PEACE;

-- SAID THE SOVIET UNION TOOK A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND IS READY TO COOPERATE

ACTIVELY WITH THE NEW IRAN; AND, IN CONCLUSION

SAID THE SOVIET PEOPLE VIEW WITH UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING IRAN AND SINCERELY WISH THE FRIENDLY IRANIAN PEOPLE A SOLUTION TO THEIR PROBLEMS.

9. COMMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE OBVIOUSLY BACKTRACING QUICKLY FROM THE IMPRESSION CREATED BY THE BOVIN ARTICLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS REASSESSING ITS IRAN POLICY. WE DO NOT TAKE AT FACE VALUE, HOWEVER, STATEMENTS THAT BOVIN WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS "PERSONAL OPINIONS." IT IS TRUE THE NEDELYA IS LESS AUTHORITATIVE THAN PRAVDA AND THAT BOVIN IS A MAVERICK, BUT HE IS ALSO REGARDED AS WELL-CONNECTED WITH SOVIET LEADERS. HIS ARTICLE PROBABLY ACCURATELY REFLECTS SOVIET IRRITATION OVER SOME RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN: THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE KURDS, THE SUPPRESSION OF LEFTISTS, INCLUDING THE TUDEH, IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC REBELLION IN AFGHANISTAN, DEFAULT ON GAS DELIVERY CONTRACTS, AND ABOVE ALL, ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION BY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND PRESS.

10. WE ARE NOT READY TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS AMOUNTS TO A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY, HOWEVER. AS NOTED IN REF D, THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN AMBIVALENT. WE SEE THE RECENT MIXED SIGNALS BEING EMITTED BY THE SOVIETS AS CONFIRMATION THAT THIS AMBIVALANCE STILL EXISTS, ALTHOUGH THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE MAY WEIGH SLIGHTLY MORE HEAVILY NOW THAN EARLIER. THE BOVIN ARTICLE AND OTHER RECENT CRITICISM OF IRAN PROBABLY SHOULD BE SEEN AS A WARNING THAT BT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 22156

THE SOVIETS CAN HIT BACK, IF IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADERS AND NEWSPAPERS CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH CRITICISM MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN A TRIAL BALLOON TO TEST REACTIONS TO A POTENTIAL SHIFT IN SOVIET POLICY; IF SO, THE SOVIETS WERE APPARENTLY SURPRISED BY THE STRONG REACTION IT GENERATED IN WESTERN AND IRANIAN MEDIA AND ARE NOW TRYING TO DOWNPLAY ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

11. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN IRAN AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL MOST LIKELY WAIT TO SEE WHAT FOLLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING A SERIOUS REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY. MFA DESK OFFICER KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF THAT IRAN'S FUTURE DEPENDS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND ON WHO WILL OCCUPY THE NEW ORGANS OF POLITICAL POWER. HE ADDED HIS "PERSONAL OPINION" THAT ALL OF IRAN'S CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PROVISIONAL NATURE OF THE PGOI. HE BELIEVED THAT THE CLERGY WOULD STILL CONSTITUTE THE MOST POWERFUL GROUP IN THE COUNTRY AFTER THE NEW CONSTITUTION TOOK EFFECT, BUT EXPRESSED MILD OPTIMISM ABOUT THE PENDING POLTIICAL STRUCTURE. ASKED IF HE SAW ANY OTHER RELIGIOUS FIGURES WITH THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF A KHOMEINI OR A TALEGHANI, KOVRIGIN SAID THERE WERE NONE IN VIEW. HE

CONCLUDED THIS DISCUSSION BY STRESSING THAT IRAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE IS FOR THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES TO DECIDE AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION STRICTLY ADHERES TO ITS POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

12. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION IS STICKING TO ITS POLICY OF PURSUING GOOD STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH IRAN FOR THE PRESENT. THE SOVIETS WOULD NO DOUBT PREFER A STRONGER SECULAR GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN; BUT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT KHOMEINI IS THE MOST POWERFUL IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURE BY FAR, AND THEY PROBABLY SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR ALTERING THAT REALITY. THEY ALSO KNOW THAT KHOMEINI IS 79 YEARS OLD AND CANNOT LAST FOREVER. AT LEAST AS LONG AS KHOMEINI DOMINATES IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE, WE BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE KNOWN ITS DISPLEASURE WITH IRANIAN POLICIES AND STATEMENTS HARMFUL TO SOVIET INTERESTS AND WILL WATCH FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE ITS INFLUENCE IN IRAN. HOWEVER, WE FEEL THAT MOSCOW WILL STOP SHORT OF TAKING DIRECT ACTIONS TO INFLUENCE EVENTS THERE. TOON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 LENINGRAD 02921

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, ENGR, UR, ZP
SUBJECT: LENINGRAD ZNANIYE SOCIETY SPEAKER DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, IN LECTURE ON POLITICS OF OIL PRODUCING STATES OF PERSIAN GULF

REF: MOSCOW 22156

1. SUMMARY: ON SEPTEMBER 16 LENINGRAD LECTURER DESCRIBED SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN AS ONE OF "VERY CAREFUL" (OCHEN' OSTOROZHNIYE) CONTACTS BASED ON RESPECT FOR IRANIAN INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORY. IN RESPONSE TO A LATER QUESTION HE SAID KURDISTAN WAS A "SECOND PALESTINE" AND THAT KURDS ALSO WANTED THEIR OWN NATIONAL STATE BUT THAT SOVIET TIES WITH KURDS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO INFLUENCE RELATIONS WITH IRAN. NOTING THAT U.S INFLUENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA HAD DIMINISHED, SPEAKER SAID ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN USSR AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE "GREAT VICTORY" FOR SOVIET UNION AND THAT A SOVIET "WORKING GROUP" WAS CARRYING ON IMPORTANT WORK IN THIS CONNECTION AT PRESENT TIME. END SUMMARY.

2. IN SEPTEMBER 16TH ZNANIYE SOCIETY LECTURE ENTITLED: "PROBLEMS OF THE OIL POLICIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF STATES," CANDIDATE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES, L.V. KARNAKOV, GAVE HIS AUDIENCE SOME BASIC LESSIONS IN THE POLITICS OF OIL. LECTURE TOOK PLACE IN MAIN LENINGRAD HALL OF THIS SOVIET PROPAGANDA ORGANIZATION AND WAS ATTENDED BY ABOUT 100 PEOPLE. LECTURER, WHO APPEARED TO BE AN EXPERT IN MIDDLE EAST, CITED NUMEROUS STATISTICS TO DEMONSTRATE ROLE PLAYED BY PERSIAN GULF STATES IN THE OIL SUPPLY OF NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. BEGINNING WITH ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN MAJOR COMPANIES AND PRODUCING STATES IN POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD, HE DESCRIBED POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE 1970'S WHICH WEAKENED CAPITALIST CONTROL OF OIL RESOURCES IN THIS AREA. CENTERPIECE OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS WAS REVOLUTION IN IRAN. MAJOR WORLD FACTORS WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT A CHANGE IN BALANCE BETWEEN PRODUCING AND CONSUMING STATES WERE RISE OF SOCIALIST CAMP WHICH RENDERED IMPOSSIBLE DIRECT WESTERN INTERVENTION IN AREA TO PROTECT ITS "VITAL INTERESTS", AND INCREASING DEMAND FOR PETROLEUM WHICH CREATED A SELLERS' MARKET.

3. ALTHOUGH SPEAKER MADE OCCASIONAL REFERENCES TO EFFECTS OF NEW WEALTH ON LOCAL LIVING CONDITIONS AND INTERNAL SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH LECTURER AND HIS LISTENERS (JUDGING FROM THEIR QUESTIONS) TOOK FOR TRANTED THAT AREA WAS INTERESTING PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF ITS KEY STRATEGIC POSITION IN EAST-WEST STRUGGLE. AMONG MORE INTERESTING POINTS MADE BY LECTURER WERE:

A. THE SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN MUST BE CONDUCTED "VERY CAREFULLY." IRAN IS BOTH ANI-SOVIET AND ANI-AMERICAN. WE MUST RE-EMP SIZE OUR RESPECT FOR IRANIAN INDEPENDENCE AND TERRIT

B. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT KURDISTAN (WHICH WAS NOT MENTIONED IN HIS INITIAL PRESENTATION) SPEAKER DESCRIBED IT AS A "SECOND PALESTINE," RECALLING THAT THE PALESTINE PROBLEM WOULD NEVER BE SOLVED UNTIL THERE WAS A PALESTINIAN STATE. HE NOTED THAT IRANIANS REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE A MULTI-NATIONAL CHARACTER OF STATE, ALTHOUGH IN REALITY, THERE WERE NO "IRANIANS," ONLY PERSIANS, AZERBAYDZHANIS, ETC. SPEAKER ADDED, HOWEVER, "THAT WE CAN'T LET OUR TIES WITH THE KURDS SPOIL OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAN."
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RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0019
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C. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONER WHO WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER IRAN WAS A THEOCRACY, SPEAKER SAID COUNTRY WAS TOO WELL DEVELOPED TO HAVE A MEDIEVAL POLITICAL SYSTEM.

D. NOTING THAT A U.S. DOMINATION OF SAUDI ARABIA HAD BEEN WEAKENED IN RECENT TIMES (CITING SA FAILURE TO SUPPORT CAMP DAVID AGREEMTNTS, TERMINATION OF SUPPORT FOR EGYPT, AS EXAMPLES), SPAKER SAID IT WOULD BE A "GREAT VICTORY" FOR USSR TO HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET WORKING GROUP WAS CARRYING ON IMPORTANT WORK IN THIS CONNECTION AT PRESENT.

E. SPAKER SAID THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAD ALSO SUFFERED ALONG WITH WEST FROM OPEC PRICES, BUT OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES HAD ESTABLISHED A FUND TO REDUCE THE HARM THAT WAS DONE. HE NOTED THAT THE WEST SOUGHT TO DIVIDE THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES FROM OPEC BY BLAMING THE LATTER FOR THIS SITUUTION.

4. COMMENT: ZNANIYE LECTURERS TEND TO FALL INTO TWO CATEGORIES, PROFESSIONAL PROPAGANDISTS, WHO CAN BE RELIED UPON TO ADHERE EXPERTLY TO EVERY NUANCE OF THE CURRENT LINE, AND SPECIALISTS SUCH AS KARNAKOV, WHOSE REMARKS SOMETIMES BETRAY A CONFLICT BETWEEN THEIR OWN JUDGEMENTS AND WHAT CURRENT POLICY REQUIRES THAT THEY SAY. KARNAKOV'S COMPARISON OF THE KURDS WITH THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD PERHAPS BE EVALUATED IN THIS LIGHT. BUCHANAN
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 9/25/79

SUBJECT: Situation in Iran and Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS: Vasiliy K. Gorovoi — First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.

Stephen Grummon — Iran Analyst INR/RNA/SOA

DATE: September 24, 1979

PLACE: State Department

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Gorovoi appeared to have three topics that he wished to discuss. First he wanted to know the state of US-Iranian rela I replied that our basic position was that the Iranians had to sort out their political differences before any sort of meaningful relationship could be reestablished. We also felt that it was essentially up to the Iranians to determine the pace of this process.

Gorovoi then asked about our supplying the armed forces with spare part I said that we had supplied the Iranians with spare part that had been bought and paid for prior to th revolution. I then went on to point out that we were still in the process of reviewing with the Iranians several other contracts.

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Gorovoi then questioned me about the ethnic minorities. I replied that it seemed to me that potentially the Arabs of Khuzistan represented the greatest threat to the Khomeini regime. Gorovoi seemed surprised and asked about the Kurds. I agreed that the Kurds were a serious problem, but that they were not capable of critically crippling the present regime, something that could happen if the Khuzistan situation got out of control. Gorovoi then commented that Khomeini could have handled the situation more adeptly than he did and that his tactics represented poor judgment. I concurred.

Gorovoi then turned to what he called the "sad state" of the joint US/USSR Indian Ocean talks. He lamented about the suspension of the talks commenting that since such good progress had been made in the past, that it was a shame that we could not continue down the same path. He acknowledged that the political complexion of the region had changed, but said that this fact should not alter the basic fact that both countries had a mutual interest in resuming the talks.

I responded that one way to get the talks back on track would be for the Soviets to help allay US suspicions by refraining from a massive troop intervention in Afghanistan and/or by withdrawing the troops in Cuba. Gorovoi acknowledged my comment with a non-commital response.

I then asked Gorovoi if he had read Ramazani's article in Foreign Affairs Quarterly about Persian Gulf security. (Ramazani suggests that the time is propitious for the Persian Gulf littoral countries to sign a regional security pact.) He responded that the Gulf was part of the Indian Ocean and that Gulf security problems could only be solved in the wider context of Indian Ocean security.

I then asked Gorovoi for his views of the present situation in Iran. Cutting through the Marxian rhetoric Gorovoi believes:

--The Revolution has not yet run its course;

--Khomeini is still the preeminent power and that there is no single group who can effectively challenge him. He does not see Bakhtiyar as a serious contender.

Gorovoi then asked if I thought Khomeini would export his revolution. He pointed out that it seemed that there was a contradiction between Iran's professed policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and their claim to support Moslem rebel groups. He was particularly concerned about Afghanistan. I replied that certainly Khomeini was potentially laying the groundwork for an activist

foreign policy, but that at the present there seemed to be more rhetoric than action.

In response to a question about Soviet-Iranian relations Gorovoi defensively said that the USSR had not shifted its policy toward Iran (as some may believe based on recent newspaper commentary) and that the Soviets wanted good relations with the present regime. Gorovoi felt that the Soviets would be able to finish development projects which have been 50% or more completed. (When I asked what specific projects would be completed, he said that he did not have such detailed information.) Projects that were less than 50% complete have been frozen.

Afghanistan

We briefly touched on Afghan affairs. Gorovoi believes that time is on Kabul's side and that eventually the peasants will come to realize that the present regime was a bulwark against feudal reactionaries. He indicated that Moscow was prepared to help Kabul until the peasants saw the light.

Gorovoi asked me if we were contemplating any change of attitude toward Kabul. I said that I was not aware of any change.

Biography

Gorovoi grew up in Moscow, but is of Ukranian origin (he doesn't speak Ukranian). He spent 10 years in Korea and says he speaks the language. He also has worked on Indian Ocean negotiations. He has been posted in Washington since August, 19

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SUBJ: USEUCOM INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY CABLE (EISC) 161-79. (U)
THERE ARE FIVE ITEMS IN THE 5 OCTOBER EISC.
1. USSR: IL-86. (C)
2. USSR: BREZHNEV SPEECH. (C/NOFORN)
3. GHANA: POST TRANSITION PROBLEMS. (S/NOFORN)
4. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. (S)
5. INDICATIONS AND WARNING STATUS: NO CHANGE. (W)

PAGE 2 RUSNAAA1349 S E C R E T NOFORN ECJ2-W 18820

1978. 1. (C - ALL PARAS) USSR: AEROFLOT'S RECENT RECEIPT OF ITS FIRST ILYUSHIN-86 (CA R) UNDERSCORES MOSCOW'S STRONG DESIRE TO HAVE A SOVIET-BUIL WIDE-BODIED AIRCRAFT IN OPERATION FOR THE 1980 OLYMPICS.
THE IL-86, ANNOUNCED IN 1971 AND FIRST FLOWN IN 1976, HAS SUFFERED FROM A SERIES OF DELAYS CAUSED PRIMARILY BY INDECISION ON THE DESIGN AND CONFIGURATION OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE NEED FOR A LARGE, FUEL-EFFICIENT, QUIET POWER PLANT. SOVIET DESIGNERS FINALLY LOCKED IN ON A TRADITIONAL DESIGN AND A SEATING ARRANGEMENT FOR UP TO 350 PASSENGERS, BUT HAVE NEVER REALLY SOLVED THE ENGINE PROBLEM. EFFORTS TO PRODUCE DOMESTICALLY A LARGE THRUST, MORE FUEL EFFICIENT COMMERCIAL ENGINE HAVE FALTERED, WHILE NUMEROUS TALKS WITH WESTERN ENGINE MANUFACTURERS TO PROCURE A SUITABLE ENGINE HAVE YIELDED NO CONCRETE RESULTS. FAILURE TO OBTAIN THE NEEDED POWER PLANT HAS LEFT THE CURRENT MODEL OF THE IL-86 WITH THE RANGE OF 1,800 NAUTICAL MILES, ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE RANGE OF THE TYPICAL U.S. WIDE-BOD?; DESPITE ITS OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS THE SOVIETS WILL USE

PAGE 3 RUSNAAA1497 S E C R E T NOFORN WNINTEL
MOST OF THE REMAINING PROGRAMS ARE ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. OUTPUT OF THE LONG AND MEDIUM RANGE CARELESS EDGED UP SLIGHTL BUT THE PRODUCTION OF TWO OTHER JETS, THE LONG-RANGE CLASSIC AND THE MEDIUM RANGE CRUSTY, WAS MAINTAINED AT THE SAME LEVEL OF RECENT YEARS.

ANOTHER CHARGER SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT WAS COMPLETED IN EARLY 1979, BRINGING THE CUMULATIVE TOTAL OUTPUT TO 13. THIS PROGRAM, HOWEVER, IS STILL EXPERIENCING PROBLEMS AND MAY SOON END.

SEVERAL NEW TRANSPORTS ARE NOW UNDER DEVELOPMENT, BUT LIMITE PROGRESS HAS BEEN SEEN IN ANY OF THE PROGRAMS. ONLY TWO CAM THE 350-PASSENGER AIRBUS, HAVE THUS FAR BEEN PRODUCED IN 197 THE CUMULATIVE TOTAL IS NOW FOUR, AND MORE ARE EXPECTED FOR U BY AEROFLOT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE 1980 OLYMPICS, BUT PROBL WITH THIS PROGRAM ARE BELIEVED TO EXIST. CONSIDERABLE SLIPPA HAS ALSO OCCURRED IN THE CLOBBER TRANSPORT PROGRAM. THE AIRC FIRST FLEW IN 1975, BUT SERIES PRODUCTION WILL REPORTEDLY NOT BEGIN UNTIL NEXT YEAR.

IN OTHER PROGRAMS THE SOVIETS REPORT THAT A SECOND COALER

PAGE 4 RUSNAAA1497 S E C R E T NOFORN WNINTEL
HAS BEEN BUILT. THIS LIGHT, SHORT TAKEOFF AND LANDING AIRCRAF IS CURRENTLY RATED BY THE SOVIETS AS AN EXPERIMENTAL MOEL, AND SEVERAL YEARS OF FLIGHT TESTING WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE ANY DECISION IS REACHED CONCERNING SERIES PRODUCTION.

NO INDICATION HAS BEEN OBSERVED OF PROGRESS IN THE CLINE PROGRAM. (THIS AIRCRAFT IS A MODIFIED CURL DERIVATIVE AND IS PRIMARILY SLATED FOR EXPORT.

OVERALL, FURTHER DECREASES IN TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION CAN BE EXPECTED UNTIL SO[illegible] OF THE NEWER MORE FUEL EFFICIENT AIRCRAFT,SUCH AS CLOBBER AND CAMBER, ARE PRODUCED IN LARGER QUAWTITIES. (MR SHACKELFORD, PM 6288) (SOURCE: DIA, USEUCOM J2. (S) OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:
A. (S) USSR: ORBITED A SECOND GENERATION NAVAL NAVIGATION SUPPORT SATELLITE ON 16 OCT. SIX PRESENTLY OPERATIONAL. (DEF
B. (U) ISRAEL: SECURITY FORCES BLEW UP THREE HOUSES IN GAZA WHICH BELONGED TO ARAB LIBERATION FRONT MEMBERS, ONE OF WHOM CONFESSED TO KILLING AN ISRAELI SOLDIER IN JAN. (PRESS)

C. (C) WESTERN SAHARA: POLISARIO ATTACKED AND OVERRAN MOROCCAN BASE AT MAHBES, SOUTH OF ZAAG, ON 14 OCT. DETAILS

PAGE 5 RUSNAAA1497 S E C R E T NOFORN WNINTEL
NOT REPORTED. (USDAO RABAT)
D. (C) ZAMBIA: ON 12 OCT, TWO MAJOR BRIDGES OVER THE CHAMBEZI RIVER IN NORTHWESTERN ZAMBIA BLOWN UP SEVERING THE MAIN RAIL AND ROAD LINK TO DAR ES SALAAM. LUSAKA PUBLICALLY CHARGED RHODESIAN COMMANDOS WITH THE ATTACK. WILL FORCE ZAMBIA TO REL MORE ON RHODESIA'S TRANSPORT ROUTES. (USDAO PRETORIA)
3. (U) INDICATIONS AND WARNING (I&W) STATUS: THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE I&W STATUS SECTION FOR TODAY, 17 OCT 79. (SOURCE: USEUCOM J2)
REVW 16 OCT 99
BT
#1497

REMAINS AT A STANDSTILL. PARLIAMENT HAS YET TO CONFIRM PRESIDENT LIMANN'S MINISTERIAL NOMINATIONS, LEAVING THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT WITHOUT LEADERSHIP.

LIMANN IS ALSO CONCERNED OVER THE DELICATE POLITICAL SITUATION. FORMER CHAIRMAN RAWLINGS HAS YET TO DEPART GHANA. HE REMAINS A POPULAR PUBLIC FIGURE AND AT LEAST A POTENTIAL HINDERANCE TO LIMANN'S FLEDGLING REGIME.

CLASHES HAVE BEEN REPORTED BETWEEN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND GHANAIAN POLICE IN TAKORADI LAST WEEKEND. POLICE ARRESTED TWO AIR FORCE MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND ABOUT 200 AIRMEN RETALIATED BY MARCHING ON THE POLICE STATION AND BARRACKS WHILE TWO AIRCRAFT FLEW OVERHEAD AND NUMEROUS WARNING SHOTS WERE FIRED. AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF POLICEMEN WERE BEATEN AND FIVE WERE TAKEN TO TAKORADI AIR STATION. ONE POLICEMAN REPORTEDLY DIED LATER. YESTERDAY, GHANAIAN POLICE BEGAN A NATIONAL STRIKE IN PROTEST, LEAVING BANKS AND OTHER SENSITIVE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

UNPROTECTED. THE STRIKE, IF IT CONTINUES, COULD SETBACK THE RECENTLY IMPROVED SECURITY SITUATION. LINGERING RUMORS ABOUT MILITARY ELEMENTS PLOTTING TO RETAKE CONTROL CANNOT BE TOTALLY

PAGE 6 RUSNAAA1349 S E C R E T NOFORN ECJ2-W 18820
DISCOUNTED. THE RECENT VIOLENCE, RAWLINGS' CONTINUED PRESENCE, AND LIMANN'S INABILITY TO GET THE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY MOVING DO NOT BODE WELL FOR A QUICK RESOLUTION OF GHANA'S PROBLEMS.
(MAJ FERGUSON, PM 6284) (SOURCE: DIA)
4. (S) OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:
A. (U) NORTH/SOUTH YEMEN: JOINT STATEMENT ON UNIFICATION NOTED ONLY THAT COMMITTEES WOULD CONTINUE TO MEET. NO PROGRESS TOWARD UNIFICATION ACHIEVED. (PRESS)
B. (S) NIGERIA: BEGAN RECEIVING T-55 TANKS PURCHASED FROM USSR. FIVE DELIVERED, 60 MORE EXPECTED. CREWS BEING TRAINE IN INDIA AND IN THE USSR. (DIA, USDAO LAGOS)
5. (U) INDICATIONS AND WARNING (I&W) STATUS: THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE I&W STATUS SECTION FOR TODAY, 5 OCT 79.
(SOURCE: USEUCOM J2)
REVW 4 OCT 99
BT
#1349

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TO AIG 994
INFO RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENGLAND
SIXTHFLT
MIDEASTFOR
ZEN/INFO USDAO PRAGUE CZECHOSLOVAKIA
ZEN/INFO USDAO BUDAPEST HUNGARY
ZEN/INFO USDAO BELGRADE YUGOSLAVIA
ZEN/INFO USDAO THE HAGUE NETHERLANDS
ZEN/INFO USDAO COPENHAGEN DENMARK
BT
S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL ECJ2-W SECTION 1 OF 2
WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLV
SUBJ: USEUCOM INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY CABLE (EISC) 162-79. (U)
THE 9 OCTOBER EISC CONTAINS FOUR ITEMS.
1. USSR: BREZHNEV SPEECH AFTERMATH. (S)
2. RHODESIA/MOZAMBIQUE RAIDING ACTIVITY. (S/NOFORN)
3. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/WNINTEL
4. INDICATIONS AND WARNING STATUS: NO CHANGE, FULL CHART. (S/NOF

PAGE 2 RUSNAAA1902 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL ECJ2-W

1. (S - ALL PARAS) USSR: DURING SATURDAY' CELEBRATIONS COMMEMORATING THE 32TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GDR, SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHWEV ANNOUNCED THAT THE USSR WOULD UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW UP TO 20,000 #SERVICEMEN" AND 1,000 TANKS FROM EAST GERMANY WITHIN THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS. BREZHNEV IMPLIED THAT THESE FORCES WOULD BE REMOVED FROM CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT THEIR COMPOSITION OR REDISPOSITION.

BREZHNEV ALSO OFFERED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MEANS, DEPLOYED TO THE WESTERN USSR, IN EXCHANGE FOR THE STATUS QUO IN SUCH SYSTEMS IN THE WEST. HE OFFERED, AS WELL, TO NEGOTIATE ON PROPOSALS DEALING WITH EXERCISES AND TROOP MOVEMENTS AS FOLLOWS: REDUCE CEILING FOR EXERCISE NOTIFICATION FROM MORE THAN 25,000 TROOPS TO 20,000; NOTIFY OF GROUND FORCE MOVEMENTS OF OVER 20,000 TROOPS; ELIMINATE MILITARY EXERCISES INVOLVING MORE THAN 40-50,000 MEN.

ON SUNDAY, TASS COMMENTARY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE WEST WAS EXPECTED TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET LEAD BY MAKING SIMILAR CONCESSIONS. THE NEBULOUSNESS OF THE ANNOUNCED WITHDRAWAL, AND THE SUBSEQUENT

PAGE 3 RUSNAAA1902 S E E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL ECJ2-W
CALL FOR RECIPROCITY, SUGGEST THAT SOME ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET OFFER, SUCH AS ACTUAL NUMBER OF TROOPS "UP TO" 20,000 AND THEIR DESTINATION, MAY BE CONDITIONAL ON WESTERN MOVES. THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWALS ARE AMBIGUOUS, AT BEST. IF DRAWN FROM THE GROUND FORCES, 20,000 MEN COMPRISE TWO OF THE 20 GSFG DIVISIONS, YET ARE ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF GSFG PERSOWNEL OVERALL. THE REDUCTION COULD BE SPREAD OUT WITH LITTLE EFFECT. ADDITIONALLY, THESE PERSONWEL COULD BE RELEASED FROM ACTIVE DUTY, BUT REMAIN IN THE GDR.
1,000 TANKS MAKE UP THE INVENTORY OF THREE DIVISIONS, YET COULD BE DRAWN FROM TANKS REPLACED IN THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS, BUT NOT YET RETROGRADED TO THE USSR, AS WELL AS, FROM TRAINING UNITS, WITHOUT DIMINISHING ACTIVE TANK STRENGTH. A REORGANIZATION IN GSFG CANNOT BE RULED OUT AND THE USEUCOM TROOP ROTATION TASK FORCE WILL MONITOR AND REPORT ON ANY OBSERVABLE FORCE CHANGES DURING THE UPCOMING FALL INDUCTION AND RELEASE.
EUROPEAN LEADERS PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THE OUTWARDLY POSITIVE ASPECTS OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, BUT HAVE

NOTED THE POTENTIAL OF SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT FOR DERAILING NATO

PAGE 4 RUSNAAA1902 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL ECJ2-W
PLANS TO UPGRADE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, AGAINST WHAT WOULD STILL BE A SUPERIOR WARSAW PACT FORCE IN EASTERN EUROPE. (MAJ FREEMAN, PM 6182) (SOURCE: DIA, USMISSION NATO, USAREUR, USEUCOM J2)
2. (S/NOFORN - ALL PARAS) RHODESIA/MOZAMBIQUE: RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES ARE INTO THE THIRD MONTH OF ALMOST CONTINUOUS RAIDS ON TARGETS IN MOZAMBIQUE. THE LATEST MAJOR CROSS-BORDER ATTACK BEGAN ON 27 SEPTEMBER AND LASTED UNTIL 1 OCTOBER. THE FOCUS OF THE ATTACK WAS ON THE LARGEST ZANU CAMP, 40 MILES NORTHEAST OF UMTALI, IN CENTRAL MOZAMBIQUE. REPORTS FROM SALISBURY INDICATE ZANU RESISTANCE WAS STIFFER THAN EXPECTED, BUT AIR STRIKES AND A FRONTAL ASSAULT EVENTUALLY ROUTED THE DEFENDERS FROM TUNNELS AND BUNKERS OF THE COMPLEX, WHICH REPORTEDLY COVERED 25 SQUARE MILES. THE GUERRILLA DEATH TOLL MAY BE AS HIGH AS 1,000. THE DEFECTION OF TWO MOZAMBICAN ARMY MEMBERS, ONE OF WHOM WAS AN OFFICER, PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE RAID, AS THEY PROVIDED DETAILS ON THE TARGET. LARGE QUANTITIES OF DOCUMENTS, SUPPLIES, AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS,

WERE CAPTURED OR DESTROYED. THE ONLY INVOLVEMENT OF MOZAMBICAN FORCES APPARENTLY WAS A FORCE OF SIX T-34 TANKS WHICH WERE

PAGE 5 RUSNAAA1902 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL ECJ2-W

DRIVEN OFF BY RHODESIAN TROOPS USING CAPTURED ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. THIS LATEST RAID CONTRASTS WITH EARLIER RAIDS IN SEPTEMBER, IN WHICH MOZAMBICAN FACILITIES SUFFERED HEAVY DAMAGE. BRIDGES RAIL LINES, AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE, USED LOGISTICALLY BY THE GUERRILLAS IN SOUTH MOZAMBIQUE, WERE DAMAGED OR DESTROYED IN THE EARLIER RAIDS. MOZAMBICAN OFFICIALS UNDOUBTEDLY ARE ANGERED BY THE RAIDS, AND THE CONTINUING INCURSIONS ARE PUTTING INCREASED PRESSURE ON MAPUTO TO ACCEPT EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE. THE MOZAMBICANS PROBABLY ALSO FEAR THE RAIDS COULD CAUSE ZANU TO QUIT THE SETTLEMENT TALKS IN LONDON, WHICH THIS MORNING WERE REPORTED TO BE NEAR THE BREAK-DOWN POINT. ONCE MORE, THE RHODESIANS HAVE RECENTLY REFRAINED FROM ATTACKING FORCES OF ZAPU, BASED IN ZAMBIA. ZAPU INFILTRATION INTO RHODESIA UNDOUBTEDLY HAS CONTINUED, BUT CONTACTS BETWEEN ZAPU FORCES AND THE RHODESIANS APPEAR TO BE MINIMAL. WHILE ZAPU LEADER NKOMO SEEMS TO HAVE HIS FORCES ON STANDDOWN, AWAITING THE OUTCOME OF THE SETTLEMENT TALKS

IN LONDON, THE LACK OF RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON ZAPU GIVES RISE TO SPECULATION THAT NKOMO MAY HAVE MADE A DEAL WITH SOMEONE IN THE RHODESIAN HIERARCHY TO STANDDOWN HIS TROOPS IN EXCHANGE

PAGE 6 RUSNAAA1902 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL ECJ2-W
FOR A PROHIBITION ON RAIDS AGAINST ZAPU CAMPS IN ZAMBIA.
(MR THOM, PM 6284) (SOURCE: DIA, USEUCOM J2)
3. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/WNINTEL) OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:
A. (S) USSR: ORBITED COSMOS 1139, A LORES PHOTO/GEOPHYSICAL SATELLITE, ON 5 OCT. A MEDRES PHOTO SATELLITE ALSO CURRENTLY IN ORBIT. (DEFSMAC)
B. (S/NOFORN) USSR: DETONATED A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE UNDERGROUND IN CENTRAL USSR ON 4 OCT. ESTIMATED YIELD 39 KT. (IA)
C. (S) EAST GERMANY: "NATIONAL DAY" PARADE HELD ON 7 OCT. T-72 TANKS SEEN, AS ANTICIPATED. SA-9 TEL ALSO APPEARED. PROBABLY BORROWED FROM GSFG. (USCOM BERLIN)
D. (S) FRANCE: APPARENTLY DECIDED TO SEND AGI BERRY TO THE CARIBBEAN FOR ABOUT A MONTH TO BE TARGETED AGAINST CUBA. MISSION TO BE MAINLY COMINT INTERCEPTION AND INCLUDE AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF FIXED LISTENING SITE ON MARTINIQUE OR GUADELOUPE

FEASIBLE. ALSO TO MOWITOR OTHER TRANSMISSIONS DEALING WITH CUBAN MILITARY FORCES AND INTERESTS IN AFRICA. (DIA)
E. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/WNINTEL) TURKEY: ARMY SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES IN CONNE TION WITH 14 OCTOBER
BT
#1902

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UNNVV   ESB038BRN883
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H RUSNAAA #1903 2821100
NT SSSSS                                                    DAO
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EN/INFO USDAO COPENHAG   DENMARK
T
E C R E T   NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL ECJ2-W  FINAL SECTION OF 2
LECTIONS.  ONE-THIRD OF ARMY ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY
UNCTION IN PROVINCES IN WHICH ELECTIONS TO BE HELD. (USEUCOM)
. (U) TURKEY:  INTERIOR MINISTER GUNES SUBMITTED RESIGNATION
O ECEVIT GOVERNMENT OVER WEEKEND.  MOVE APPARENTLY APOLITICAL,
ELATED TO ALLEGED AMOROUS LIAISON WITH A SINGER.  FORESTS
INISTER ILHAN APPOINTED YESTERDAY TO REPLACE GUNES. (PRESS)
. (U) LEBANON:  40 KIDNAPPED, INCLUDING 7 MEMBERS OF FORMER


AGE 2 RUSNAAA1903 S E C R E T   NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL ECJ2-W
RESIDENT FRANJIYAH'S FAMILY AND POSSIBLY 7 KILLED IW NORTH,
ONDAY.  COULD SPARK RENEWAL OF INTRA-CHRISTIAN HOSTILITIES.
PRESS, USEUCOM J2)


. (S/NOF$RN)  INDICATIONS AND WARNING (IW) STATUS:
 (S/NOFORN)  THE MILITARY AND POLITI(AL CONDITI$NS
 ALL COUNTRIES WITHIN THE USEUCOM AREAS OF INTELLIGENCE
ESPONSIBILITY AND INTEREST ARE ASSESSED FR$M AN IW STANDPOINT
$ NORMAL (5) WITH THB FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS:
  A.  MIDDLE EAST
OUNTRY/CATEG$RY          STATUS T$DAY  STATUS PAST  DATE CHANGED  CONDITIONS
AN/P$LITICAL                    2      2FEB79  GENERAL INSTABILITY.
RIA-ISRAEL/MILITARY        4    3       APR76   TENSIONS/INCIDENTS.
EBANON-ISRAEL/MILITARY     4    3    14 JUN 78 POSSIBILITY FOR
                                                FURTHER INCIDENTS.
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PAGE 3 RUSNAAA1903 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL EC

LEBANON/POLITICAL	4	3	17NOV78	REDUCTION OF TENSION .
SOUTH YEMEN/POLITICAL	4	5	13AUG79	TURMOIL.
B. OTHER				
NATO				
TURKEY/POLITICAL	4	5	26DEC78	INTERNAL TURMOIL
MEDITERRANEAN/NORTH AFRICA				
EGYPT-LIBYA/MILITARY	4	5	JUL78	BORDER TENSIONS.
ALGERIA-MOROCCO/MILITARY	4	3	23 MAR 76	POSSIBILITY OF M TARY CONFRONTATI OVER WESTERN SA
MAURITANIA/MILITARY	4	3	23MAR76	OPERATIONS AGAIN GUERRILLAS IN WESTERN SAHA
OTHER				
ETHIOPIA/POLITICAL	4		19 JUN 78	INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH.
ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA/MILITARY	4	3	15 JUN 78	SOMALI DIRECTED INSURGENCY IN

PAGE 4 RUSNAAA1903 S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL EC

				ETHIOPIA'S OGADE REGION CONTI
CHAD/MILITARY	4	5	15DEC78	INSURGENCY.
CHAD/POLITICAL	4	3	02APR79	INTERNAL TURMOIL.
UGANDA/POLITICAL	4	5	18APR79	INSTABILITY.
RHODESIA/MILITARY	4	5	14DEC78	INSURGENCY.
DESIA/POLITICAL	4	5	13APR79	INTENSIFYING INSURGENCY WITHI RHODESIA
LA/POLITICAL	4	5	1RSEP79	UNCERTAINTY.

JRCE: WSEUCOM JB)
8 OCT 9

33

SSG H.
CIRCULATE FOR ALL TO READ FOR INFO.

A/M

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: H.E. Vladimir Vinograd, Ambassador of U.S.S.R. to Iran
L. Bruce Laingen, American Charge d'Affaires, ad interim, Tehran, Iran

TIME AND PLACE: Wednesday, October 10, 1979, at Residence of Soviet Ambassador in Tehran

SUBJECT: Conversation with Soviet Ambassador

I made a courtesy call on the Soviet Ambassador at his residence on the Soviet Compound (ten hectares) in downtown Tehran. The Ambassador speaks excellent English, is about 55 years old, soft-spoken and relaxed, a friendly fellow. He has been in Tehran for two-and-a-half-years. Earlier he served as Ambassador in Japan (with Reischauer) and as Ambassador in Cairo. From Cairo he was detailed to Geneva as Co-Chairman (with Bunker) of the once scheduled Geneva Conference on the Middle East.

His wife is with him. He has three grown children, all trained in the physical sciences. There are three grandchildren. He has just recovered from an appendectomy at the Soviet Hospital in Tehran.

The Ambassador said there are about 2,500 Russians in Iran, including families. The bulk of them are at the steel plant at Isfahan and at a currently building thermo electric power plant in Ahwaz -- the latter a turnkey project of considerable size. He said there was no military mission as such in Iran and no personnel except a "few technicians" at Shiraz. The Embassy maintains a school (four grades) on the Compound.

I probed a bit on Soviet experience here with Iranian capabilities in maintenance. He seemed careful to want to avoid any critical comments but allowed as how Soviet technicians had had difficulties in developing concepts of preventive maintenance, particularly at the Ahwaz project. He described Iranian iron ore deposits as of top quality; the problem at Isfahan related to coking coal, where one of the difficulties was getting Iranians to work effectively in below ground mines.

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The Ambassador seemed intrigued by the numbers of Iranians currently seeking visas to go to the United States. He commented with amusement on the contrast between that and the rather critical press treatment currently of the United States.

He described his midnight meeting with Taleghani, the same night in which Taleghani died. The Ambassador had just returned from Moscow and had sought the meeting to review Soviet policy with Taleghani and particularly to refute charges that the Soviets were involved in stirring up trouble in Kurdestan. He had told Taleghani that the Soviets had no interest in contributing to a fragmentation of Iran which would leave a number of small and weak states on the Soviet southern border. Much better, he said, a strong and independent Iran, friendly of course to the Soviet Union. He had asked Taleghani what proof there was of Soviet involvement; he had pooh-poohed Taleghani's reference to Kalashnikov machine guns, which the Ambassador said were made and found everywhere. He had liked Taleghani a moderate with whom one could have a dialogue. Taleghani had been prepared, after his midnight meeting, to say something positive about Soviet interests in Iran. His death had prevented that.

The Ambassador expressed puzzlement over the current upsurge of difficulty in Kurdestan. He thought it was not expected now. He professed to know very little about the Kurdish leadership.

He saw Iran having serious "nationalities" problems in the future if the regime did not face up to the problem more effectively. He had tried to persuade ministers in the PGOI of this, including Yazdi. The latter had emphasized that the regime was fully conscious of Kurdish sensitivities and that provisions in the constitution for local councils, local use of the language, etc., should meet Kurdish expectations. But this, said the Ambassador, was inadequate.

The Ambassador described at some length for me the approach to the nationalities issue taken by Lenin in the Soviet Union, which he said had proven correct. Lenin had insisted on providing the Republics the right to secede, determined that they should not but convinced that allowing them the right was necessary to keep them satisfied. This and other extensive provisions for self-government in the Soviet Union had kept the problem under control until today, when the evolution of a Soviet society untroubled by nationality issues had demonstrated the wisdom of Lenin's approach.

This was the line he was taking with the Iranians, but regrettably they seemed unable to appreciate the problems they faced and the need for a different approach.

The Ambassador described Khomeini as a rigid personality with whom it was difficult to have a dialogue but nonetheless a very able man. The Islamic State he envisaged was unrealistic for the long-term; Islam was an inadequate ideology as a unifying and governing force in a country like Iran.

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S E C R E T NOFORN WNINTEL
WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOL
ECJ2-W 19572
SUBJ: USEUCOM INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY CABLE (EISC) 166-79. (U)
THE 17 OCTOBER EISC CONTAINS THREE ITEMS
1. USSR: TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)
2. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. (S)
3. INDICATIONS AND WARNING STATUS: NO CHANGE. (U)

PAGE 2 RUSNAAA1497 S E C R E T NOFORN WNINTEL

1. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL - ALL PARAS) USSR: SOVIET PRODUCTION OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT TOTALED 180 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1979, A CONTINUATION OF THE DECLINE THAT WAS FIRST OBSERVED IN 1977.
THE DECREASE HAS AMOUNTED TO AN OVERALL 9 PERCENT THIS YEAR ON AN ANNUAL BASIS, AND IT HAS BEEN CONFINED TO SHORT-HAUL TRANSPORTS, ALTHOUGH CURL PRODUCTION REMAINS AT ABOUT 100 PER YEAR. THE COKE AND THE CODLING PROGRAMS ARE BEING PHASED DOWN AND COKE OUTPUT COULD HAVE ALREADY ENDED.
PRODUCTION OF ANOTHER SHORT-RANGE AIRCRAFT, THE PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE CLANK, MAY ALSO END THIS YEAR. IN CONTRAST TO THESE SMALLER TRANSPORTS, THE LONG AND MEDIUM-RANGE JETS HAVE GROWN AT A STEADY PACE. THEIR OUTPUT HAS MORE THAN DOUBLED DURING THE LAST SIX YEARS AND HAS NOW REACHED AN ANNUAL RATE OF ABOUT 180, IN THESE LONG AND MEDIUM RANGE PROGRAMS.
THE VERSATILE AND HIGH PRIORITY CANDID LONG-RANGE MILITARY JET TRANSPORT PROGRAM IS STILL PROGRESSING ACCORDING TO THE PATTERN OF RECENT YEARS AND MONTHLY OUTPUT HAS INCREASED TO ABOUT THREE.

PAGE 3 RUSNAAA1349 S E C R E T NOFORN ECJ2-W 18820
THE OLYMPICS TO HIGHLIGHT THE IL-86 WHILE PUSHING FOR GREATER
RECOGNITION FOR AEROFLOT'S OVERALL OPERATIONS. THE AIRLINE
IS BILLING ITSELF THE "OFFICIAL CARRIER OF THE OLYMPICS" AND
THE PHRASE IS PAINTED IN ENGLISH ON MANY OF ITS NEWER AIRCRAFT.
FOLLOWING SOME ADDITIONAL TESTING AND FLIGHT CREW FAMILIARIZATION,
THE IL-86 SHOULD BE IN SCHEDULED SERVICE BY SPRING, INITIALLY
ON A MIX OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS TO BE FOLLOWED BY INTERNATIONAL
SERVICE TO EASTERW AND WI ERN EUROPE. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT
PERHAPS 10 OF THE SOVIET DE BODIES WILL BE IN SCHEDULED
SERVICE WHEN THE OLYMPICS OPEN.
ALTHOUGH THE IL-86 WILL GET EXTENSIVE PRESS COVERAGE, ITS
SHORT RANGE AND THE SMALL NUMBER AVAILABLE STILL PRECLUDE
EXTENSIVE PARTICIPATION IN CHARTER OPERATIONS TO THE OLYMPICS.
INSTEAD AEROFLOT WILL USE SOME OF ITS 250 LONG-RANGE SL-62S AND
MEDIUM RANGE TU-154S FOR SUCH LUCRATIVE TRAFFIC. (MR SHACKELFORD,
PM 6298) (SOURCE: USEUCOM J2, VARIOUS)
2. (C/NOFORN - ALL PARAS) USSR: THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN
MOSCOW BELIEVES THAT THE USSR IS INTENSIFYING ITS PUBLIC

CAMPAIGN AGAINST DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING II AND CRUISE

PAGE 4 RUSNAAA1349 S E C R E T NOFORN ECJ2-W 18820
MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE EMBASSY, TAKING NOTE OF
PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ON MONDAY TO A VISITING SOCIALIST
INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION AND OF REPORTS IN PRAVDA THIS WEEK ON
NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION PLANS, SUGGESTS THAT MOSCOW
IS SETTING THE STAGE FOR BREZHNEV'S ANTICIPATED SPEECH IN EAST
BERLIN THIS SATURDAY. EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES ARE TO BE ONE
THEME OF THAT SPEECH.
THE SOVIET WARNING OF 19 SEPTEMBER IN PRAVDA THAT MOSCOW
WOULD MATCH WESTERN DEPLOYMENTS OF THESE MISSILES WAS REPEATED
YESTERDAY BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER ZAGLADIN AT A PRESS
CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. AN EARLIER ESTIMATE BY THE AMERICAN
EMBASSY MOSCOW, THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ADOPT A NON-THREATENING TONE
AT THIS TIME AS A MEANS OF MAKING A MORE POSITIVE IMPACT IN THE
WEST MAY NOT BE CORRECT. THE TONE AND CONTENT OF BREZHNEV'S
ADDRESS TOMORROW SHOULD GIVE FURTHER INDICATIONS OF SOVIET
INTENTIONS IN THIS REGARD. (MS BLISS, PM 6285)
(SOURCE: AMEMB MOSCOW, FBIS, USEUCOM J2)

3. (S/NOFORN - ALL PARAS) GHANA: DESPITE THE SM$OTH
TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE, ON 24 SEP, THE GHANAIAN BUREAUCRACY

PAGE 5 RUSNAAA1349 S E C R E T NOFORN ECJ2-W 18820

DE RUQMHR #1260 297 **
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INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0343
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 10/24/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:HPRECHT:GO
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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/24/85 (LAINGEN, L. BRUCE). OR-P
TAGS: IR, UR, PEPR
SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTS ON IRAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AT DINNER RECENTLY SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV SPOKE CANDIDLY OF PGOI. HE HAS SEEN VIRTUALLY ALL KEY LEADERS. AS AMIR-ENTEZAM OBSERVED, "IF YOU CLOSE ONE DOOR, HE COMES IN THE OTHER WITH A PROPOSAL OR SOME DEAL."

3. VINOGRADOV HAS SEEN KHOMEINI FOUR TIMES. HE DESCRIBED THE AYATOLLAH AS A MAN OF GREAT RECTITUDE, A TEACHER DISINCLINED TO LISTEN AND LITTLE VERSED IN POLITICAL REALITIES DOMESTICALLY OR INTERNATIONALLY. TALEGHANI, THE AMBASSADOR SAID, WAS MUCH MORE THE REALIST. VINOGRADOV THOUGHT BEHESHTI WAS THE MOST INTELLIGENT AND POLITICALLY SKILLFUL OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. BANI SADR MERITED ONLY SCORN.

4. THE SOVIETS THINK THE PGOI'S MOST DANGEROUS PROBLEM IS THE KURDISH REVOLT, FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY THE STAGNATED ECONOMY. VINOGRADOV FEELS THE IRANIANS ARE TRYING TO MANAGE THE KURDS WITH FORCE AND THE ECONOMY WITH DREAMY ISLAMIC THEORIES. NEITHER WILL WORK. ALTHOUGH THE KURDISH PROBLEM MAY EVENTUALLY BE SETTLED, THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT OF SHORTAGES, UNEMPLOYMENT AND OTHER SERIOUS ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES LEADING TO DISAFFECTION OF THE LOWER CLASSES FROM KHOMEINI. IT HAS ALREADY STARTED, BUT THE PROCESS COULD CONTINUE FOR A COUPLE YEARS. HE SUSPECTED THE IRAQIS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN CAUSING PROBLEMS WITH IRAN'S KURDS AND ARABS, BUT DISMISSED THE THOUGHT THAT THE USSR MIGHT HAVE INFLUENCE IN BAGHDAD TO RESTRAIN THE IRAQIS. "THEY ARE JUST CRAZY PEOPLE."
LAINGEN
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S E C R E T //N03840//
FOSIC PAC SPECIAL REPORT (U)
1. (C) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO THE CURRENT SOVIET NAVAL FORCE LEVEL IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.
2. (S) THE SOIVET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS GROWN OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS FROM SMALL FLAG SHOWING FORCE TO A CREDIBLE AND CONTINUOUSLY DEPLOYED SQUADRON, WITH A STANDING FORCE LEVEL AVERAGING 18-19 COMBATANTS AND AUXILIARIES. THE ROLE OF THE FORCE IS TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, SOVINDRON SEEKS TO ENHANCE SOVIET PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE AND, IN GENERAL, CONTRIBUTE TO THE USSR'S IMAGE AS A SUPERPOWER. MILITARILY, IT

PAGE 02 RUWPAAA2170 S E C R E T
CONDUCTS SURVEILLNACE OF, AND GATHERS INTELLIGENCE ON, OTHER NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA WHICH, DURING PERIODS OF INCREASED TENSION, IT MAY BE REQUIRED TO COUNTER. ADDITIONALLY, IT PROVIDES A CAPABILITY TO ESTABLISH CONTROL IN A LOCALIZED AREA, INTERVENE IN A GIVEN LOCAL SITUATION, AND A MEANS OF PROTECTING SOVIET INTEREST IN THE AREA. ROUTINE OPERATIONS BY COMBATANTS ARE GENERALLY LIMITED TO THE GULF OF ADEN AND SOUTHERN RED SEA AREAS, WITH APERIODIC MOVEMENTS TO THE PERSIAN GULF, NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA AND PORTCALLS AT VARIOUS INDIAN OCEAN COUNTRIES (F.G. MOZAMBIQUE, SEYCHELLES). THE SMALLER COMBATANTS AND MINESWEEPERS ROUTINELY CONDUCT PATROLS IN BAB EL MANDEB STRAIT. CURRENTLY, SOVIET AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS APPEAR TO FUNCTION IN A LOGISTICS TRANSPORT ROLE. LOCATING DATA SUGGEST THESE SHIPS ARE REGULARLY ENGAGED IN LOGISITCS SHUTTLE RUNS BETWEEN ADEN, SOMALI, WHERE SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS CAN OFFLOAD WITH SECURITY, AND THE ETHIOPIAN PORTS OF MASSAWA AND ASSAB. SOVIET SUBMARINES ARE THOUGHT TO PREFER AN AREA OF OPERATIONS IN THE MORE OPEN AND LESS CONGESTED AREAS OF THE EASTERN GULF OF ADEN AND THE WESTERN ARABIAN SEA. ALSO, THEY OCCASIONALLY VENTURE INTO THE SOUTHERN RED SEA. SOVINDRON SHIPS CONDUCT ONLY MINIMAL TRAINING, AND SPEND A LARGE PORTION OF THEIR DEPLOYMENTS AT THE VARIOUS SOVIET ESTABLISHED

PAGE Ø3 RUWPAAA2170 S E C R E T
ANCHORAGES.
2. (S) SINCE 1974, SOVINDRON FORCE LEVELS HAVE STABILIZED FOR SUBMARINES AT ABOUT 460 SHIP-DAYS PER YEAR; SURFACE COMBATANTS, AMPHIBIOUS, AND MINE WARFARE SHIPS HAVE BEEN AT APPROXIMATELY 2[illegible] SHIP-DAYS PER YEAR. IN 1978, HOWEVER, AMPHIBIOUS LEVELS MORE THA[illegible] DOUBLED FROM THE PREVIOUS 490 SHIP-DAY AVERAGE. THIS INCREASE IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA AND SUBSEQUENT SUPPORT TO ETHIOPIA IN ITS WAR WITH SOMALIA. ASSOCIATED WITH THE TWO EVENTS, AND THE CONCOMITANT INCREASE IN OPS TEMPO THEY ENTAIL WAS THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN NAVAL AND NAVAL ASSOCIATED AUXILIARIES DEPLOYED TO THE INDIAN OCEAN, UP APPROXIMATELY ONE TH FROM PREVIOUS YEARS. THE SOVINDRON IS PRIMARILY COMPRISED OF SOV PACIFIC OCEAN FLEET ASSETS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO RELY ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN FLEET TO PROVIDE THEIR ROUT INDIAN OCEAN PRESENCE, WHILE RETAINING THE CAPABILITY AND FELXIBILITY OF UTILIZING THE SUEZ CANAL FOR REINFORCEMENT FROM TH MEDITERRANEAN.
3. (S) SOVIET INDIAN OCEAN SQUADRON SHIP-DAYS:

	CY1978	CY1979 (TO 30 SEP)
SUBMARINE	467	365

PAGE Ø4 RUWPAAA2170 S E C R E T

SURFACE COMBATANT	1462	1478
AMPHIBOUS/MINE WARFARE	1555	848
AUXILIARY/SUPPORT	4959	3487

INCREASE IN COMBATANT LEVEL FOR 1979 IS PRIMARILY DUE TO INTERFLEET MOVEMENTS.
4. (S) PEAKS OF SOVILT NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN CO CORRELATED TO REGIONAL CRISES AND THE RECENT SPATE OF INTERFLEET TRANSFERS. EXAMPLES OF CONTEMPORARY REGIONAL CRISES, WHICH HAVE ELICITED A SOVIET RESPONSE, INCLUDE THE SOVIET OUSTER FROM SOMALI THE SOMALI-ETHIOPIA WAR, THE IRANIAN CRISIS, AND THE PDRY-YAR CLASH. DURING THE SUMMER AND FALL MONTHS OF 1979, THE SOVIETS TRANSFERRED TO THE PACIFIC SEVEN COMBATANTS AND TWO AUXILIARIES, INCLUDING CVHG MINSK.
5. (C) THE PRESENT LEVEL OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OC (5 COMBATANTS, 8 AUXILIARIES) IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THOSE OBSERVE DURING NON-CRISIS PERIODS AND IS ONLY SLIGHTLY BELOW NORMAL.
A. THE DECREASE IS MAINLY CAUSED BY SHIPS OF NO MILITARY THR (BUOY TENDERS, HYDROGRAPHIC SHIPS, SPACE SUPPORT SHIPS).
B. THREAT SHIPS ARE NOW 3 BELOW NORMAL LEVELS. THESE SHIPS MINOR COMBATANTS AND A SUBMARINE) SHOULD BE REPLACED IN THE NEAR

PAGE Ø5 RUWPAAA2170 S E C R E T

TERM, DURING THE ROUTINE WINTER TURNOVER.
4. (S) FACTORS WHICH COULD INFLUENCE A CHANGE IN SOVIET INDIAN OCEAN DEPLOYMENT LEVELS IN THE FUTURE INCLUDE:
A. ACCESS TO SUPPORT FACILITIES AT DEHALAK ISLAND AND ADEN REDUCING THE REQUIREMENT FOR AFLOAT LOGISTIC RESOURCES.
B. SOVINDRON CAN BE READILY REINFORCED FROM ASSETS IN THE BLACK AND MEDITERRANEAN SEAS VIA THE SUEZ CANAL.
C. THE INCREASINGLY FREQUENT SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, COUPLED WITH ACCESS TO SRV FACILITIES, AFFORDS THE CAPABILITY TO RAPIDLY AUGMENT THE INDIAN OCEAN SQUADRON.
D. THE POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL IS RELATIVELY STABLE AT THE MOMENT.
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5589
INFO RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0021
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0[illegible]A
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 32
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 13
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0021
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0017
RUCNKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0010
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5575
RUDKET/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0001
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0036
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0047
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0113
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, UR, XF
SUBJECT: LENINGRAD LECTURERS DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST

REF: LENINGRAD 3221, 3251, 3403 (NOTAL)

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN LENINGRAD'S CENTRAL LECTURE HALL ON OCTOBER 15 AND 26, SPEAKERS ON FOREIGN POLICY DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THE MIDDLEEAST. THEIR AUDIENCE WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. "CAMP DAVID" POLICY IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE, THAT THE POSITION OF MODERATE ARAB STATES IN THE AREA IS WEAKENING; THAT THE ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP IN IRAN HAS BETRAYED THE REVOLUTION AND SOME NEW "EXPLOSION" IS LIKELY; AND THAT IT IS NOT QUITE CLEAR WHAT HAPPENED IN CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENT TARAKI'S DEATH IN AFGHANISTAN. A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL REMARKS WERE ALSO OF INTEREST: E.G., THAT THE PLO UNDER ARAFAT IS EXPLORING SOME WAY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL; THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS ENDORSED THE USE OF EGYPTIAN "VOLUNTEERS" IN AFGHANISTAN, AND IS FUELING U.S. MILITARY AID TO MOROCCO AGAINST THE POLISARIO; THAT SUDAN'S PRESIDENT NUMAYRI IS UNDER GROWING PRESSURE TO ABANDON SUPPORT OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT OR RISK RENEWED CIVIL WAR IN THE SOUTH; AND THAT, ON THE STATE-TO-STATE LEVEL, SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS ARE "SATISFACTORY", BUT GAS SHIPMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN RESUMED TO THE USSR, WITH CONSEQUENT PROBLEMS, IN PARTICULAR FOR THE ARMENIAN S.S.R. END SUMMARY.

2. LECTURERS ON FOREIGN POLICY AT LENINGRAD'S MAIN LECTURE HALL RANGED SUPERFICIALLY OVER A NUMBER OF MIDDLE EASTERN TOPICS ON OCTOBER 15 AND 28.

-- SPEAKER ON OCTOBER 28 PICTURED THE "CAMP DAVID POLICY" AS BEING ON THE VERGE OF "FULL COLLAPSE"; HE CLAIMED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD NOT "ENSURED A BUSINESS-LIKE BASIS" FOR HIS PROGRAM. THE OCTOBER 15 SPEAKER HAD TALKED ABOUT THE "HONEYMOON" BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL COMING TO AN END, WITH BEGIN BEING VERY SICK.

-- SPEAKER EQUATED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS U.S. "MANEUVERING" WITH A "WEAKENING OF U.S. DIPLOMACY" ON MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES. AS EXAMPLES, HE CITED THE MILD REBUKE TO ISRAEL IN THE CANADIAN/US/COSTA RICAN RESOLUTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH SAID THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WERE "NOT NECESSARY"; HOW U.S. HAD RESPONDED TO EGYPTIAN PRESSURE BY INCREASING ITS OFFER OF PLANES; AND HOW U.S. HAD BELATEDLY OFFERED TANKS TO JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN WITHOUT REQUIRING HIM TO CHANGE HIS POSITION ON THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. 8 SPEAKER DESCRIBED WITH SATISFACTION HOW HUSSEIN REJECTED THE U.S. OFFER, AND WARNED THAT HE WOULD TURN TO THE USSR, IF NECESSARY. SAYING THAT SITUATION WAS "NOT SO SIMPLE", HOWEVER, SPEAKER IMPLIED DOUBT THAT JORDAN WOULD MAKE GOOD ITS THREAT.

-- ASKED ABOUT PRESIDENT CARTER'S CALL TO THE P.L.O. TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST, SPEAKER ON OCTOBER 15 INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT P.L.O. WAS PREPARING SOME SORT OF PLAN WHICH WOULD HAVE THIS EFFECT. HE SAID THAT THE USSR HAMADE CLEAR TO ARAFAT ITS BELIEF THAT ALL THE STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING ISRAEL, HAD RIGHT TO EXIST. DISCUSSING THE PALESTINIANS, LECTURER NOTED THEY WERE AMONG THE MOST ADVANCED PEOPLE AMONG THE ARABS AND HAD DEVELOPED THEIR OWN "NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE" -- IMPLYING THEY WERE NOT FIRMLY ALIGNED WITH THE USSR ON MARXIST IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS.

3. OCTOBER 28 LECTURER DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO WEAKNESSES OF "SO-CALLED MODERATE" ARAB STATES, WHICH HE SAID WERE CAUSING SAUDI ARABIA, IN PARTICULAR, CAUSE FOR CONCERN.

-- IN THE SUDAN, 25,000 EGYPTIAN TROOPS ARE SAID TO BE PROTECTING PRESIDENT NUMAYRI FOR THIRD YEAR IN A ROW, AND KEY POSTS ARE OCCUPIED BY EGYPTIANS; EVEN SO THERE WAS AN UPRISING WHICH WAS "DROWNED IN BLOOD" BY AN EGYPTIAN ARMY CORPS SENT IN FOR THAT PURPOSE. HOWEVER, THE "NEGRO MAJORITY" IN SOUTHERN SUDAN HAS ISSUED A

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RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0005
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0003
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0044
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0022
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0018
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0011
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5576
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0002
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0037
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"SERIOUS THREAT" OF RENEWED CIVIL WAR IF THE SUDAN DOES NOT DISASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM THE CAMP DAVID POLICY.

-- IN EGYPT, LECTURER NOTED THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS HAD TO CONDUCT HIS THIRD PURGE OF THE ARMED FORCES FIRING 40 OFFICERS.

-- AND HE PREDICTED THAT U.S. SUPPORT OF MOROCCO'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE POLISARIO CAN END WITH "SAD RESULT (PECHALNIYE RESULTATY), SINCE MOROCCO IS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION SUPPORTING AN UNPOPULAR POLICY. EGYPT HAS OFFERED TO SEND TROOPS TO MOROCCO TO FREE MOROCCAN FORCES TO FIGHT AGAINST THE POLISARIO. SAUDI ARABIA HAS ALSO PROMISED SUPPORT TO EGYPT IN ITS EFFORT TO BOLSTER KING HASSAN, EVEN THOUGH THIS AID WILL VIOLATE THE ARAB SUMMIT AGREEMENT CONCLUDED AT BAGHDAD. SAUDI ARABIA WILL ALSO PAY FOR U.S. ARMS TO MOROCCO. THE SPEAKER WONDERED HOW THE U.S. WAS GOING TO JUSTIFY IT AID TO MOROCCO IN THE FACE OF UN AND OAU SUPPORT FOR REFERENDUM ON THE DISPUTED WESTERN SAHARA. AND HE CLAIMED THAT WHEN THE POLISARIO ATTACKED INTO MOROCCO THE MOROCCAN PEOPLE SUPPORTED THE POLISARIO RATHER THAN THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT. ALGERIAN AID TO THE POLISARIO WAS DESCRIBED AS FULLY JUSTIFIED.

4. DESPITE THEIR EFFORTS TO PLAY UP SOVIET SUCCESSES AND U.S. SETBACKS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SPEAKERS WERE UNABLE TO HIDE THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT OR AT LEAST PUZZLEMENT ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. LECTURER ON OCTOBER 15 WAS SURPRISINGLY FRANK, AND REALISTIC, IN HIS RESPONSE TO A QUESTIONER WHO WANTED TO KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PLAN FOR A SYRIA-IRAQ UNION. LECTURER REPLIED THAT ARABS OFTEN TALK ABOUT UNION BUT NOTHING WILL HAPPEN. MOREOVER, SYRIANS KNOW IT WOULD BE EASY TO GET IRAQI TROOPS TO COME IN TO ASSIST THEM AGAINST ISRAEL, BUT ARE NOT SO SURE HOW THEY COULD GET THEM OUT.

5. OCTOBER 28 LECTURER WAS CAREFUL NOT TO MAKE ANY PREDICTIONS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN DESPITE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE APPARENTLY ASKING WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO FORMER PRESIDENT TARAKI. HE SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY THE CHANGEOVER HAD NOT BEEN BLOODLESS, AND THAT HE DID NOT KNOW "AT LEAST AT HIS LEVEL" WHAT HAPPENED. AT ONE POINT OF HIS LECTURE, EXPRESSING HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE LACK OF CONSISTENCY IN SAUDI ARABIA'S ANTI-CAMP DAVID POLICY, HE CRITICIZED THE SAUDIS FOR ALLEGEDLY SPEAKING OUT IN SUPPORT OF EGYPTIAN "VOLUNTEERS" SENT TO AFGHANISTAN.

6. THE LECTURER ON OCTOBER 15 WAS AT LEAST MORE TALKATIVE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. HE ACCUSED IRAN AND PAKISTAN OF TRYING TO HOLD BACK THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION SO THAT IT WOULD NOT BECOME AN EXAMPLE FOR THEIR OWN COUNTRIES. LECTURER TALKED ABOUT DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF WHY AMIN HAD REPLACED TARAKI, INCLUDING HOPES EXPRESSED IN THE WEST THAT AMIN MIGHT BE DIFFERENT SINCE HE WAS EDUCATED IN THE U.S. HE INDICATED THAT "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" FORCES HAD BECOME VERY STRONG, THAT THERE WAS EXTERNAL INTERVENTION, CLASS WARFARE AND MANY DIFFICULTIES FACING THE AMIN REGIME. HE ACKNOWLEDGED TARAKI MAY HAVE MOVED TOO FAST AND ALIENATED THE ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP, IMPORTANT IN A COUNTRY WHERE 90 PER CENT ARE BELIEVERS. ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN AFGHANISTAN, SPEAKER WAS BLUNT, SAYING LEADERSHIP IS COMMUNIST AND HE RECENTLY MET WITH A DELEGATION OF YOUNG AFGHAN COMMUNISTS. SUMMING UP, HE SAID: "WHAT HAS HAPPENED? STRONGER PEOPLE ARE IN COMMAND, THAT'S ALL!"

7. THE MOST NOTEWORTHY CHANGE IN REPORTING ON THE MIDDLE EAST BY LENINGRAD LECTURERS CONCERNS IRAN, WHERE SOVIET DISAPPOINTMENT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY APPARENT. IN THE AREA OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS, TO BE SURE, SPEAKERS PRETEND THAT THEY ARE "SATISFACTORY" -- TO USE EXPRESSION OF OCTOBER 15 LECTURER. SPEAKER ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT

IRAN HAD NOT RENEWED DELIVERIES OF THE 20 PER CENT OF ITS GAS WHICH IS SUPPOSED BY CONTRACT TO GO TO THE USSR; AND HE NOTED THAT THE ARMENIAN S.S.R. HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY HARD HIT BY THIS CESSATION IN GAS DELIVERIES.
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RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0006
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0004
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0045
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASC[illegible] 0023
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL [illegible]
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTO[illegible] 0012
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5577
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0003
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0038
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0049
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HARD HIT BY THIS CESSATION IN GAS DELIVERIES.

8. SPEAKER'S OTHER COMMENTS ABOUT IRAN SUGGESTED RELATIONS WERE LESS THAN "SATISFACTORY". ACCORDING TO OCTOBER 15 SPEAKER, THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION WAS ANTI-COMMUNIST AS WELL AS BEING ANTI-IMPERIALIST. SPEAKER NOTED THE CALL OF THE TUDEH PARTY TO CARRY THE REVOLUTION THROUGH TO A "VICTORIOUS END". HE SPOKE OF THE SENSED NEED FOR A SECOND REVOLUTION CONCERNED WITH THE GOALS OF FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY (NOTING THERE ARE FOUR MILLION UNEMPLOYED INCLUDING MANY INTELLECTUALS); AND WHILE KHOMEINI HAS ENORMOUS POWER, RESPECT FOR HIM IS ERODING AND THE ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP WHICH VIRTUALLY RUNS THE COUNTRY CANNOT GO ON IN ITS PRESENT WAY. REPLYING TO QUESTIONER, LECTURER SAID THAT 1921 TREATY WAS IN FORCE BUT RIGHT OF INTERVENTION APPLIED ONLY IF ANOTHER COUNTRY INTERVENED WITH TROOPS (AN INTERPRETATION AUDIBLY QUESTIONED BY MEMBER OF AUDIENCE SEATED IN FRONT OF CONGENOFF).

9. OCTOBER 28 LECTURER WAS EVEN MORE DISAPPOINTED OVER PRESENT EVENTS IN IRAN WHERE HE CLAIMED THE SITUATION HAS ENTERED A "VICIOUS CIRCLE" IN WHICH "REACTION" IS STRENGTHENING ITS HOLD ON THE COUNTRY. WHEREAS THE ISLAMIC CLERGY CAME TO POWER WITH THE HELP OF THE "MOST PROGRESSIVE LAYER" OF THE POPULATION, PEOPLE ARE NOW DISILLUSIONED

AND ONLY EIGHT PER CENT VOTED FOR THE NEW CONSTITUTION. LECTURER ACCUSED PRESENT LEADERSHIP OF ALL MANNER OF ILL-DOING: BETRAYING THE PALESTINIANS IN IRAN; PROVIDING OIL SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF AN ENGLISH FIRM; OF BEING INDIFFERENT TO THE SHAH'S PRESENCE IN THE U.S. BECAUSE LEADERSHIP CONTAINS MANY PEOPLE WHO ARE "PRO-AMERICAN" AS WELL AS AGENTS OF SHAH'S SECURITY POLICE, SAVAK.

10. ASKED TO EXPLAIN THE KURDISH PROBLEM, OCTOBER 28 SPEAKER SAID THAT THE KURDS HAD SOUGHT NATIONAL AUTONOMY IN A DEMOCRATIC IRAN, BUT A "TURNING POINT" WAS THE IRANIAN REGIME'S ATTACKS AGAINST THE LEFT, INCLUDING THE TUDEH PARTY; THE KURDS BEGAN TO QUESTION WHETHER THERE COULD BE ANY AUTONOMY IN "SUCH A FANATIC RELIGIOUS STATE." THUS FAR, THE KURDS HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES TO BE VERY ENDURING (STOIKI). THE OCTOBER 15 LECTURER, INCIDENTALLY, CRITICIZED KHOMEINI FOR TRYING TO BLAME THE KURDISH REVOLT ON THE USSR BECAUSE THE KURDS HAD SOME SOVIET WEAPONS, OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THEY HAD ACQUIRED WEAPONS FROM ALL OVER.

11. IN A NEW DEPARTURE, THE OCTOBER 28 LECTURER BEGAN TO PAINT A PICTURE OF AN AGGRESSIVE, EXPANSIONIST IRAN. HE CLAIMED THAT "RELIGION ALWAYS WAS AN AGGRESSIVE FORCE." NOT ONLY IS IRAN INTERFERING IN AFGHANISTAN BUT SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAQ ARE ALSO BOTH DISTURBED OVER IRANIAN CLAIMS TO BAHREIN ISLAND.

12. IN CONCLUSION, LECTURER CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. IS WATCHING AND EXPLOITING THESE VARIOUS DIVISIVE FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THAT THE SITUATION HAS REACHED A DANGEROUS "VERY SHARP" (OSTRIY) POINT IN HISTORY. LECTURER CONCLUDED, HOPEFULLY, THAT IT IS THE LOGIC OF HISTORY THAT THE ARAB STATES SHOULD TURN INCREASINGLY TO THE USSR FOR HELP. AND, WITH REFERENCE TO IRAN, HE PREDICTED THAT "EVIDENTLY AN EXPLOSION LIES AHEAD" (OCHEVIDNO VSRYV VPEREDI). BUCHANAN
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